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Abstract: This dissertation focuses on right-wing terrorism (RWT) in the United States
perpetrated by adherents to the White Supremacist Movement (WSM). In depth case
history data were collected using a variety of sources and analyzed on 66 federally
indicted WSM terrorists representing 10 different terrorist organizations in the United
States from 1980-2002. The primary means of analysis was a qualitative case analysis
using narrative data to uncover what influences an individual to become involved in a
terrorist group. Specifically, I analyzed the influences of: 1) structural components, 2)
family dynamics, and 3) non-familial relationships on the involvement process. Results
from this study can provide valuable theoretical and practical implications to
understanding terrorists and terrorist groups.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, terrorism has become one of the most consistently discussed
“social problems” within academic, political, legal, and public arenas (LaFree & Dugan,
2004; Rosenfeld, 2004). Despite a large amount of research, there is relatively little
conclusive knowledge and a number of questions remain unanswered. The following
study uses a mixed methodological approach to analyze 66 US right-wing extremists
indicted for terrorist-related charges. In general, I seek to answer how individuals
become involved in right-wing terror (RWT) groups. More specifically, I focus on three
interrelated questions: (1) What are the “structural components” of the involvement
process (e.g., place of involvement, type of involvement, length of process, etc.)?; (2)
What is the influence of family dynamics on the involvement process?; and (3) What is
the significance of one’s non-familial relationships to the involvement process (this will
include an examination of the relationship between right-wing extremist [RWE] groups
and RWT groups)?
There is little consensus on precisely how to define terrorism, who qualifies as a
terrorist, and how or why people engage in such behavior. One of the most important
questions that remain unanswered is how to effectively counter terrorism. Since 9/11,
there have been unintended and potentially severe consequences from the recent surge of
terrorism research. In fact, since 2001, the term “terrorism” has become largely
associated with the Middle East and Islamic religion (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000;
Ferber, 1999; 2003, p. 64). This has clear implications in terms of perpetuating
dangerous stereotypes in an increasingly polarized world. The damage does not end with
stereotypes however. The remarkably disproportionate amount of attention, funds, and
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research to one type of terrorism allows for other violent and marginalized groups to
mobilize undetected (Vohryzek-Bolden, 2003).
The following study focuses on right-wing terrorism (RWT) in the United States,
much of which is related to the white supremacist movement (WSM)1. While most
extremists are not terrorists, all terrorists are inherently extremists (Bjorgo 1995). One
cannot discuss a particular type of terrorism2 without providing an overview of the
historical context and current state of the broader extremist or social movement (SM) to
which it belongs. Further, a terrorist’s or terrorist organization’s connection to the
broader SM may be real or perceived. In other words, the broader SM need not be aware
of nor endorse the existence of a person or organization acting on behalf of the SM.
The extreme right-wing refers to a variety of groups that adopt and promote one,
or any combination of the following beliefs: anti-government, anti-Semitic, antihomosexual, anti-abortion, anti-immigration, and racist (Kaplan & Bjorgo, 1998; Smith,
1994; Vohryzek-Bolden, 2003). One of the most pervasive beliefs among the extreme
right-wing is the inherent sense of racial superiority which serves as a motivating force in
their effort to gain power (Vohryzek-Bolden, 2003). The extreme right-wing can thus be
further delineated into other categories including, but not limited to, black supremacists,

1

There has been a great deal of debate among scholars who study the WSM regarding the appropriate term
to use when referring to its adherents. Researchers have traditionally used ‘white-power’ or ‘supremacists’
to denote these individuals, however, some experts have pointed out that the term white ‘separatist’ may
best categorize the contemporary movement arguing that it accounts for varying degrees of supremacy
ideology and it is a more analytical movement term for the purposes of objective social science research
(Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000, pp. 9-11). Contrary to such arguments, ‘supremacist’ will be used here
because the term separatist is inextricably linked to holding supremacist ideological beliefs (Ferber, 1999).
2
Though there are various typological rubrics, the most commonly utilized have been religious
fundamentalist terrorism, religious new age/apocalyptic terrorism, nationalistic-separatist terrorism, leftwing, single-issue, and right-wing terrorism. For further discussion on typologies and explanations of the
above typologies see Crenshaw (1992), McCauley (2002), Piven (2002), and Post (2004).
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Jewish extremists, some single-issue groups such as anti-abortionists, patriot and nonsanctioned militia organizations, and white supremacists.

Justifications for the Study of RWT
One of the reasons to focus on right-wing terrorism is simply because relative to
other types of terrorism, RWT is one of the more understudied areas. Due to my study’s
exploratory and inductive approach, the results will inform existing theoretical
frameworks that lack empirical testing. The very nature of terrorism has made it a
remarkably difficult field to collect empirical data on. Most terrorism scholars agree that
as a field it is still in its “infancy” (Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004, p. 51; Cooper, 2001;
Crenshaw, 2000; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 1999; Victoroff, 2005) and in fact, many of
the conclusions drawn in the field are highly impressionistic (Laqueur, 1999). To the
extent that terrorism research neglects RWT, it is unclear whether findings from other
types of terrorists are applicable to RWT. This lack of attention to RWT has significantly
hindered theoretical development. The need for this type of research becomes even more
clear when considering mounting evidence from the Southern Poverty Law Center and
other organizations suggesting that RWE and RWT groups have been growing and
consistently involved in planning terror attacks over the past decade. In fact, from 1995
to 2005, more than 60 terrorist plots from the extreme right, including bombings, arsons,
and assassinations, were uncovered (Blejwas, Griggs, & Potok, 2005). Despite popular
belief regarding where the next terrorist attack will come from and who will be
responsible, it is clear that the right-wing has posed and does pose a significant threat to
the United States.
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The WSM is the oldest type of RWE and has the longest tradition of perpetrating
domestic terrorism in the nation’s history (Blee, 1991; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000;
Gardell, 2003; White, 2006). Contemporary developments regarding changing patterns
in recruitment and funding, as well as the state of the economy also provide justification
for research as the following are potential catalysts for increases in RWT (Smith, 1994).
During the 1980’s and 1990’s, Christian Identity based white supremacist groups began
increasingly targeting prison ministries and skinhead gangs all over the country to gain
membership (Smith, 1994). Christian Identity is a religion based on the superiority of the
white race (discussed in detail later) and has served as a religions justification for
terroristic violence among these organizations for several decades (Vohryzek-Bolden,
2003). The fact that these organizations are infiltrating prisons under the guise of
religion, and also recruiting marginalized youth is reason for concern as this is increasing
the number of violent prone individuals entering these organizations (Smith, 1994). The
WSM has been gaining considerable membership over the past couple of years however,
and it appears the most influential dynamic producing this latest upsurge is the current
controversy surrounding illegal immigration (ADL, 2007c; Avila, Tribolet, &
Francescani, 2007; DHS, April, 2009; SPLC, 2007b; Vohryzek-Bolden, 2003). Some
white supremacist groups are using the immigration issue as a platform in order to
expand their base of support3.
Regarding funding, RWT organizations are beginning to cross the line into
organized crime, specifically drug dealing (Smith, 1994). This strategy is unprecedented
among the ‘white right’ because engaging in drug use or the drug trade has previously
been condemned by their ideological beliefs (Smith, 1994). Involvement with drugs has
3

See Appendix A, Figure 1.
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traditionally been perceived by the WSM as a problem in minority communities and used
as evidence of non-white inferiority (Smith, 1994). Additionally, a recent and
unanticipated alliance has formed between individuals within the WSM and Islamic
terrorists in the Middle East (Kemp, 2007). Law enforcement intelligence suggests that a
loose coupling has formed between the two divergent extremist groups because of their
shared hatred for the United States government (Kemp, 2007). Though precise amounts
are unknown, it has been estimated that groups within the WSM have supplied Middle
Eastern Islamic terrorists with hundreds of thousands, upwards to possibly millions of
dollars (Kemp, 2007; Simi, Smith, & Reeser, 2007). In terms of the economy, its current
instability may stimulate membership because this provides a further source of frustration
and anger towards minority populations and the government, thus a justification for
action, regardless of how misplaced the blame (Blazak, 2001; Smith, 1994). The WSM
has historically placed blame on policies that promote demographic representation in
schools/workforce (e.g., Affirmative Action) for their own rates of unemployment or
earning low wages (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000).
Finally, the recent and historic election of Barack Obama in 2008, the nation’s
first African-American president, has intensified the perception among white
supremacists that America is controlled by “alien” interests. The election of a black
president, new restrictions on firearms laws, and the continued downturn of the U.S.
economy are all issues utilized by these groups to gain membership (Simi 2008; DHS,
2009). Many argue it is only a matter of time before these groups not only grow in
numbers, but in terroristic action (DHS, 2009). The report especially warns about RW
lone wolf terrorists and small terrorist cells as being the greatest threat because they are
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the most difficult individuals to locate and monitor (DHS, 2009). In summary, failing to
study RWT has severe consequences both in terms of minimizing theoretical
development and undercutting counterterrorism strategies.
Generally speaking, it is clear that there are important reasons to analyze RWT. It
is also noteworthy to briefly point out that studying RWT should be of specific interest to
criminologists for several reasons. First, while terrorism has yet to be conclusively
defined4, at the very least, one necessary element is that terroristic behaviors are by
definition criminal (Hamm, 2005; LaFree & Dugan, 2004). Secondly, there is evidence
indicating that terrorists often exhibit prior criminality unrelated to their future acts of
terrorism (Hamm, 2002, 2004). Finally, some criminologists that have contributed to
terrorism scholarship have been sharply critical of their colleagues and argue that
criminologists have a responsibility to be at the forefront of terrorism scholarship
(Hamm, 2005; LaFree & Dugan, 2004; Rosenfeld, 2004).

Historical Overview of the WSM
To analyze RWT in the United States, the history of RWE movements must first
be addressed. While not all scholars are in agreement on how to categorize the WSM in
the United States5, the most widely employed scheme will be used to discuss its
emergence and development. The WSM can be discussed as having four branches,
including the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), Christian Identity religion, neo-Nazis, and racist
skinheads (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). It should be mentioned that these four
4

For further discussion regarding the intricate and controversial process of defining terrorism as well as
variations and elements of definitions of terrorism see Crenshaw (1992), Hoffman (2006), Laqueur (1999),
and the most comprehensive, Schmid & Jongman (1988).
5
See Berlet’s and Vysotsky’s (2006) arguments for an alternative approach based on ideological beliefs
and the display of their ideology within the movement.
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branches, however, are not mutually exclusive from one another, and, in fact, have
overlapping memberships and beliefs. Likewise, while all are part and parcel to the
WSM, there is certainly dissent from one another within a branch and across branches.
Nonetheless, the movement shares the most fundamental aspects of white supremacist
ideology and thus will be discussed accordingly (Simi & Futrell, 2010).
One of the oldest formal organizations dedicated to white supremacy in the
United States is the KKK (Gardell, 2003). The KKK has a very complicated history that
has ebbed and flowed, having at least three phases of activity6 (Blee, 1991, 2002; Dobratz
& Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999; Gardell, 2003). In response to Reconstruction after
the Civil War, defeated Confederate soldiers founded the Klan in 1865 (Dobratz &
Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999; Trelease, 1971). Though originally created for the
more benign purposes of amusement and camaraderie among veterans, the Klan would
quickly morph into a violent terrorist organization with localized chapters (known as
“dens”) spreading throughout the Southern states (Blee, 1991; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile,
2000; Ferber, 1999; Trelease, 1971). By 1867, the first national convention had
representatives from every Klan den and a very intricate hierarchy was formed and led by
a single Grand Wizard, General Nathan Bedford Forrest (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile,
2000). The organization’s goal was plainly laid out, Klansmen were charged with
maintaining white power and supremacy in the South by any means necessary including
brutal violence (Blee, 1991; Trelease, 1971).

6

Gardell (2003) discusses the Klan as having 5 distinct eras, the first three being the same as will be
discussed here, the last two stages he discusses are most often referenced as nuanced extensions of the third
era by most other scholars.
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Though reports of official Klan violence in this initial era are not precisely
known7, it is certainly the case that the KKK was responsible for a great deal of violent
victimizations including murders, rapes, whippings, cases of torture, and countless
lynchings (Blee, 1991; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999; Trelease, 1971).
Violence by Klansmen became so widespread that even Southern whites not involved in
the Klan became quite fearful (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). The Klan’s first era had
a very short lifespan that quickly transformed in purpose and rapidly grew with a peak
membership of over a half million members by the late 1860’s (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile,
2000). However, the Klan ‘officially’ collapsed after a 5 year reign of terror in the South
(Trelease, 1971). Multiple reasons have been offered as to why the organization became
defunct so quickly. While some maintain that the Klan was ended due to either white
upper-class fear or that the Southern states were steadily regaining control from forced
Reconstruction and economic deprivation, the more likely reason was that Forrest feared
for his own reputation and safety from criminal prosecution by the government (Dobratz
& Shanks-Meile, 2000). It is worth noting that though the Klan’s first appearance was
‘officially’ over, some disaffected members continued to be active in intimidation tactics
and actual violence well into the 1870’s (though nowhere near a half million members)
(Trelease, 1971).
Nearly half a century later, the second era of the KKK began in 1915 (Dobratz &
Shanks-Meile, 2000). This second era would be the least violent as well as the “heyday

7

Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (2000) have pointed out that a portion of crimes attributed to the Klan based
on an offender’s regalia for example may have been an individual posing as a Klansman to shift blame,
arouse doubts about Klan activities, etc. Further, Trelease (1971) finds that some of the victimizations
against African-Americans at this time were actually committed by community vigilantes and not the Klan
(e.g., case of an arrested African-American murderer being killed by a member of the community while in
custody) (p. 289).
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of the Klan,” with membership ranging from two million to as high as eight million
(Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999). Heightened membership was likely due
to a shift in reputation since the first Klan era (Blee, 1991; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile,
2000; Ferber, 1999). Part of this modified status was due to the second era founder
William Simmons, a recently “defrocked” Methodist preacher accused of “moral
impairment” (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000, p. 38). Simmons used the immense
popularity of D. W. Griffith’s infamous film The Birth of a Nation8 (1915) to attract
sympathetic moviegoers to his group by strategically placing group meeting
announcements near film advertisements (2000). In addition, the country enacted far
stricter immigration laws and open anti-Semitism, anti-Catholic, and anti-immigrant
sentiments were common at that time (Blee, 1991; Ferber, 1999). As the Klan enjoyed a
more positive reputation and white America became more intolerant of difference,
membership not only grew in size but also expanded upwards in the status of its
members. For example, public figures holding Klan membership included one United
States Supreme Court (USSC) Chief Justice, one USSC Justice, and one President (two
others were suspected members including President Truman) (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile,
2000). The KKK’s second wave made more of an effort to enter into political circles,
and some candidates that were publicly endorsed by the Klan were elected into office
(Trelease, 1971). It is also in this era that the Klan broadened their frame of prejudices
beyond blacks to include Jews, Catholics, and many other ethnicities and religions (Blee,

8

Griffith’s silent film is famous for both its effect on the Klan as well as its place in cinematographic
history (establishing ‘feature’ length films, quality and shots, etc.). Stating that the film depicts the KKK in
a positive light is a gross understatement. The Klan is depicted as being the heroic saviors of the South and
sole protectors of its culture and white womanhood. The North and South had polar opposite reactions to
the film, as Southerners celebrated the film, Northerners rioted in vehement opposition (Blee, 1991;
Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000).
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1991). Further, while people often associate the Klan with the Civil War or Civil Rights,
it is in this era that widely known Klan traditions were established, including the
notorious tradition of cross burnings (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). While the Klan of
the 1920’s lasted nearly two decades longer than their predecessors, they too disbanded
rather suddenly (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Unlike their predecessors that
collapsed due to external pressure, this Klan seemed to be fraught with internal
dissension and corruption leading to criminal indictments (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile,
2000). By the 1930’s, several Klan leaders were prosecuted for crimes of corruption and
violence, and politically powerful members quickly distanced themselves from
association as it became recognized that this ‘new’ Klan had the same ideals as the first:
the maintenance of white supremacy through brutal violence (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile,
2000).
The final wave of the KKK was well under way by 1958 (Dobratz & ShanksMeile, 2000). Instigated by the civil rights movement and most notably the decision to
desegregate schools in the landmark Supreme Court case of Brown v. Board of Education
(1954) the new KKK resembled the original organization. Though this era had the least
amount of members reaching a maximum of approximately seventy thousand, the level of
violence endorsed and perpetrated by the organization was extremely high (Dobratz &
Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999). One possible reason for the smaller size yet
widespread incidents of violence is that during this third era the Klan was extremely
decentralized with dens competing for membership nationwide (Ferber, 1999). By the
late 1960’s the organization was beginning to decline in membership and activity due to
leadership corruption and criminal activities (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber,
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1999). In addition, the Klan became a major target of Congressional and FBI
investigations where it has been estimated that by this time the Bureau had over two
thousand informants planted in the hierarchy of the organization (Dobratz & ShanksMeile, 2000). The organization again began to fall.
While the Klan from this point to the present has never fully disappeared, it has
never reemerged and become as large as in past eras. By the mid- to late-1970’s the Klan
was taken over by David Duke and membership was extended to Catholics and more
heavily advertised to women (as women had already formed chapters of their own in the
Klan of the 1920’s) (Blee, 1991; Gardell, 2003). Often referred to as the “television era”
of the Klan, Duke attempted to move the organization towards a more polished and
professional reputation, or what Gardell (2003) has referred to as a failed attempt at
presenting the Klan as a “nonviolent, ‘white civil rights’” organization (Dobratz &
Shanks-Meile, 2000; Gardell, 2003, p. 81). As Duke’s ambitions for political office grew
he decided to step down as leader of the KKK, and some members welcomed this
transition (Gardell, 2003). Around this time the other branches and dens of the Klan
were led in different directions. Rather than follow Duke’s mainstreaming, prominent
Klan members like Bill Wilkinson, Louis Beam, and Glenn Miller preferred to restore the
“good old days” of Klan violence (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Gardell, 2003, p. 51).
And indeed, this effort culminated at an anti-Klan march in North Carolina where
Klansmen and neo-Nazis perpetrated a mass shooting that killed five and injured several
others (Gardell, 2003).
While leaders like Wilkinson restored the Klan’s violent history, Robert Miles, a
well-known white supremacist, restored the Klan’s element of secrecy (Dobratz &
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Shanks-Meile, 2000; Gardell, 2003). In an attempt to bring back the terroristic nature of
the Klan that Duke tried to shed, Miles argued that “secrecy breeds fear…respect begins
with fear” (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000, pp. 178-179; Gardell, 2003). The other goal
of secrecy was to avoid the mass infiltration by the federal government that the Klan
experienced in the late 1950’s and 1960’s, which led Miles to encourage the
establishment of disconnected and independent Klan dens nationwide (Dobratz &
Shanks-Meile, 2000; Gardell, 2003). Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s the Klan
continued to decentralize into numerous factions (Gardell, 2003). As Klandom became
more fragmented, internal dissension between dens increased over who belonged to the
“true bloodline” of the Reconstruction Era Klan (Gardell, 2003). Creating more
problems for the Klan, Morris Dees and the Southern Poverty Law Center began their
monitoring program of the Klan by the 1980’s (i.e., Klanwatch), which included more
than just detection of dens and counts of members (Gardell, 2003). A series of successful
civil lawsuits ensued awarding victims of Klan violence monetary settlements that
bankrupted factions of the Klan (Gardell, 2003). The Klan had continued to lose
membership and by the 1990’s had split into two major factions led by Thomas Robb and
James Farrands, probably totaling around eight thousand members (Dobratz & ShanksMeile, 2000; Gardell, 2003).
The most recent Klan developments include increased activity within
longstanding groups as well as the emergence of new groups in areas that have not
traditionally been linked to such activity (ADL, 2007b). Some of the highest levels of
activity coming from established chapters are in Tennessee (Brotherhood of Klans),
Indiana (Church of the National Knights of the KKK), and Mississippi where the White
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Knights of the KKK have been holding highly visible recruitment events (ADL, 2007b).
The emergence of chapters in areas of the country not typically known for Klan activity
has mostly taken place in Mid-Atlantic states such as New York, Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, Maryland, and West Virginia (ADL, 2007b). Traditional Klan regions are also
experiencing growth in new chapters, especially in Florida and Texas (ADL, 2007b). Not
only is the increase in new chapters of interest, but it is also the immediate growth of
membership that is causing watchdog groups and law enforcement agencies a great deal
of concern (ADL, 2007b). For example, the Empire Knights of the KKK was founded in
2005 and has already claimed the establishment of chapters in 18 states in less than three
years (ADL, 2007b).
The second branch of the WSM in the United States is the Christian Identity
religion (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Christian Identity has been influential and
pervasive within the WSM and some scholars refer to it as “white supremacist
orthodoxy” (Barkun, 1997, p. 3). While the first official Christian Identity church in the
United States was not established until 1946, the Identity religion dates back to the mid1800’s in Great Britain, known as British Israelism (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000).
Briefly stated, this religion promotes the notion that the white race is “…the direct
descendants of Ancient Israel, and therefore God’s chosen people” (Perry, 1998, p. 301).
Christian Identity religion is essentially an adaptation of British Israelism (Dobratz and
Shanks-Meile, 2000). Charles Totten, Howard Rand, and William Cameron, all
representatives of British Israelism in the United States are most often credited with the
transformation of the religion into the anti-Semitic and racist theology of Christian
Identity (Barkun, 1997). As people became drawn in and involved in meetings for
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British Israelism through the leaderships of Totten, Rand, and Cameron, many antiSemitic publications and viewpoints were being circulated during the 1920’s and 1930’s
regarding the Jewish conspiracy to dominate the world9 (1997). By the 1940’s and
1950’s Wesley Swift, a former Klansman, became the most influential Identity adherent
in the WSM (Ferber, 1999). The religion slowly transitioned to accepting and preaching
anti-Semitic viewpoints as doctrine where Jews were recognized as being directly linked
to the devil (Barkun, 1997; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). The three core beliefs that
characterize Christian Identity are: 1) pure Aryans are the true descendants of the tribes
of Israel, thus God’s chosen people; 2) the Jews are the direct descendants of Satan and
can be traced to Eve’s sexual relationship with the serpent in the Garden of Eden; and 3)
the world is on the brink of the apocalypse where whites are charged with saving the
world from Jewish hegemony (Barkun, 1997). As various churches began to emerge
‘preaching’ such beliefs, Christian Identity religion gained a place in the WSM as biblical
justification for violence (1997). In fact, it is probably no coincidence that two of the
most dangerous WSM terrorist groups in contemporary history (the Order and the
Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord discussed later) were comprised of a
majority of Identity fundamentalists. Like the Klan however, Christian Identity has
become significantly splintered over the decades (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Even
though there is a great deal of diversity within the movement when it comes to religion,
Christian Identity is the pinnacle of WS theology. Currently, specific estimates of actual
churches that purport to be Christian Identity (or some derivation) are unknown.
Christian Identity adherents number between 2,000 and 50,000 in the US (Barkun, 1997).

9

The most famous of these publications, The Dearborn Independent, had strong ties to Henry Ford who
was well-known for his anti-Semitic beliefs (Barkun, 1994).
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The third branch within the WSM is broadly known as neo-Nazis (also may be
referred to as National Socialists) (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). One of the first
official neo-Nazi organizations to emerge was in 1958, founded by George Rockwell
(2000). Influenced by a constellation of factors including the influx of immigrants, the
emergence of civil rights, and especially the anti-German–American sentiment in the
United States during and after World War II, Rockwell established the National Socialist
White People’s Party (2000, p. 57). Interestingly, like cross-burnings are associated with
the KKK, the often heard phrase “white-power” came from Rockwell in his writings and
speeches throughout the 1950’s (2000, p. 58). Less than a decade later however,
Rockwell was assassinated by a fellow member of his organization (2000). For years
after this incident, there would be several changes in leadership and splintering of
members leading to the formation of many groups under the neo-Nazi umbrella (2000).
Regardless of minor discord for various reasons, these groups do share core
values and goals while going through periods of splintering and merging (2000). NeoNazi organizations are often modeled after Hitler and his Nazi military (2000). While the
Klan is heavily influenced by its own history, and Christian Identity by “creative”
interpretations of the Bible (Perry, 1998), neo-Nazi’s often use Hitler’s Mein Kampf as a
foundational source (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). This branch also has a history of
being the most active in terms of demonstrations, leafleting, propaganda/comics, and
books10 (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). The Southern Poverty Law Center (2007)
currently estimates that there are nearly 200 neo-Nazi groups active in the United States

10

One of the most well-known leaders in the American neo-Nazi movement, the late William Pierce of
National Alliance, authored the infamous Turner Diaries, the fictional race war book that was Timothy
McVeigh’s “blueprint” for the Oklahoma City Bombing (Smith, 1994).
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today (SPLC, 2007a). Neo-Nazis are probably most closely linked in overlapping
membership and symbolism with the fourth branch of the WSM.
The fourth branch that is part of the WSM in the United States is most commonly
referred to as skinheads11 (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 2000). Skinheads are the least
understood branch of the WSM (2000). The likely reason for this is that skinheads are
typically younger than members of their counterpart organizations12 (Hamm, 1993).
Because of their age, skinheads’ beliefs and membership are likely more fluid than adult
members. Consequently, many skinhead members will grow out of these groups with
age, while adults in other organizations have come to solidify their attitudes, values and
identities in their respective WS organizations (Hamm, 1993). This characteristic has
made it quite difficult for researchers to get an accurate categorization of groups and
members (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Certainly, however, their historical
emergence is well known.
Skinheads originally emerged in Great Britain in the 1960’s and were essentially
classified as a deviant youth subculture, characterized by their punk rock music and
haircuts (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). These were loosely based groups of young
people that came from working-class families that were quite prejudiced towards
immigrants (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Skinhead style crossed the ocean and
started to appear in the United States, mostly in the punk rock scene, in the 1970’s (Simi,
2006). The punk scene eventually splintered as some punks became increasingly

11

It is relevant to note that not all skinheads are racist, and in fact, non-racist skinheads (e.g., Skinheads
Against Racial Prejudice [SHARP] outnumber their racist counterparts (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000;
Ferber, 1999). Within the context of this analysis, ‘skinhead’ can always be understood as meaning a racist
skinhead.
12
Although the age factor makes sense and is a claim that is often made, it has not yet been verified by
empirical evidence.
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radicalized, or “hardcore” (Simi, 2006, p. 149). These hardcore youth marked the
beginnings of early skinhead gangs that adopted traditional skinhead style (e.g., shaved
heads, boots, etc.), territorial violence with other street gangs, and varying forms of
delinquency (Simi, 2006). Overt racism however, was not a central characteristic of early
skinhead gangs (Simi, 2006). In these formative years, skinheads were part of a larger
rebellious youth subculture and as time went on, skinheads emerged as a more distinct
youth culture (Simi, 2006). While the majority of racist skinhead gangs were not
politically active in the WSM and restricted their use of violence to defend their own
territories (Simi, 2006), some skinhead organizations became a hotbed for recruitment
into adult organizations (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Hamm, 1993). For skinheads
that did not age out of their white supremacist beliefs, they could ultimately ‘graduate’ to
more sophisticated white supremacist organizations, or at the very least, leadership roles
within their current gangs (Hamm, 1993). Tom Metzger, a well-known whitesupremacist, and Richard Butler, founder of the Aryan Nations organization, actively
recruited skinheads into their groups as did others in the WSM (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile,
2000). Many individuals in the other three branches of the WSM commonly refer to
skinheads as “…the security forces and the foot soldiers in the movement” (Dobratz &
Shanks-Meile, 2000, p. 67). Estimates differ in the number of racist skinhead
organizations in the United States, from conservative estimates of around 80 groups
(SPLC, 2007a) to higher estimates of approximately 110 organizations (ADL, 2006).
While there is a great deal of overlap between ideology and membership among
the Klan, Christian Identity believers, neo-Nazi’s, and skinheads (Berlet & Vysotsky,
2006; Gardell, 2003; Simi & Futrell, 2006), there is discord within each of the four
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categories and across categories, creating a complex web of various WSM organizations
that in actuality are based around central tenets of RWE (i.e., anti-minority, antigovernment, etc.). Gardell (2003) refers to the WSM as a “smorgasbord” of varying
ideologies (p. 67). Further, as society has become progressively more tolerant of
particular lifestyles, it seems that groups claiming to be a part of the WSM are openly
becoming more active as evidenced by Waldner, Martin, and Capeder’s (2006) analysis
of gay racist skinhead forums on the internet. As the author’s note, most would “dismiss
gay skinheads as a contradiction in terms” and historically it unequivocally would have
been (Waldner, Martin, and Capeder, 2006, p. 165). Cases such as these however
(though rare), demonstrate quite clearly that the WSM is not one unitary phenomenon,
and fundamental differences can exist within the same social movement. What the above
discussion does provide is a chronological picture of the manifestations of the core
factions of the WSM in the United States. Particular groups within these core factions
that are a part of this analysis will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3, 4, and 5
(Data and Methodology, Results and Discussion, and Conclusion respectively).
As stated above, the following mixed methodological study will analyze RWT,
most of which are connected to the WSM. The above historical discussion provided an
overview of the emergence of the WSM in the United States. The purpose of the
following analysis is to explore how individuals become involved in RWT and the
relationship between RWT and the broader SM to which it belongs (WSM). I focus on
the intricate process by which people join or are recruited into these terrorist groups. I
am examining whether individuals go from ‘0-terrorism’ so to speak, or alternatively, are
they exposed to an extremist group first and progressively become radicalized to the
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point of joining a terrorist group? It is this process and the dynamics that surround it that
I am concerned. To summarize then, I will be focusing my attention on three interrelated
issues; (1) What are the structural characteristics of the involvement process? (2) What is
the influence of family dynamics on the involvement process? (3) What is the
significance of one’s non-familial relationships on the involvement process (this will
include an examination of the relationship between right-wing extremist [RWE] groups
and RWT groups)? Finally, and while discussed in greater detail later, the above three
questions are not mutually exclusive and indeed will involve some overlapping concepts
and measures13. This should not be viewed as unusual or problematic due to the fact that
the areas under analysis are complex social processes that cannot be precisely delineated
from one another.

13

See Appendix A Figure 2 for a Path Analysis Model of Research Questions and Analytical Tools which
will be discussed in great detail later.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
There has been a great deal of research on why individuals join informal and
formal groups. This question has been applied to a broad range of organizations
including volunteer groups (Becker & Dhingra, 2001; McPherson, 1981; Rotolo, 2000),
civic and leisure groups (Hagedorn & Labovitz, 1968; Rotolo & Wilson, 2003; Serow,
1991), political interest groups (Faich & Gale, 1971; Forsythe & Welch, 1983; Knoke,
1986; McCulloch, 1990), college fraternal and sorority organizations (Kimbrough, 1995;
Mongell & Roth, 1991), farming co-ops (Cell, 1980; Rook & Carlson, 1985), labor
unions (Seidman, London, & Karsh, 1951), and church congregations (Bibby &
Brinkerhoff, 1973; Levi, 2003; D. V. A. Olson, 1989; G. L. Wilson, Keyton, Johnson,
Geiger, & Clark, 1993). Though not an exhaustive list, the aforementioned illustrates
past research regarding why individuals join conventional organizations. Following della
Porta (1995, p. 166), I will examine, “How and why do people join underground
organizations”? This question, though seldom researched, has been addressed mostly in
the social behavioral science fields of social movements, new religious movements
(NRM) (previously referred to as cults), and most recently, terrorism. What do we know
from these interrelated fields? While these disciplines have addressed a variety of issues,
the following will provide a detailed overview of previous findings as it relates to
characteristics of the involvement and/or recruitment processes.
In addition to using terrorism research (which has comparatively been the least
studied area regarding involvement processes), I am also using research from social
movements and NRM to guide my dissertation. Though the study of involvement
processes has been applied to a variety of groups/organizations (see above), these
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additional two fields are most closely related to terrorism in that the decision to join any
groups of these types requires an individual to deviate from mainstream society. Indeed,
identifying “a collectivity” of semi-organized (or fully organized) individuals promoting
change in the society to which they belong, also known as a social movement, inherently
suggests that these individuals are deviating from the current establishment because they
have a specific grievance with the current status quo (McAdam & Snow, 1997, p. xviii)14.
Likewise, NRMs deviate from its host society’s mainstream religious
organizations which are usually defined by the prevailing establishment (Melton, 2004).
As Melton (2004) points out, the status of NRMs “…are thus primarily defined not by
any characteristic(s) that they share, but by their relationship to…religious life
represented by the dominant churches” (p. 27). For example, one of the largest churches
in the United States that is commonly intertwined with some of the most well-known
schools, universities, and medical institutions, the United Methodist Church, is defined
by Greece’s government as a “destructive cult” because it deviates so far from their
dominant Orthodox faiths (Melton, 2004, p. 25). NRMs are better characterized when
considered within the field of religious studies’ church-sect-new religion spectrum
(2004). Churches are the dominant religions within a society, sects are those religious
organizations that tolerably differ (in beliefs or proceedings) from the host society’s
churches, and NRMs differ to a degree that is entirely unacceptable to the host society’s
churches and sects (2004).

14

Like most fields in the social sciences, there is not a single, agreed upon definition of social movements
(McAdam & Snow, 1997). However, what is used above is part of McAdam and Snow’s (1997) definition
formulated after having identified the most common elements found in scientific definitions of this
phenomenon.
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Finally, past scholarship in the study of terrorism will be used. Though more
seldom researched than its anti-mainstream counterparts mentioned above, there have
been some key works concerning an individual’s involvement in terrorist groups. Also
like social movements and NRMs, defining terrorism has become a “conceptual
minefield” for scholars and government officials alike15. Nonetheless, nearly all past
studies claim that terrorism involves the following: dissident violence (or threat of)
inciting emotions of fear (terror) in a country’s government/citizenry for the purposes of
forced political and/or social change advantageous to the perpetrator(s) (terrorists)
(Schmid & Jongman, 1988). Regardless of particularities in meaning, studies in all three
of these interrelated fields have yielded two recurring themes accounting for how
individuals come to be involved in subversive organizations. The vast majority of social
movement, NRM, and terrorist group participants join due to either 1) biographical
availability or 2) social networks (frequently a combination of both characterizes the
process of becoming involved)16.

Biographical Availability
Social movements, NRMs, and terrorist groups are all organizations centered on
ideological convictions. The logical answer as to the reason individuals join these types
of groups is simply an extension of the above statement: individuals join such groups
because they share in the organization’s ideological proclivities. This seems like a valid
assumption and indeed may account for some individuals who join these types of groups.

15

For a comprehensive discussion of definitions of terrorism, see Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman’s
(1988) Political Terrorism.
16
Again refer to Appendix A Figure 2 for the Path Analysis Model of Research Questions and Analytical
Tools.
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More telling, however, is the fact that it cannot possibly explain the countless number of
individuals “whose attitudes place them in the ‘latitude of acceptance’” with a particular
social movement, NRM, or terrorist group’s ideology but do not engage in any form of
participation or activism with the organization (McAdam & Paulsen, 1997, p. 148). In
fact, it has been widely accepted that psychological attributes and individual
predispositions cannot explain an individual’s decision to join these groups (McAdam &
Paulsen, 1997; Snow, Zurcher Jr., & Ekland-Olson, 1997). Personal beliefs are certainly
not irrelevant and may matter in terms of one’s likelihood for attempting to join these
groups. But in the actual commitment to an organization, personal beliefs are often
secondary to other circumstances simultaneously taking place. One of these processes is
known as biographical availability. A concept developed primarily in social movement
research, biographical availability is best defined as “the absence of personal constraints
that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation…costs and risks of
protest activity are not equal for everyone” (McAdam, 1986, p. 70). More simply stated,
an individual can only join a group if they are in fact available to do so, regardless of
ideological beliefs. Examples of personal constraints most often analyzed include an
individual’s age, education level, socio-economic status, employment status and
occupation type, marital status and family, religious affiliations, and life turning points
(e.g., divorce, job change, moving, etc.). Findings regarding each of the most common
aforementioned constraints will be discussed.
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Age
An individual’s age appears to be highly correlated with membership in a social
movement, NRM, or terrorist group. Providing evidence for a commonly assumed
strategy regarding recruitment, Blazak (2001) finds that neo-Nazi skinheads frequently
gain membership by scouting area high schools for disaffected youth as a means to
increase organizational membership. Unlike Blazak’s (2001) predatory model, Smith
finds that the average age of individuals indicted for terrorist-related charges is nearly
two decades older between 32-35 (1994). The above are exceptions however and the vast
majority of research has found that individuals that join these groups tend to do so during
the years in between the above cases. Analyzing nearly a thousand applicants
volunteering for the 1964 Freedom Summer project in Mississippi, Doug McAdam
(1986) was able to draw many conclusions regarding one’s propensity to join a high-risk
social movement17. McAdam (1986) argues that the window years from about 20 to 26
are critically relevant to social movement participation because outside of this range
people become biographically unavailable. Before the age of 20, young people are too
constrained by the wishes of their parents, usually involving school, the need for adult
supervision, etc. (1986). While after age 26, people are too constrained by the
responsibilities of adult responsibilities, such as maintaining a full-time job, marital
partnerships, and raising children (McAdam, 1986). Similarly, research on NRM
participants reveals that very few join while younger than 18 due to parental dependency
17

The Freedom Summer campaign of 1964 was a project that enlisted college students from mostly the
northern parts of the United States as volunteers to help staff freedom schools, register black voters, and
raise awareness of Civil Rights activism in the South. Participation in Freedom Summer can be considered
a high-risk/cost social movement due to the fact that participants needed to commit to living and working in
the South for two months over the summer, and financially support themselves. Further, three volunteers
were kidnapped and murdered by segregationists at the beginning of the project, while intimidation,
beatings, and unlawful arrests continued throughout the summer (McAdam, 1986, p. 71).
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and supervision (Levine, 2003). Between the ages of 21 to 26 young adults are relatively
free to depart from the influence of their parents’ religious/spiritual beliefs for the first
time (Levine, 2003). Indeed this is a time of forming one’s adult identity while at the
same time still free of any adult-like constraints, well over half of NRM participants
report joining during these years (Barker, 1984; Dawson, 2003; Levine, 2003; Rochford,
1985; Wright & Piper, 1986). However, some researchers have found that as the required
level of commitment becomes less demanding as is the case in some NRM, the
distribution of ages at which people join becomes more widespread (30’s-40’s) (Carter,
1990; Latkin, Hagan, Littman, & Sundberg, 1987; Palmer, 1994; Wallis, 1977; B. Wilson
& Dobbelaere, 1994). Also consistent with the majority of social movement and NRM
research, Sageman (2004) found that the average age of Islamic Jihad terrorists18 was 25.
This finding is consistent with a great deal of past research on various terrorist typologies
where nearly all participants joined between the ages of 18 to 31 (Clark, 1983; Handler,
1990; Hassan, 2001; Pedahzur, Perliger, & Weinberg, 2003; Russell & Miller, 1983;
Strentz, 1988; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). Though there are some outliers, the majority
of individuals become involved in social movements, NRMs, and terrorist organizations
in their 20’s during that window of availability between being dependent on their parents
and developing adult responsibilities.

18

Sageman (2004) has a total of 172 terrorists in his sample. He defines all of them as being Muslim,
following the Salafi interpretation of Islam. Such an interpretation is a “revivalist movement” in which its
followers attempt to “restore” Islam to a fundamentalist or “authentic” ancient form advocating and using
violent/terroristic means (Sageman, 2004, p. 1). Throughout his work, Sageman (2004) refers to his sample
as Salafi Mujahedin (meaning Muslim guerillas engaged in a Jihad). He defines Jihad as “any form of
activity, either personal or communal, undertaken by Muslims in attempting to follow the path of God”,
and further refers to his sample of Islamic terrorists as being engaged in the “global Salafi Jihad”
(Sageman, 2004, p. 1). It warrants noting that these terms (i.e., Jihad, Jihadist, Mujahedin,
Fundamentalism, Fundamentalist) are not without contentions and in fact are currently under a great deal of
scrutiny and debate. Please refer to Martin Marty’s and R. Scott Appleby’s extensive work for further
discussion of the issues (1992, 1994, 1996).
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Education
Findings regarding an individual’s level of education as a predictor of
involvement in a social movement, NRM, or terrorist organization have been mixed.
Oliver (1997) found that active members in a collective action neighborhood association
were consistently more highly educated than token (nonparticipating) members
concluding that there were two possible reasons. Educated individuals have learned more
skills that provide them with the ability to better help the social movement or those less
educated are likely in more restrictive occupations working more hours (1997).
Regardless of the reason, educated individuals are more biographically available to
participate (1997). The above is an example of a socially acceptable and even
encouraged social movement, and common belief is that participants in less mainstream
and even abhorrent social movements are likely less educated.
To the contrary, Blee (2002) found in her interviews of 34 women active in the
WSM that 85% had graduated high school and nearly half were college educated. Also
studying the WSM, Aho (1990) finds that of 383 participants, 38% have high school
degrees, 25% have some college education, 20% have a four-year degree, and nearly 10%
have a graduate degree. Of 89 WSM activists, Simi and Futrell (2008) found that the
majority had a high school degree and 25% had at least some college education.
Likewise, scholars have consistently found that NRM participants tend to not only be
more educated than the general US population, but exceptionally so (Dawson, 2003). A
study examining a sample of Scientologists found nearly 60% had a four year degree
(Wallis, 1977), while more than a quarter of the members in Church Universal and
Triumphant have graduate degrees (Jones, 1994), and in the NRM known as the
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Rajneeshpuram, 36% of members have graduate degrees (12% of which are doctorates)
and the remaining 64% all have a four year degree (Latkin, et al., 1987). The
aforementioned groups are only examples that provide a picture into a much broader
pattern regarding education and NRM involvement. Indeed, in their national survey of
nearly 13,000 households, Bader and Demaris (1996) confirm that the more highly
educated an individual is, the more likely they are to affiliate themselves with a NRM
than a mainstream church. There are mixed findings in terrorism research.
Confirming social movement and NRM findings, Sageman (2004) finds that of
132 Salafi Jihad terrorists 29% have some college, 33% have a four year degree, 5% have
a master’s degree, and 4% have a doctorate. In other words, 70% of terrorists in his
sample were college educated (2004). But, contrary to Sageman’s (2004) terrorist
sample and Blee’s (2002) WSM activist sample, Smith (1994) found that his sample of
WSM terrorist indictees were less educated with only 12% having a college degree, 33%
having a GED or less, and the remaining indictees were high school graduates19. Though
mixed findings exist, it appears that joining a social movement, NRM, or terrorist
organization tends to be correlated with an increased level of education. It is possible
that as individuals become more formally educated, they also become more
biographically available in a number of ways. Some examples may include a greater
amount of skill sets attractive to an organization, more free time to participate (working
less jobs/hours), and having a more open worldview to allow for deviating from
mainstream society.

19

It warrants mentioning however that Brent Smith’s (1994) sample is made up entirely of indictees. In
other words, these are not proven terrorists like those in Sageman’s (2004) sample or experienced WPM
activists like those in Blee’s (2002) sample though it is probable that this is the case.
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Socio-Economic Status
Findings regarding the correlation of socio-economic status (SES) with
involvement in a social movement, NRM, or terrorist group are quite similar to those
regarding education levels. Oliver (1997) found that active participants in the collective
action neighborhood association were significantly more likely to own their own homes
and have much higher incomes than token members. Whether it was due to time
constraints (e.g., working more hours, multiple jobs) or resources (e.g., transportation),
the poorer an individual is, the less biographically available he is to participate in social
movements (Oliver, 1997). Interestingly, while Blee (2002) found that nearly all of the
WSM activists in her sample were at least middle-class, Blazak (2001) found that high
school youth in lower SES classes were most likely to be recruited into skinhead
organizations. One of the most consistent findings in the NRM literature is that a
disproportionate number of participants are from middle and upper SES classes (Barker,
1984; Dawson, 2003; Jones, 1994; Latkin, et al., 1987; Levine, 2003; Rochford, 1985;
Wallis, 1977; B. Wilson & Dobbelaere, 1994; Wright & Piper, 1986). Findings in
terrorism research have been more mixed and it appears that SES is correlated with the
type of terrorist group. For example, terrorist scholars analyzing Islamic terrorists and
left-wing terrorists find that the majority come from at least middle-class, and many from
upper-middle to upper-class backgrounds (Hassan, 2001; Pedahzur, et al., 2003; Russell
& Miller, 1983; Sageman, 2004; Strentz, 1988; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). But, in the
few studies looking at RWT, findings indicate that the majority of these individuals come
from lower to working class backgrounds (Handler, 1990; Smith, 1994). The majority of
research (but certainly not all) supports that individuals from middle-class or higher SES
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backgrounds are more biographically available to join social movements, NRM, or
terrorist organizations, and thus are more represented than their lower-class counterparts
in these populations.

Employment Status and Occupation Type
Arguably, education level, SES, and employment status/occupation type are
variables measuring similar concepts. In other words, the more educated an individual is,
the more likely they are to be in a higher economic bracket because they are more likely
to have secure employment at a well paying job. Though there has been very little
research on employment/occupation type, it is not surprising that the few findings
regarding these variables follow the same pattern as level of education and SES relating
to an individual’s likelihood for involvement in social movements, NRMs, or terrorist
groups. McAdam (1986) found that 78% of his Freedom Summer social movement
participants were either unemployed or employed part-time; this however was merely due
to the fact that the vast majority of participants were college students. The remaining
22% were employed full-time and 70% of which were teachers (1986). Further, those
applicants that were employed full-time were significantly more likely than their
unemployed counterparts to follow through by participating (as opposed to withdrawing
after application). This finding lends a great deal of support for the idea that participating
in high-risk and demanding organizations is highly dependent upon one’s biographical
availability (namely, teachers have summers off) (1986).
Even in more unpopular social movements like the WSM, researchers have found
that most were employed full-time in professional occupations (Blee, 2002). In his
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research on Salafi Jihad terrorists, Sageman (2004) found that very few were employed
full-time. However, prior to joining the Jihad (a high-risk and extremely demanding antimainstream movement), 43% were in professional occupations, 33% were skilled
workers, and 24% were unskilled workers (2004). Again, due to the demands of
terrorism, this sample of Islamic Jihadists chose to leave their jobs in order to be
available to the group (2004). Nearly all of them however, were previously employed
full-time, most of which in professional careers (2004). Also following previously
established patterns in education and SES for RWT particularly (and again opposite of
the majority of findings for other organizations), Smith (1994) found that most RWT
indictees were unemployed or underemployed. Most research finds that individuals who
join an anti-mainstream organization are or were previous to joining the group employed
full-time in professional occupations. Those who remained in their occupations seemed
to have jobs that allowed them availability to join their respective groups, and if not,
many joiners chose to quit their jobs in exchange for more availability.

Marital Status and Family
It seems logical that being married, and especially having children would decrease
one’s biographical availability thus decreasing their likelihood for joining a social
movement, NRM, or terrorist organization. Like employment status and occupation type,
there has not been a great deal of research specifically analyzing the influence of family
circumstances. Though McAdam (1986) concluded that the very young were constrained
by parents and the older were likely constrained by adult responsibilities (loosely defined
as being in the workforce, having a family, etc.), he did find that married applicants were
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far less likely than their unmarried counterparts to withdraw from participating in
Freedom Summer. Overall however, the majority of participants were unmarried (1986).
Though generally less biographically available than individuals without family
responsibilities, a plausible explanation for married applicants being less likely to
withdraw from participation once it was time to depart for the site of Freedom Summer is
possibly due to a greater degree of stability in their lives allowing them to better predict
future events/scheduling (1986). Similarly, Blee (2002) found that most of her social
movement participants were married with children. However, these results may be less
representative of other social movement participants for two reasons. First, this may be
an artifact of an entirely female sample (2002). Second, the social movement these
women are participating in believe strongly that it is a woman’s duty to marry and bear
children for the movement (2002).
Focusing on a different angle regarding the effects of marital status on NRM
participation, Bader and Demaris (1996) found that the amount of marriages a person has
significantly increases their likelihood of joining a mainstream church or a religious sect,
however has no influence on a person’s likelihood for joining a NRM. Finally, prior
research regarding terrorists finds that “most terrorists are unmarried and that those who
are married tend to sever family ties upon embarking on a terrorists career” (Sageman,
2004, pp. 79-80). Sageman (2004) finds the opposite however, in his examination of 114
Salafi Jihad terrorists, where 73% were married and the majority of which had children.
From the little research that has analyzed the effects of family situations, it can be
asserted that it is not uncommon for anti-mainstream organization participants to be
married and raising children. However, it is clear that further research must be done on
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more participants in different organizations, and especially studies that attempt to explain
existing correlations.

Religious Affiliations
An individual’s lifelong religious affiliations have been substantially overlooked
as to whether it has an influence on joining a social movement. Indeed, Aho (1990)
asserts that “it is still an open question how religious backgrounds are transmuted…into
political activism” referring to this as an “immense theoretical gap” in the literature
(1990, p. 185). In his assessment of right-wing extremists in the United States, or what
he refers to as the Patriot Movement, Aho (1990) finds that there appears to be a mixed
spectrum of participants reporting everything from mainstream religious upbringing (e.g.,
Catholicism, Protestantism, etc.) to no religious upbringing. Findings in much of the
NRM research also indicate mixed results, although some researchers have concluded
that the “unchurched” (Dawson, 2003, p. 123) are more open to cult participation than
those with a history of having been involved in mainstream religion (Stark & Bainbridge,
1980). For example, over 75% of participants in the NRM known as Nichiren Shoshu in
Great Britain claim that they did not belong to any religious organization prior to joining,
and 47% claim that they have never been introduced to religion at all (B. Wilson &
Dobbelaere, 1994). Likewise, only 40% of all members of Rajneeshpuram claim to have
been involved in a religion prior to joining (Latkin, et al., 1987). It is possible that
having no prior experiences with religion leaves an individual more susceptible, or
biographically available, to joining a NRM.

33
To the contrary however, Wright and Piper (1986) found that out of 90
participants in the Unification Church, Hare Krishna, and Children of God/Family of
Love NRM, 41% were raised Catholic, 41% were raised Protestant, 9% were raised
Jewish, and the remaining 9% claimed no childhood affiliation. Though they do caution
that 86% of those raised in a mainstream religion claim that their participation and
indoctrination was nominal at best (e.g., mass on holidays, etc.) (1986). Nonetheless, this
population is still distinct from being entirely “unchurched” (Dawson, 2003, p. 123).
Other work on Hare Krishna, however, has yielded different findings. Fifty percent of
Rochford’s (1985) sample were not only raised in religious homes, but 77% assert that
they were educated in mainstream religious schools, with over half attending church on a
weekly basis and another 30% attended mass at least occasionally.
Like social movement research, religious affiliation has been largely if not
entirely overlooked in terrorism scholarship with Sageman’s (2004) work on Salafi Jihad
terrorists being one of the few exceptions. Of 108 terrorists, 49% report having been
raised in religious households, and approximately 15% had an Islamic based formal
education (Sageman, 2004). Just prior to joining the Jihad however, 99% of 155
terrorists report being extremely devoted to the Islamic faith (2004). Reported numbers
from childhood and adult affiliation should be taken with caution though as this sample
particularly is taken from an area traditionally marked by widespread religious affiliation
(more so than Western countries) (2004). It is possible that these numbers are inflated
compared to other terrorist typologies in less religious areas of the world. The influence
of religious affiliation, in relation to joining social movements, NRMs, and terrorist
organizations is in need of further inquiry. As it stands, results have been predominantly
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mixed with the exception of some emerging patterns of the “unchurched” being more
susceptible to joining NRMs.

Life Turning Points
Another necessary condition in Lofland and Stark’s (1965) and Lofland’s (1966)
theory of conversion developed from their NRM research on Doomsday Cult converts is
that individuals must be at a self-perceived turning point in their lives when they come
into contact with the group to be joined. A life turning point can be understood as:
a moment when old lines of action were complete, had failed, or had been or were
about to be disrupted, and when they were faced with the opportunity or necessity
for doing something different with their lives (Lofland, 1966, p. 50; Lofland &
Stark, 1965, p. 870)
This opportunity to do something different with one’s life is essentially having a greater
degree of biographical availability (desired or forced) than those that are not at a turning
point in their lives. The authors consistently found this to be the case with each
individual that joined the Doomsday Cult (1966; 1965). Analyzing over 500 conversion
experiences of the NRM known as Nichiren Shoshu Buddhism in the United States,
Snow and Phillips (1997) find some support for Lofland and Stark’s (1965) model of
conversion. Measuring potential life turning points like job loss, divorce, military drafts,
dropping out of school, and close encounters with death, the authors find that over 70%
of converts claimed to be at a life turning point just prior to joining the Nichiren Shoshu
Buddhists (Snow & Phillips, 1997). In their survey of nearly 12,500 families regarding
church, sect, and NRM involvement, Bader and Demaris (1996) also attempted to
measure life turning points specifically focusing on the number of marriages, residential
moves, adult employment, and the authority figures in one’s childhood as turning points
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that may influence an individual’s likelihood for joining a church, sect, or NRM. The
author’s found that life turning points had the greatest influence on individual’s joining
churches and sects, but contrary to Lofland (1966) and Lofland and Stark (1965), turning
points showed no significant effects on the likelihood for joining a NRM (1996).
There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that prior to joining a NRM,
individual’s perceive themselves as being at some decision point in their lives. There is
also significant evidence to suggest however that such turning points are not a necessary
condition to conversion as Lofland and Stark (1965) and Lofland (1966) once asserted
(Bader & Demaris, 1996; Snow & Phillips, 1997). Claiming that being at a turning point
in life prior to joining a group like a NRM is fraught with problems beyond calling it a
necessary condition. Indeed, Blee’s (2002) research on women in the WSM points to the
ambiguous, subjective, and retrospective nature of self-identified turning points
influencing their conversion. Blee (2002) finds that each of the WSM activists she
interviewed recalled a story of conversion into the movement that was very exact and
detailed pointing to specific incidents (often with race as a backdrop) and using their new
found racist ideology to define their pasts. The problem however, was that her data
suggest a very different story of conversion. While Blee (2002) asserts, like other
researchers have, that turning points may account for some influence in the conversion
process, it is clear that the women in her sample have created a story completely ignoring
other factors. More specifically, in each of her cases, women ignored their greatest
influence of all; social networks.
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Social Networks
As stated earlier, the wide acceptance that psychological attributes and individual
predispositions cannot fully account, or even minimally account for an individual’s
decision to join social movements, NRM’s, and terrorist organizations has prompted
scholars to analyze other processes (McAdam & Paulsen, 1997; Snow, et al., 1997). In
addition to biographical availability, there is substantial evidence pointing to the
influence of social networks. Originating in anthropology over a century ago, the study
of social networks was breaking analytical ground by looking at the influence of one’s
interpersonal networks in various social situations like the diffusion of information, social
behaviors, and social cohesion (Granovetter, 1973). Through the decades, the analysis of
social networks, especially as they relate to joining or being recruited into an
organization, has most often been demarcated into three categories. The first and most
common area of social network research has focused on the strength and number of ties
one has to the object in question (in this case, a subversive group like a social movement,
NRM, or terrorist organization). The second area of social network influence specifically
related to joining an organization is the number of memberships one has in interrelated
groups like the organization in question. Finally, the influence of extra-group ties (ties
external to an organization that an individual belongs to) has also been analyzed as a
factor influencing the likelihood of joining or being recruited into an organization.

Strength and Number of Ties
The strength (i.e., degree of intimacy between two people or type of relation to
another person) and number of ties has proven to be one of the most influential aspects of

37
social networks on a person joining or being recruited into a social movement, NRM, or
terrorist group. In his analysis of over 950 Freedom Summer applicants, McAdam
(1986) found that participants claimed to have two times as many friends as fellow
applicants and to claim that they knew (i.e., acquaintance or less in terms of the strength
of tie) at least three times as many known activists on their applications than those
applicants that were “no shows” to the site of Freedom Summer (p. 64). In a follow up
study on Freedom Summer applicants, McAdam and Paulsen (1997) conclude that the
preexisting ties to friends and acquaintances also in the pool of applicants are pivotal to
whether a person actually participates. Indeed, these individuals serve to reinforce the
potential recruit’s identity with the social movement, thus sealing their decision to join
(1997). This is a recurring finding in much of the social movement literature, where the
majority of individuals in a social movement recruit from within their preexisting social
networks (Blazak, 2001), and likewise, individuals that join a social movement already
know individuals within the social movement (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi,
2004; Gould, 1997; Snow, et al., 1997). In her comprehensive analysis of left-wing
social movement activists and terrorists in Italy and Germany, della Porta (1995) found
that friendship ties were the single most important factor influencing an individual’s
likelihood for joining the social movement. She found that 75% of participants had at
least one preexisting friend in the movement already (1995). Further, 75% of those had
more than one preexisting friend, while another 50% had seven or more (1995). Della
Porta (1995) found that those with seven or more friendship ties were often a function of
several members of the same social group deciding to join at the same time (also referred
to as block recruiting). Finally, in analyzing the individuals from social movements that
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eventually moved to operating underground as terrorist organizations, della Porta (1995)
concluded that the strength of the friendship tie with the recruiter mattered considerably
more than one’s dedication to the ideological beliefs of the movement. In other words,
the stronger the friendship was, the more likely the social movement activist would
follow the recruiter underground to become a terrorist. Reiterating the finding that
joining must be a consequence of something beyond parallel ideology, Aho (1990) states:
…converts are not particularly identifiable by their stupidity, by their genius, by
their craziness, or by their transiency, but instead by the largely accidental fact of
their having bonds with people already in or sympathetic with the movement…
(p. 210).
Research in NRM’s has yielded similar findings. In fact, in the first
comprehensive study of NRM conversion, Lofland and Stark (1965) and Lofland (1966)
assert that a potential convert must experience an affective bond with a NRM member
(thereby strengthening their network tie), and additionally, any ties external to the NRM
(extra-NRM) must be non-existent or at least weakened. Indeed, the authors found that a
preexisting friendship link usually preceded ultimate conversion into the “Doomsday
Cult” (Lofland, 1966; Lofland & Stark, 1965). For NRM scholars who later tested the
applicability of the necessary conditions in Lofland and Stark’s (1965) and Lofland’s
(1966) Theory of Conversion, the majority of research indicates that individuals are most
influenced to join an NRM because of preexisting social networks (Dawson, 2003; B.
Wilson & Dobbelaere, 1994). Seeking more detail regarding the influence of networks,
Stark and Bainbridge (1980) assessed and compared the influences of social ties in two
NRM’s and one conventional faith (Mormonism). The authors found a significant
amount of evidence for the importance of the strongest type of social tie influencing a
person’s likelihood for joining a NRM or a conventional religious; family ties (Stark and
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Bainbridge, 1980). In fact, nearly 75% of joiners in one of the NRM’s and the sample of
Mormons had preexisting family links (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980). Additionally,
preexisting friendship ties were also found for the majority of members in these
organizations (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980). Finally, the authors also found that those
least likely to defect were those that claimed to have made the strongest friendship bonds
with members unknown to them prior to joining the group in question (Stark and
Bainbridge, 1980).
Similar to some of the NRM research, Sageman (2004) also finds kinship ties to
be of tremendous importance in joining Islamic terrorist organizations. In addition,
Sageman (2004) was able to conclude that joining the terrorist group for many of the
individual’s in his sample preceded any ideological commitment to organizational beliefs,
certainly illustrating the power of social networks. Like della Porta (1995) in her work
on left-wing terrorists, he also found that strong friendship bonds were nearly as
influential as kinship ties. Finally, Sageman (2004) also uncovered a pattern that showed
not only the importance of strong ties, but the role that weak ties can play in being
recruited into Salafi Jihad terrorist groups. Reaffirming the most classic and early work
regarding the “strength of weak ties” in social structures and relationships (Granovetter,
1973), Sageman (2004) found that weak social ties were pivotal in linking independent
cliques of close friends that wanted to join the terrorist Jihad but did not know how.
These linkages would often lead to block recruitments of clusters (Sageman, 2004).
There is strong evidence to suggest that the number of ties one has to a social movement,
NRM, or terrorist organization influence an individual’s propensity to join a group where
the greater number of social ties holds a greater amount of influence. The strength of
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one’s ties also seem to be an important factor where the more intimate or close a social
tie can be defined as being, the more likely it is to have a greater amount of influence,
though even weak ties have been proven to be important as well.

Membership in Interrelated Organizations
There has also been a great deal of evidence to suggest that having multiple
memberships in interrelated organizations is common among social movement
participants. In his sample of right-wing extremists, Aho (1990) found that the majority
of his sample had a number of lateral group memberships, where no particular group was
necessarily more radical than the other but where they were all groups within the same
broader social movement. Being so densely networked into a social movement through
various outlets seems to strongly secure one’s commitment (Aho, 1990).
Other researchers have found that multiple memberships can cause a person to
become increasingly radical in their beliefs eventually leading to their participation in a
more extreme group. McAdam (1986) for example found that participants in Freedom
Summer belonged to a greater number of politically based interest groups and had
significantly higher levels of involvement in Civil Rights activism than their “no show”
counterparts. It is logical that participants had more experiences with political activism,
especially regarding Civil Rights, and had over time increased in their willingness to
engage in high-risk activism like the Freedom Summer. Similarly, Almeida (2005)
consistently found that participants with a high degree of “multi-sectoralness” (i.e.,
membership in an array of ideologically related social movement organizations that cut
across different social groups from students to workers to clergy, etc.) (Almeida, 2005, p.
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65) were the most likely to later participate in high-risk protest activity. Finally, della
Porta (1995) concluded that most left-wing Italian and German terrorists were previously
radicalized in at least one political activist group before moving underground. Like the
amount of individual social group ties and the strength of those ties, the number of
memberships across organizations also influences joiners by inducing radicalization. The
likely reason is due to the increased amount of one’s social ties to a movement through
several group memberships, which simultaneously decreases ties and communications
external to the movement. In other words, their lives become enveloped in “the
movement”.

Extra-Group Ties
Often overlooked in social network research on recruitment and joining processes
is the possibility that ties can hinder one’s proclivity to join a group or organization. As
Gould (1990) points out, most social network studies are initiated with an unspoken
“…presupposition that existing social relations exert an unconditionally positive
influence…” on an individual’s decision to join an organization (as cited in McAdam &
Paulsen, 1997, p. 147). Indeed, one of Lofland (1966) and Lofland and Stark’s (1965)
necessary conditions for joining a NRM was that individuals experience a weakened, if
not entirely severed relationship with extra-group ties. Providing some evidence for the
plausibility of such conditions, among McAdam’s (1986) sample of Freedom Summer
applicants, “no shows” report a significantly higher number of extra-group ties that are
oppositional to Civil Rights activism than those who participated (McAdam & Paulsen,
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1997). While a relatively under-researched area in social network scholarship, it can still
be concluded that extra-group ties are influential.

Past Research and Present Research Questions
Research in social movements, NRM’s, and terrorism has yielded two major
findings accounting for why individuals join such groups. Though ideological
compatibilities increase the likelihood an individual will join a particular organization, it
can be conclusively stated that people are either propelled or restrained the most by
biographical availability and/or their social networks. Precisely how much influence
various aspects of these processes hold is not fully understood however, and this is
especially true in regard to joining terrorist groups. Indeed, the only comprehensive
studies on joining terrorist groups are della Porta’s (1995) left-wing terrorists, and
Sageman’s (2004) work with Islamic terrorists, as well as some similar analyses also with
Islamic terroritsts conducted by Horgan (2008, 2009) and the NYPD (Silber & Bhatt,
2007).
This dissertation focuses on the involvement processes of individuals who joined
right-wing terrorist groups in the United States. I specifically examine (1) the structural
characteristics of the involvement process (this will include an assessment of the
biographical availability of indictees), (2) the influence of family dynamics on the
involvement process (this includes an assessment of both biographical availability and
social networks), and (3) the significance of one’s non-familial relationships on the
involvement process (this will assess an individuals social networks, including an
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examination of the relationship between right-wing extremist [RWE] groups and RWT
groups). In the next chapter, I discuss the methods and data.
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CHAPTER 3: DATA & METHODS
Mixed Methodology Research Design
In this chapter I will provide a detailed overview of the data in terms of sample
selection and cases, sources used for data collection, data collection processes and
methodological analyses, including the development of variables and coding, the
development of case narratives, and finally, research limitations. This dissertation
utilizes a mixed methodological approach to analyze the data for this exploratory study.
As methodologists have stressed, the choice of research methodology is secondary to
research questions (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). In other words, given the nature of my
research questions and analytical concepts, a mixed methodological approach is required.
My inquiries involve complex social processes that can only be minimally quantified,
thus qualitative analyses must also be employed in order to delve into the intricacies of
my data. The quantitative, variable-oriented portion is exploratory and inductive in
nature and will only include frequencies and cross-tabulations in order to understand the
distribution of my data (Ragin, 1987). This will be a traditional, case-study approach by
doing qualitative case analysis (W. Olson, 2004; Ragin, 1987; Ragin & Becker, 1992;
Rihoux, 2006; Stake, 1994).
I analyze in-depth case history data on 66 federally indicted WSM terrorists
representing 10 different terrorist organizations in the United States20. Thus, my unit of

20

This data was also collected for an NIJ Grant that I worked on as a graduate research assistant (PI: Pete
Simi, Title: “The Operation and Structure of Right-Wing Extremist Groups”, #: 2006-IJ-CX-0027). Two
individuals were actually never indicted due to extraordinary circumstances. One individual was killed in a
standoff with federal authorities and the other individual committed suicide while in custody awaiting
charges. Further, regarding the latter mentioned case, authorities had not yet charged this individual as they
were attempting to bargain with him for information regarding his co-conspirators. Had each individual
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analysis is the individual indictees, who were included in the sample as part of a three
stage process. Indictees were first selected based on their inclusion in The American
Terrorism Study Database (ATS), which I used to establish the parameters of my sample;
my cases are persons federally indicted for terroristic behaviors, thus officially labeled by
the government as being a terrorist21 (Smith & Damphousse, 2006). The ATS project
began in 1988 and is a comprehensive dataset including all federal terrorist indictments
that occurred in the United States from 1980-200222 (2006). I am using the ATS data due
to the fact that it was the first publicly released dataset on terrorists in the United States,
and is currently regarded as the most detailed source of information on domestic terrorists
and the incidents they are alleged to have been involved in to date. Within the dataset,
indictees are categorized and coded by their terrorism typology (i.e., international,
environmental, left-wing, lone wolf, right-wing, etc.). After RW indictees were selected
from the ATS dataset, non-WS RW indictees provided a sampling pool of 179 persons
from 27 WSM groups.
The second stage of sample selection involved the development of activity
thresholds. An activity threshold was developed because not all of the 179 RW-WS
terrorists represented in the ATS database were indicted for acts of terrorism. In fact to

survived, they unarguably would have been indicted. Due to their quite central roles in the incidents for
which they were involved, they are included in this sample.
21
Though largely beyond the scope here, it warrants mentioning that the government has a great deal of
discretion regarding precisely who is and who is not a terrorist committing terrorism (Smith, 1994).
‘Indicted terrorists’ then are actually prosecuted under a constellation of already federally criminalized
offenses, though the investigatory label of “terrorism” raises the priority level and designated resources to a
case (1994). Certainly a limitation of the dataset when one is strictly concerned with behaviors and is
restrained by political semantics. Nonetheless, the ATS provides concise and practical selection
parameters. For further discussion regarding governmental labeling see Hoffman (2006), Schmid and
Jongman (1988), and Smith (1994).
22
An exception to this is if a particular terrorism case has not been officially “closed”. For example, if a
terrorist was indicted in 2000 and the case was still open beyond 2002 (at any stage; trial, appeals, etc.),
then privacy laws, due process, issues of national security and the like would bar it from inclusion (Smith,
2007).
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the contrary, less than half of the indictees were actually indicted for the actual
implementation of one of two types of crimes; an actual terrorist act(s) against a
designated target(s) or an instrumental violent crime(s) to enable future terrorist attacks
against a designated target(s) (e.g., armed robberies). The remaining individuals were
charged with a constellation of preparatory offenses aimed at executing their plans
(whether a terroristic plot or an act to support an impending terroristic plot)23. This
discrepancy is not meant to minimize the severity and potential threat of such preparatory
behaviors by would-be terrorists because the detection of such actions should
undoubtedly be considered symptoms of impending terrorist incidents in need of
prevention. For the purposes of this analysis, the distinction between those that
committed acts and those that prepared or conspired to commit acts (terrorism or
instrumental crimes for terrorism) may matter. In other words, it begs the question
whether those that were apprehended prior to implementation would have implemented
anything at all. For the purposes of an inquiry into the properties of terroristic
involvement, however, it is arguably a necessary substantive condition that each of my
cases has crossed the threshold from contemplation to overt commission. While it is
possible that the properties could be identical in both contexts, it is equally possible that
the properties could be entirely different24. After this filter was applied, 76 WSM
indictees representing 12 WSM terrorist groups remained.
The third consideration used to construct the sample relates to whether there was
enough secondary data not only available on each indictee’s particular case, but also their

23

Examples of such preparatory behaviors may include crimes such as the possession and/or stockpiling of
illegal weaponry (firearms, explosive materials/devices), various combinations of conspiracy to commit
offenses (often amounting to a conversation with co-conspirator and infiltrator), various types of fraud, etc.
24
This is an interesting, nonetheless empirical question requiring analysis which is beyond the scope here.
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backgrounds. Based on information availability, the final sample is comprised of 66
terrorist indictees representing 10 WSM terrorist organizations25. It should be noted that
this includes two persons (each from a different group) that were not a part of the official
list of RW indictees. These individuals were core members of their respective WSM
terrorist groups, and the only reason they were not indicted was due to their deaths (prior
to indictment)26. Though I am concerned with the involvement and /or recruitment
process on an individual level, the 10 WSM terrorist organizations included in this
analysis provide a rich sample characterizing the broad spectrum of the various types of
groups within the larger WSM. For example, the organizations range from two to thirty
members, located from across the United States, fractured into small cells to residing on
heavily guarded compounds, and being ideologically steeped in religion to entirely
secular27. Yet each group had similar, if not the exact same objectives that included
destroying the U.S. government and attempting to start a violent race war that would
ultimately lead to an Aryan nation.
Table 1: Sample Demographic Characteristics
Variables
Gender
Male
Female
Race
White (non-Hispanic)
Age
Adolescence (13-18)
Young Adult (19-24)
Adult (25-40)
25

Frequency
63
3

%
95.5
4.5

66

100

3
8
33

4.5
12.1
50

See Table 1 for Sample Demographic Characteristics
Though briefly mentioned in a footnote earlier, it certainly warrants mentioning again. To reiterate, one
died in a shootout with federal authorities and the other by suicide while in the custody of authorities. They
undoubtedly would have been indicted as they played vital roles in the terroristic behaviors executed by
their groups.
27
See Appendix B, List 1 for synopses of each group represented in the sample.
26
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Mid-life (41-55)
Retirement (56+)
Branch (by Group, N=10)
Ku Klux Klan
Christian Identity
Neo-Nazis
Racist Skinheads
Combination
WSM Group (by Indictee,
N=66)
Aryan Nations
Aryan Republican Army
Covenant, Sword, & Arm of
the Lord
Fourth Reich Skinheads
Oklahoma City Bombing
Oklahoma Constitutional
Militia
Order
Order II
Phineas Priests
White Patriot Party

15
5

22.7
7.6

1
3
0
1
5

10
30
0
10
50

4
6
14

6

2
3
2
29
2
3
1

9
21.2
3
4.5
3
43.9
3
4.5
1.5

Some may question whether 66 cases is a large enough sample for analysis.
Although this is a relatively small sample according to conventional quantitative social
science standards, there is a long tradition of qualitative case analysis that relies on indepth studies of small samples (Athens, 1992; Shaw, 1966). Further, the utility of a study
analyzing the process of involvement into a RWT group is extremely important because
it has not yet been done for this typology. One of the reasons it has never been done is
simply because a comprehensive dataset with variables relevant to the involvement
process has not been constructed for RW terrorists. Also, any individual level analysis
that has ever been done to this point on terrorists typically has involved smaller sample
sizes. This is simply an extension of the nature of terrorism itself, meaning that the
behavior and its perpetrators are a relatively rare occurrence anyway. In other words, the
total sampling pool is few in number from the start. Finally, 66 cases is enough when
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one considers the high degree of source exhaustion and precision in collecting and
analyzing secondary data to obtain personal and in-depth life history information on each
indictee.

Data Sources
Data for both the variable-oriented portion and the in-depth, qualitative case
studies were collected from a wide array of secondary sources. Sources ranged from
newspaper articles (usually published during a group’s or indictee’s arrest and/or trial),
websites (e.g., government, terrorist group, watchdog groups, research institutes, personal
information finder sites), peer-reviewed scholarly articles, journalistic accounts including
books and documentaries, academic books, documents made available by the freedom of
information act, watchdog group reports and publications, information from the RWT
group or indictee (e.g., books authored by the group/indictee, manifestos, declarations of
war, websites, biographies), court records, court transcripts, police reports, FBI 302’s
(agent reports), surveillance records/transcripts, witness transcribed interviews, and even
psychological evaluations/reports28. Effort was made to locate as many sources as
possible to obtain relevant information29. The amount of information available for each
indictee/group was not evenly distributed. In some cases there was little information,
while in other cases the amount of information was tremendous (e.g., Oklahoma City
bombing conspirators). In addition, I was also was granted access to ethnographic data

28

For a comprehensive list of secondary data sources see Appendix B, List 2.
All secondary sources were collected by me with the exception of court records, court transcripts, police
reports, FBI 302’s, surveillance records/transcripts, witness transcribed interviews, and psychological
evaluations/reports. These sources were available as downloadable PDF files from the ATS Database
(obtained from www.tkb.org).
29
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collected from 89 WSM individuals in phases between 1996 and 200530. The data were
collected by face to face and telephone interviews, as well as participant observations in
WSM individual’s homes, social gatherings, and WSM events. Portions of this data
includes information specific to several terrorist indictees included in my sample.
Therefore my use of this ethnographic data is limited to the information relevant to only
these individuals31.

Collection & Methodological Analyses
Data collection and coding of information on each indictee was completed group
by group. As briefly stated earlier, one of the biggest strengths of my data is the high
degree of intercoder reliability or investigator triangulation (Berg, 2004; Huberman &
Miles, 1994; Singleton Jr. & Straits, 1999). The principle investigator on the NIJ grant
and I worked side by side during the collection and coding processes. Both of us
searched for sources for each indictee, and each source found was analyzed by both of us.
This allowed us to check and verify our interpretations of all sources of data as well as
the information itself in terms of accuracy, meaning, relevance, etc. Further, the sheer
quantity of secondary sources that we analyzed provided another advantage; source
triangulation (Berg, 2004; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). In other words, we were often able
to verify information on most variables for indictees by finding such information in more
than one (sometimes many) sources, thus ‘triangulating’ the information and greatly
30

The data were collected by Pete Simi and supported by the National Science Foundation (SES –
0202129), the UNLV Graduate College Research, and the University of Nebraska, Omaha’s Office of
Sponsored Programs.
31
Due to confidentiality concerns with regard to the information made available to me from this data,
identifying information cannot be connected to any quotations that I utilize. I will attempt to at least
provide the RWT organization the indictee was a member of where possible unless doing so would
compromise their identity. If the name of a RWT indictee is provided, it signifies that the information is
publically available.

51
increasing the validity and veracity of our data (Berg, 2004; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).
When a situation arose where sources provided conflicting information, we investigated
until we had more credible sources in greater number confirming the information one
way or another. As stated earlier, this is a mixed methodological analysis. The data I
collected was organized into both a quantitative database in SPSS and a qualitative
narrative database in Excel.

Variables: Quantifying the Data
Because this analysis is an exploratory study, the development of variables and
codes was a fluid process that constantly evolved throughout the data collection
(Huberman & Miles, 1994; Levin-Rozalis, 2004; Singleton Jr. & Straits, 1999). As
already mentioned, I have chosen this area to research partly due to the fact that there is
less known about RWT and far less about the process of involvement into RWT groups.
Due to the very nature of the topic and the state of existing empirical research, when
discussing exploratory research, especially on gangs and social movements, Singleton Jr.
and Straits (1999) point out that initially, “there are no clearly delineated independent and
dependent variables, and therefore, no categories within which to classify what one sees”
(p. 91). Based on my research questions then, I chose to look for and include measures
that would likely be useful in painting a picture of the involvement process. Some
measures were included as a result of prior research in terrorism and related fields such as
social movements and new religious movement studies discussed in the previous chapter,
while other measures were included simply based on more common practice
justifications that they may be relevant. Variables that attempt to assess biographical
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availability issues are included in the measures for my first and second research questions
while variables that attempt to assess social network issues are included in the measures
for my second and third research questions. In addition, I analyze and report on other
variables that I collected data on that measure characteristics of biographical availability
that do not particularly fit one of my three research questions, but are nonetheless
important in leading to an understanding of involvement processes32.
To analyze my first research question regarding the structural characteristics of
the involvement/recruitment process I used the following 20 variables; each indictee’s
gender, date of birth, age at initial contact with WSM ideology, age at initial contact with
the terrorist group joined, the geographical and social location of an indictee’s
involvement/recruitment, the relationship between the indictee and the recruiter, the type
of recruitment used (direct/indirect), whether media (literature, television, etc.) was used
in the recruitment process, the number of recruiters involved in the process, the age of the
recruiter(s), the gender of the recruiter(s), the type of RWT group the indictee was
recruited into, the length of the recruitment process (measured by taking the date of
joining minus the age at initial contact with terrorist group), each indictee’s level of
involvement in the group33, and whether an indictee has military experience (Aho, 1990;
Blee, 2002; della Porta, 1995; Lofland, 1966; Sageman, 2004). For indictees with
military experience, the following four variables were also measured; military branch,
length of service, reason for leaving military, and whether they received specialized
training.

32

See Appendix B, List 3 for the complete codebook of all variables.
For example, the following is a quote from a former RWT leader in my data, “He became an elder of
[unnamed RWT group] around 1981…”. This quote would render the code of “leader, non-founder” for
the indictee referred to here.
33
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To analyze my second research question regarding the influence of family
dynamics on the involvement/recruitment process I used the following six variables; each
indictee’s marital status, whether the indictee has children, whether indictees with
children are parentally involved with their children34, whether an indictee has a family
member that is already involved in the WSM, and for those with a family member
involved, how many family members, and the relation of family member(s) involved
(parent, sibling) (della Porta, 1995; McAdam, 1986; Noble, 1998; Oliver, 1997;
Sageman, 2004).
To analyze my third research question regarding the influence of non-familial
relationships on the involvement/recruitment process I used the following seven
variables; indictee’s relationship to recruiter35, whether the indictee had prior knowledge
of the WSM, whether the indictee had prior membership(s) in other WSM organization,
and if so, the number of prior memberships, the group type of prior memberships, their
highest level of involvement during a prior membership, and whether they joined with
one or more acquaintances/friends (joined as a clique) (Aho, 1990; Almeida, 2005; della
Porta, 1995; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Sageman, 2004; Stark & Bainbridge, 1980).
To analyze biographical availability characteristics that do not fit one of the above
research question categories, yet have proven to be significant influences, I collected
information on the following 6 variables; current socio-economic status, education level,
history of chronic unemployment, the indictee’s occupation at the time of arrest, current
34

The following excerpts from Flynn and Gerhardt’s (1995) The Silent Brotherhood is an example of how
a statement would be taken as evidence that two RWT indictees were parentally involved in raising their
children: “…[having] children meant everything…knowing how much children meant to [RWT founder
and leader], asked his friend to be the godfather…talk mostly centered on their children’s future…but when
love for [his] children entered the picture…”(pgs. 107-108).
35
The following is a quote from a former RWT group member in my data, “He [RWT group
founder/leader] was like a father to me”. This quote would render the code of “mentor” for the relationship
to recruiter variable.
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religious preference, and whether the indictee was experiencing or had recently
experienced a life turning point36 (Akhtar, 1999; Bader & Demaris, 1996; Clark, 1983;
Handler, 1990; Hassan, 2001; Hubbard, 1971; Jager, Schmidtchen, & Sullwold, 1981;
Levine, 2003; Lofland, 1966; Lofland & Stark, 1965; Post, 2004; Russell & Miller, 1983;
Sageman, 2004; Smith, 1994; Strentz, 1988; Sulloway, 1997; Weinberg & Eubank,
1987).
Though this is the “quantitative”, variable-oriented portion, this is ultimately a
qualitative study. For lack of better words, “qualitative designs are not copyable, off-theshelf patterns, but normally have to be custom-built, revised, and ‘choreographed’” (as
cited in Huberman & Miles, 1994, p. 431). With that statement in mind, as the process of
data searching and collection progressed, variables and codes would evolve to sometimes
exemplify emerging preliminary themes and sometimes to fit the available data. As
mentioned earlier, data was collected in group by group, then indictee by indictee order.
Advised by Huberman and Miles (1994), this was a constant cyclical process of four
stages the authors refer to as data collection, data reduction, data display, and conclusions
and verification. The beginning of my “data collection” stage was guided by some
measures developed in SM, NRM, and terrorism studies (e.g., age at recruitment, prior
extremist/terrorist group membership), however many variables were not yet created
(Huberman & Miles, 1994; Stake, 1994). Indeed, as a part of my “data reduction” stage,
biographies were also constructed (in Excel) for each indictee that included not only data
36

As some authors in the field have warned, nearly anything can be subjectively viewed as a life turning
point (Snow & Phillips, 1997). For this reason, I have specifically limited a life turning point to include
one or more of the following to have occurred within 18 months or less of joining the RWT group in
question: marriage, divorce, birth of a child, close death (relative/friend), relocation, job loss, or the failure
of a highly valued occupational/personal goal (e.g., Timothy McVeigh for example, often expressed his
desire to be a Green Beret to family and friends. His failure of this goal has been determined to be a major
turning point in his life (Michel & Herbeck, 2001). Evidence of a life turning point may include selfdeclared or family/friend/associate declared commentary in secondary source materials.
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related to my analytical tools (biographical availability and social networks), but any life
history data that appeared to be of possible relevance (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Stake,
1994). From these case narratives, I began organizing and refining the information (“data
display” stage) thereby leading to the emergence of preliminary patterns and the
development of new quantifiable variables, also referred to as the conclusion
drawing/verification stage (albeit preliminary) (e.g., type of recruitment, length of
recruitment, military experience, parental involvement) (Huberman & Miles, 1994;
Stake, 1994). The development of further variables and codes after performing some
qualitative case analysis inevitably returned me to the data collection stage to try and
extract more information from data sources.
Two quantitative analyses will be run on these data; frequencies and crosstabulations. It is important to note however that I am running frequencies to simply
understand and illustrate the distribution of my data and will not be making any
predictions or generalizations based on only those results. Further, because this is an
inductive, exploratory study, I will run cross-tabulations to aide exploration. Crosstabulations are an efficient means to uncovering points of convergence and discontinuity
in my sample, indeed laying a foundation for starting my qualitative case analysis
(Huberman & Miles, 1994; Lieberson, 1992; W. Olson, 2004; Ragin, 1987). Again, due
to the fact that I am not making any predictions based solely on these analyses, it is
unnecessary to run any inferential statistics. These quantitative analyses will help
provide a high degree of direction in the in-depth, case-study portion.
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Narratives: Qualitative Case Analysis
My purposes here are to explore the process of becoming involved in a RWT
group. In other words, what are the factors in a person’s life that “tip” a person over the
line that divides non-terrorists from terrorists? While the process of developing codes
and quantifying information can expose potential points of interest, it can also severely
diminish particular details and richness of the information available and collected on each
case. For the collection of data on each indictee, narratives were constructed detailing
nearly any available information about their backgrounds and criminal cases even if at
the time of collection the discovered information did not appear to suit any created
variables. The purpose of this is not only to collect data that may become relevant in
quantifying variables, but more so to produce as much depth in case narratives to later
exemplify findings.
In an effort to illustrate the distributions in my data, I have chosen the case study
approach known as qualitative case analysis. Qualitative research especially inductive
approaches, seek to uncover a phenomenon where relatively little may be known about it
(Babbie, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Levin-Rozalis, 2004; Singleton Jr. & Straits,
1999). Terrorism research in general is still in its infancy, and in many ways is still
largely impressionistic (Crenshaw, 1998, 2000; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 1999;
Victoroff, 2005). This of course is due to the very nature of terrorism and terrorists; the
act is a rare occurrence, and terrorists are not always readily accessible to talk with (e.g.,
covert operations, dangerous individuals, discovery and/or incrimination, if apprehended,
a government may not allow access, etc.) (Laqueur, 1999; Victoroff, 2005). While other
typologies of terrorism have received detailed attention (della Porta, 1995; Sageman,
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2004; Smith, 1994), right-wing terrorists in the United States are an understudied
population (with the exception of sensational cases like Timothy McVeigh37). Lastly, an
aspect of terrorism research that requires further exploration is the process of
involvement. If this process was better understood, it would not only make a significant
contribution to academic research, but also counterterrorism efforts. The above factors
characterizing the state of right-wing terrorism research justifies in-depth, qualitative case
exploration.
Yin (1998) has identified five characteristics and skills that make good case
studies. The first is to ask questions throughout the data collection process. The second
is to absorb as much data as possible of various forms, and attempt to make sense of it
(Yin, 1998). Third is to change data collection strategies when necessary (Yin, 1998).
Fourth, to understand the field that is being studied providing a researcher the ability to
interpret the data, not just record it (Yin, 1998). Finally, a researcher must be able to
interpret the data in an unbiased manner (Yin, 1998). This analysis easily meets Yin’s
(1998) first three requirements as constructing codes was a constant evolutionary process
based on the richness of the data we found, as well as the broad range and depth of our
secondary source collection, and our ability to try new means of information gathering
for particular cases when necessary (e.g., resorting to www.peoplefinder.com). Yin’s
(1998) final two points provide evidence explaining why a deductive approach to this
topic of research and this data could be highly problematic. The ability to interpret one’s
data in an unbiased manner requires that it not be analyzed under the lens of a theoretical
framework (Yin, 1998). Indeed, to do so intrinsically biases one to absorb only those
37

Even in such sensational cases however, most studies to date have focused on individual-level factors
such as psychological pathologies. For an exception, see Wright’s (2007) book on the RWT movement and
the Oklahoma City Bombing.
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points in the data that either clearly “fit” or clearly do not “fit” a given theory (LevinRozalis, 2004; Stake, 1994; Yin, 1998).
The construction of codes and categories were not preconceived by any one
theory, and sometimes not by any theory at all for that matter. Rather, it was as the data
were being collected, preliminary characteristics or patterns emerged that enabled me to
ask questions and change my strategy as I went, a necessary stage (i.e., “data display”,
“data reduction”, etc.) of qualitative case analysis (Huberman & Miles, 1994, p. 429).
Stated differently, my data and methods will allow me to be interpretive and tell its
“story” rather than letting a theory tell the story of my data (Stake, 1994, p. 240). More
specifically, I intend to take the narratives made for each indictee and create more
organized biographies of their lives providing more of a beginning, middle, and end so to
speak of their path to becoming involved with their respective RWT organization
(Huberman & Miles, 1994). These biographies will then be analyzed systematically
using line-by-line coding. This will be a tedious process of constant cross-case
comparing and contrasting, the bedrock of qualitative case analysis, where I will be
uncovering themes related to the process of joining that cut across all cases (or likewise,
do not) (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Olsen, 2004; Rihoux, 2006). In other words, while I
am line-by-line coding each indictee’s biography for “originality” in their process of
joining a RWT group, I am also seeking out “representativeness” of the process of
joining a RWT group among my sample (Wieviorka, 1992). I am interested in
uncovering whether there are some conditions (e.g., family dynamics, particular
friends/cliques) that are necessary, or at the very least sufficient in influencing an
individual to join a RWT organization (Lieberson, 1992; Olsen, 2004; Ragin, 1987). I
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will create matrices that will allow me to physically display thematic groupings of my
indictees on particular variables. These matrices can be viewed as a more detailed
narrative version of quantitative cross-tabulations. This systematic process of line-byline coding of themes in the narratives and physically displaying them will provide me
with a detailed analysis of the process of joining a RWT organization.
Indeed, while narrative data was collected in the spirit of documenting anything
that could aide in constructing an indictee’s background at the broadest level, the data
will be analyzed thematically narrowing around my research questions. Most
specifically, I intend to especially exemplify military experience (research question 1),
the role of children (research question 2), the role of past prior WSM group memberships
(research question 3), the role of social cliques (research question 3), and the role of life
turning points (biographical availability extra) with narrative case data. Finally, though I
am not using any particular theory, I will use the qualitative case analysis results to
inform theory, and in the data chapter will discuss various theoretical implications.

Limitations
As with any study, there are limitations of this analysis in terms of sample, data
collection, and methodology. In terms of sample limitations, the parameters for inclusion
in the present analysis were first decided based on whether the case was included in the
ATS data. A condition of being included in the ATS data is that an individual must be
officially labeled by the government as a terrorist for investigatory purposes38 (under the

38

In other words, committing “terrorism” and being a “terrorist” is a label that the government places on a
case which increases the resources and attention that will be designated to its investigation and prosecution
(Hoffman, 2006).

60
FBI’s definition of terrorism39), and that the person must then be federally indicted
(Smith & Damphousse, 2006). The case of RWT Eric Rudolph, infamous for
perpetrating the bombing at the Atlanta Olympics in 1996, as well as two abortion clinics
and a gay bar, illustrates this limitation very well (Vollers, 2006). Though nobody would
disagree that Rudolph is a terrorist, and indeed his acts are substantively identical to those
of McVeigh and Nichols in the Oklahoma City Bombing, the federal government did not
label and indict him as a terrorist because he reportedly acted alone (Smith, 1994; Smith
& Damphousse, 2006; Vollers, 2006). In other words, a necessary condition for the
government to label a case or person as terroristic, is that there must be an element of
conspiracy present, and obviously one cannot conspire alone (Smith, 1994). The logical
extension of this same issue is that there may be missed cases during the study period
(1980-2002) prosecuted at the state level that are substantively the same in terms of
behaviors40.
The limitations in terms of data collection and methodology have already been
discussed above and thus only require brief mention here. I was limited in terms of the
availability of information about a given case or individual. It warrants reiterating
Sageman’s (2004) work on Islamic terrorists here. Currently considered one of the most
thorough case studies in the field of terrorism, Sageman (2004) provided a
39

FBI terrorism definition: “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate
or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 31).
40
The portion of RWT in the United States that my sample represents cannot be estimated during the study
period due to the aforementioned limitations. It cannot be accurately estimated how often the federal
government has not labeled an individual or action as terroristic like Eric Rudolph, nor can the amount of
state level prosecutions be accurately estimated as each state will vary in statutory definitions of terrorist
and terrorism. Further, like the federal government, states will undoubtedly utilize a great amount of
discretion (likely varying from state to state) regarding when to label a person or act as terroristic at all,
inevitably excluding many acts that may in fact be terrorism. For instance, the development and adoption
of state-level Hate Crime legislation starting in the 1980’s and expanding for the next two decades includes
many types of behaviors that would in fact “fit” other governmental agency definitions of terrorism (e.g.,
the FBI) (Jacobs & Potter, 1998; Jenness & Broad, 1997; Levin, 2002).
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methodological template for my qualitative analysis. Indeed, all of Sageman’s (2004)
data for his 172 terrorists were collected by poring over and coding many of the same
variables using the same types of secondary sources used here. More often than not
however, due to the difficulty of obtaining much of the information sought, Sageman
reported and discussed findings on less than 172 terrorists per variable. The same will be
true here; my frequencies will not always be comprised of information on each of my 66
cases per every variable. Nonetheless, the results of Sageman’s (2004) work as well as
this analysis still hold value in uncovering the process of terroristic involvement. Also,
when information was identified and obtained it was subjectively interpreted and coded.
To minimize the potential threats to the integrity of the data and later findings, we used a
wide array of sources and achieved a high degree of intercoder reliability (i.e., source and
researcher triangulation) (Berg, 2004; Huberman & Miles, 1994). Finally, and as is true
of any studied population, the results of this analysis will not necessarily be able to be
generalized beyond RWT in the United States, or possibly beyond these 66 cases.
Nevertheless, these techniques provide a much higher degree of depth regarding the
information known per individual case than a purely quantitative design could offer. This
design will allow for the first detailed view of involvement processes in RWT
organizations, and indeed will make a necessary addition to Sageman’s (2004) and della
Porta’s (1995) case studies of Islamic and left-wing terrorists respectively.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS & DISCUSSION
In the following section I discuss frequencies and cross-tabulations for each
research question. I follow this with a detailed discussion using the narrative data to
exemplify thematic findings.
Structural Characteristics of Involvement Process
In the first research question I asked, what are the structural characteristics of the
involvement process? The following are the areas in which my sample was most heavily
clustered41: gender (95.5% male), age at initial contact with movement ideas (18.2%
childhood, 16.7% young adults, 18.2% adults), age at time of joining group (50% adults,
22.7% mid-life), social location of initial contact with group (69.7% home), relational
contact between recruited and recruiter (54.5% friend), type of recruitment (72.7%
direct), number of recruiters (34.8% one, 21.2% two, 22.7% self-starter), age of first
recruiter (50% adult), gender of first recruiter (88% male)42, type of WSM group (27.3%
Christian Identity, 63.6% hybrid), length of recruitment (24.2% 1 week-6 months, 21.2%
6 months-1 year), level of involvement (13.6% founder, 18.2% leader, 30.3% core,
28.8% member), military experience (52.3% yes, 47.8% no)43.
Some of the results were expected and thus warrant little discussion. For
example, the fact that over 95% of indictees and 88% of recruiters are male is expected
considering the RWE movement was started and has been dominated by men since the
birth of the Ku Klux Klan in 1865 (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). While women hold
41

Refer to Appendix C, Table 1 for Research Question 1 Frequencies in their entirety.
Note that the “not applicables” (coded when an indictee was considered a “self-starter”, thus no recruiter
existed) were removed to obtain a figure accurately depicting this variable.
43
The unknown cases (22) were removed for the results on this particular variable. With the unknown
cases included, 34.8% have military experience while 31.8% do not, and 33.3% remain unknown. Both
versions may be found in the frequency table (Appendix C, Table 1). It has been reported in-text without
the unknowns here to gain some perspective when compared with the general population in the U.S. for
military experience which will be discussed below.
42
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some formal roles in the movement, they continue to play a supporting role overall (Blee,
1991, 2002, 2005; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Indeed, a major part of WSM
doctrine includes an emphasis on traditional gender roles and a celebration of patriarchal
attitudes and practices (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000).
The fact that over 50% of indictees are friends with their respective recruiter(s)
confirms a substantial body of research regarding the influence of social networks on SM,
NRM, and terrorism recruitment. This finding however, tells us little about the way in
which non-familial relationships influence involvement, a topic which will be explored in
great detail later in this chapter. The fact that over 60% of indictees joined a hybrid
WSM terrorist organization simply reflects the broad overlap among the four branches
discussed in Chapter 1. Over 60% of those indictees where length of recruitment was
available reveal that they joined within one year of initial contact with their respective
RWT organization. Finally, I have a well distributed sample in terms of level of
involvement where nearly 60% of indictees are a combination of core members (defined
as either being a member from the establishment of the group, or being informally
“promoted” to a role that clearly indicates some degree of leadership and/or minor
decision making responsibilities) and regular members (clearly members of the
organization and well aware of all other members of the group and the group’s intentions
and actions, though they hold no decision making powers), nearly 20% of indictees held
distinct leadership positions, and finally 14% were actual founders of the RWT
organization in question. This distribution of level of involvement provides a diverse
sample of characteristics of the involvement process.
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Particular findings warrant more detailed discussion including age of initial
contact with WSM ideology, the indictee’s actual age at joining the RWT group in
question, the social location of the recruitment, the type of recruitment and media utilized
in the recruitment, the number of recruiters, the age of recruiters, and finally, the
concentration of military experience in my sample.

Age of Initial Contact
Beginning with the age of initial contact with WSM ideology, 35% of indictees
learned of WSM ideology after the age of 19, while nearly 20% were introduced to it
during childhood. The two figures present very different life trajectories in terms of the
eventual involvement with RWT groups.
The narratives indicate that the introduction to WSM ideas in childhood occurs in
one of two ways. I refer to these two types of introduction as “Authority” and
“Coincidence.” By authority, I mean that a respected adult in the subject’s life
intentionally introduced the indictee to WSM ideas for the express purposes of
persuading the indictee to take on the same ideology. Coincidence refers to a chance
introduction to WSM ideas without the intent of persuading the indictee to adopt the
beliefs. Over 60% of indictees introduced to the WSM during childhood learned from an
adult authority figure. This introduction was sometimes extremely overt. For example,
Pete Langan, a former leader in the Aryan Republican Army (ARA) recalled being
introduced to the “mark of Cain.” The mark of Cain is a Biblical story that has often
been interpreted as equating evil with the “darkness of human skin” (Hamm, 2002). The
authority figure responsible for this was Langan’s neighbor, a devout Mormon working
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as an FBI agent (Hamm, 2002). This teaching was further reinforced by the fact that
Langan grew up during the 1960’s; a time when blacks were still routinely discriminated
against. According to Langan who was raised in a very patriotic and pro-government
family, the combined influence of the FBI agent’s authority and the racial experiences he
was observing around him fostered the development of a profound sense of racial
superiority at an early age (RWT Indictee #2).
Not all childhood authority introductions are as overt however. As opposed to the
direct teaching of racial superiority, Michael Brescia, another ARA member, recalls
observing his mother’s political actions. As president of a civic group in their
community, his mother headed a campaign opposing the construction of a synagogue in
their all Irish community (RWT Indictee #1) (Hamm, 2002). Here the authority figure
leads by example rather than directly conversing about such ideological beliefs, which is
a different way of communicating the beliefs but may have the same affect. By all other
accounts, Brescia’s mother never provided him with overt prejudicial or racist teachings
(Hamm, 2002). Over sixty percent of those introduced by an authority figure, learned
WSM ideology early on in their lives. Some were quite literally educated by the WSM,
like David Tate, an imprisoned member of the Order (RWT Indictee #32). This
indictee’s family moved him to Richard Butler’s Aryan Nations compound during his
early childhood where he was placed in an “Aryan Academy” home school with other
children. Others, however, were taught particular beliefs in the home without any official
affiliation with the broader WSM. Indeed, Richard Butler (RWT Indictee #51), for
example, recalls being taught racist and anti-Semitic beliefs by his father, yet his father
was never affiliated with any radical political groups.
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Other subjects introduced to WSM ideology in childhood were presented with it
differently. Instead of being formally introduced to such notions by a respected authority
figure, approximately 30% of those introduced in childhood discovered WSM ideology
by what can be described as coincidence. In other words, these indictees were introduced
to it either by “stumbling upon” the ideology or being introduced to it for reasons other
than indoctrination. Though coding particular narrative data as being mere coincidence
may not appear to have a great deal of scientific precision, an entire field of sociological
study has developed dedicated to what Robert Merton referred to as serendipity (Merton
& Barber, 2004).
Among those interested in interpreting the significance of serendipity for
research…happy accidental discoveries…occur when a trained observer
encounters unexpected and unfamiliar data…the trained investigator is in a better
position to evolve meaningful hypotheses. (as cited in Merton & Barber, 2004, pp.
197-198)
If scientists can uncover scientific results in a serendipitous manner during the
course of their research, I suggest that social scientists can analyze people’s lives in a
systematic way to uncover similar patterns of serendipity or coincidence. One RWT
indictee recalls the following way in which he first learned of the WSM:
…I was first made aware of [WSM ideology] in my sixth grade social studies
class. The study of reconstruction after the civil war. My social study text was
vilifying the Ku Klux Klan because it stood up for the interests of white
southerners. And I thought to myself ‘What’s wrong with that?’…Why is it okay
for non-whites to be proud and cultivate their race, but it was wrong and evil for
me…so from then on I wondered if groups such as the KKK still existed, and how
could I find them. (Interview with Order member, 2004)
In this case, the Order member was being introduced to the WSM by an authority figure
(sixth grade teacher and textbook), however the motivation was entirely different than the
other cases above. This indictee was introduced to the WSM as a historical lesson which
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then influenced him to seek out modern WSM groups quite early on in his life. Similarly,
another indictee at a remarkably young age (7 years) began questioning the plausibility of
the Holocaust which eventually led to his active denial of it (Lane, 2006). Growing up
during WWII, one of the most influential WSM terrorists in the United States, David
Lane (RWT Indictee #16), recalled being scolded by his mother for playing “Nazi
soldiers” in his backyard (Lane, 2006).
When…I played soldiers I always wanted to be the German and proudly chanted
‘Heil Hitler’ and ‘Sieg Heil’ while giving the so-called Nazi salute. My mother
told me to stop and even gave me a spanking…she regaled me with stories of the
evil Germans and how they mass murdered Jews. I rebelled. Undoubtedly,
without the vocabulary of an adult but with the uncontaminated mind of a child, I
argued that it was not true…it did not seem logical or possible… (Lane, 2006,
Chapter 2, p. 3)
Indeed, Holocaust denial has always been a widely known and supported conspiracy
theory among the WSM (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). This was the beginning of
David Lane’s exploration of WSM ideology.
Neither of these two subjects received overt guidance toward WSM ideas instead
their exposure appears to have been coincidental. The founder of the RWT organization
known as the Order also came upon WSM ideology in the same manner. At the age of
11, Robert Mathews sat with his mother as she read the local Sunday paper (RWT
Indictee #35). For an 11 year old, Mathews displayed an unusually passionate interest in
government and politics. His mother, Una Mathews, was civic-minded and encouraged
her son’s interest in politics. Growing up in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, Robert
Mathews was well aware of the Cold War and began to fear the spread of Communism.
Scanning the newspaper one October morning by his mother’s side, Mathews came
across a detailed advertisement for a radical RW political group known as the John Birch
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Society (JBS), an organization “for fighting the communist influence” (Flynn &
Gerhardt, 1995, p. 41). Una Mathews’s ignorance about the organization coupled with
simultaneous pride in her son’s interest in politics inadvertently facilitated his journey
into the WSM.
To reiterate, nearly 20% of the indictees were introduced to the WSM in
childhood and this occurred in one of two ways. Either an authority figure taught the
child or a coincidental occurrence took place that led them to their discovery of WSM
ideology. As for the nearly 35% of indictees that were introduced during young
adulthood or adulthood, these cases will be discussed in greater detail when analyzing the
influence non-familial relations has on recruitment.

Age at Joining RWT organization
The majority of indictees (over 70%) joined their respective RWT group after age
25. This finding contradicts a great deal of the biographical availability literature that
suggests most individuals join NRM or SM between the ages of 18 and 23/24, the ages in
which a person is likely to be most available due to freedom from parental control and
marriage/children (Dawson, 2003; Levine, 2003; McAdam, 1986; Snow, et al., 1997).
Though one could argue that many indictees may have joined other groups within the
WSM at earlier ages, thus lending more support to previous findings regarding
biographical availability, nearly 20% of indictees were not even aware of WSM ideology
until after the age of 25. However, approximately 16% of indictees made contact with
WSM ideology between the ages of 19-24, though this does not necessarily mean they
joined other groups within the WSM during this time. This finding suggests that RWTs
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join later than other types of terrorists and social movement activists (see also Smith,
1994). However, these slightly older ages do seem to follow previous studies of Middle
Eastern terrorists (Sageman, 2004; Victoroff, 2005). One possible explanation for the
older ages of RWTs in my sample is the WSM’s emphasis on the family which will be
explored in greater detail in the next section (Research Question #2).

Social Location of Recruitment
Nearly 70% of actual recruitment takes place in a private home. Although
interesting, it is not surprising given the secretive nature of terrorist groups. This finding
is of interest considering that most individuals are recruited into NRM, SM, and
mainstream religions in more public or semi-public settings, such as school, work,
marches, music shows, etc. (Aho, 1990; Almeida, 2005; della Porta, 1995; Futrell &
Simi, 2004; Gould, 1997; McAdam, 1986; Oliver, 1997; Simi & Futrell, 2006). Joining a
law violating organization such as terrorist group may encourage greater secrecy in terms
of recruitment strategies as compared to a radical activist group or non-mainstream
religion. Thus, it makes sense that when recruiting an individual, recruiters and potential
joiners alike seek the security a private home affords though there has been little evidence
among other types of terrorists that recruitment is predominantly occurring in private
homes (della Porta, 1995; Sageman, 2004; Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

Type of Recruitment
If 70% of recruitment/joining takes place in a private home, the finding that over
70% of recruitment takes place directly should not be surprising. In other words,
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recruitment most often takes place face to face as opposed to indirect means. Because
recruitment is typically face to face, there are few cases in this sample in which some
type of media was used (either by itself or in addition to face to face recruitment).
Although propaganda is widely used in the WSM, it is curious that these materials were
used less often among subjects in this sample. However, there are two possible
explanations for this. First, extra materials are unnecessary at the level of terrorist
organization recruitment. Indeed, nearly 90% of indictees were aware of the WSM and
65% of indictees had joined other WSM groups prior to joining their respective RWT
groups. This suggests that these individuals may have already been aware of the
movement’s literature and other materials. Secondly, indirect tools such as propaganda
may be much less influential than face to face encounters and thus recruiters are more
likely to rely on the former as opposed to the latter.
Nonetheless, a brief mention of the 21% of indictees that were subjected to media
materials as part of their recruitment process is warranted. Upon further analysis, these
indictees’ narratives reveal that they were subjected to many of the same media materials.
In 50% of these cases two books were especially influential: The Turner Diaries and The
Silent Brotherhood. The Turner Diaries (MacDonald, 1996, 1978), written under the
pseudonym “Andrew McDonald” was authored by William Pierce the founder of the
RWE organization known as the National Alliance and is a fictional account of a violent
race war that ensues in the United States (MacDonald, 1996, 1978). The Silent
Brotherhood (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995) is a journalistic account of one of the most violent
RWT organizations in the United States and one of the RWT organizations in this sample
also known as The Order. In the cases in which these texts were used, indictees were not
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only taken with the stories but also motivated to act. One indictee for instance, William
Guthrie, was so inspired after reading The Turner Diaries (MacDonald, 1996, 1978) that
he painted a swastika on the side of the U.S. Navy ship where he was stationed in Europe
(RWT Indictee #6) (Hamm, 2002). Indeed, the influence of The Turner Diaries
(MacDonald, 1996, 1978) became tragically apparent to the general public when a copy
was found in Timothy McVeigh’s possession immediately following his arrest after the
Oklahoma City bombing (RWT Indictee #57) (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Stickney, 1996).
In one particular RWT organization founded in the 1990’s, the Aryan Republican Army
(ARA), one of the leaders assigned The Silent Brotherhood (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995) to
the younger members as an educational tool to be studied. This leader, Mark Thomas,
used it as a mechanism to teach his members on how their predecessors operated (RWT
Indictee #5). In other words, Thomas used the text to show the necessary dedication and
sacrifice of the Order members as well as to illustrate the organization’s mistakes
(Hamm, 2002).
Though different types of media were not typically a central part of the
recruitment process, it is clear that particular pieces of literature turn up in various cases
across both decades. Also worth noting is the influence, or lack thereof, the internet
played in this sample. Previous studies suggest that various types of extremists are using
cyberspace for the purposes of recruitment and sustaining a sense of collective identity
(Rogers, 2003; Sageman, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2006; Tsfati & Weimann, 2002). Due to
the time period under analysis here, the internet was non-existent for a majority of the
indictees. Many of the indictees from the 1980’s were starting their RWT organizations
back in the mid- and late 1970’s prior to the development of the internet.
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Number & Age of Recruiters
The number and age of recruiters is also an interesting dimension when
developing a general composite of the recruitment/joining process. While 35% of
indictees join their respective RWT group while being recruited by one individual, 30%
are recruited by two or more individuals, and 23% are self-starters that sought out the
group on their own. Further, for those cases that involved a recruiter(s), over 75% of the
single or first recruiter and over 75% of the secondary recruiters were between the ages
of 25-40 (only eight indictees had more than two recruiters, also 75% of which were
between the ages of 25-40). These results indicate that the recruitment process is not a
predatory process which some research has contended (Barker, 1984; Blazak, 2001;
Carter, 1990; Levine, 2003; Lifton, 2000). In other words, adult recruiters are not
targeting teenagers coming from “broken homes” who are searching for a sense of
belonging and a surrogate family (Blazak, 2001; Levine, 2003).

Military Experience
Finally, the concentration of military experience in my sample is substantially
higher than the general U.S. population. At least 35%, and possibly as many as 52% of
US RW terrorist indictees in my sample have military experience. As of 2000, only
.102% of the US population had prior military experience 44 (Census, 2000a, 2000b;
DoD, 2000). There has been a consistent history of RWE in the US military. As stated
earlier, the KKK was formed by confederate soldiers (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000)
44

This statistic (military experience in general U.S. population) was derived by taking the most recent
available data from three different sources for the same year. 1) Civilian veterans in the United States as of
2000; 26,403,703 (Census, 2000a) and adding 2) Active military personnel as of 2000; 1,384,338 (DoD,
2000) and dividing the sum (27,788,041) by 3) The total U.S. population in 2000; 272,690,813 (Census,
2000b).
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and the Klan’s first Imperial Wizard was a general in the Confederate Army. Since 1953,
at least nine RWE organizations have been founded by active military personnel (SPLC,
2006). Many of these individuals have been high-ranking officers, including generals,
rear admirals, commanders, lieutenant generals, and lieutenant colonels (SPLC, 2006).
Some have even been members of elite special forces like the Navy Seals, Green Berets,
and Delta Force Recon teams (Holthouse, 2006; SPLC, 2006). At least 4 KKK chapters
were uncovered that were comprised of only active military personnel on US Army bases
(SPLC, 2006). In 1990 it was discovered that a US Air Force Sergeant was the chief
recruiter for the KKK for the entire state of Texas (SPLC, 2006). Sparked by the
Oklahoma City Bombing and the murder of a black couple near Fort Bragg, N.C. by three
white supremacist military personnel, Congressional hearings were held to assess the
presence of RWE in the military (Holthouse, 2006; SPLC, 2006). A “zero-tolerance
policy” was adopted directing recruiters to reject extremists trying to enlist in the
military. Further, officers were directed to report individuals already enlisted whom they
discovered to be extremists (by tattoos or behaviors). In theory, these individuals were
supposed to be investigated, and if an officer’s suspicions were confirmed, the individual
would receive a dishonorable discharge (Holthouse, 2006; SPLC, 2006). This crackdown
however has not worked, especially in recent wartime where building recruitment
numbers is imperative (Holthouse, 2006; SPLC, 2006).
Why is the disparity in military experience among RWTs compared to the general
population crucial to study? As Department of Defense gang investigator Scott Barfield
has said “today’s white supremacists in the military become tomorrow’s domestic
terrorists once they’re out…We’ve got Aryan Nations graffiti in Baghdad…That’s a
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problem” (Holthouse, 2006, pp. 1-5). Military personnel are neglecting the problem due
to enlistment pressures and the need for personnel overseas (Holthouse, 2006). What is
motivating RWE individuals to join the military? Or is the military creating RWEs?
Some RWEs have strongly endorsed the idea of movement members joining the military
for the purposes of receiving weapons training and infiltrating the system. An article
appearing in the National Alliance’s Resistance magazine provided encouragement to
join the US Army and advice on how to do it:
Light infantry is your branch of choice because the coming race war, and
the ethnic cleansing to follow, will be very much an infantryman’s
war...Do not—I repeat, do not—seek out other skinheads…During your
service you will be subjected to a constant barrage of equal opportunity
drivel…keep your mouth shut. Endure it. If you are ever questioned
about “race relations” parrot the following lines: “There are no races in the
Army, we are all green”…If you are a leader in the skinhead movement
advise your newly recruited members to not get tattoos and tell them their
first duty as a skinhead is to join the Army and become a trained
infantryman. As a professional soldier, my goal is to fill the ranks of the
United States Army infantry with skinheads. As street brawlers you will
be useless in the coming race war. As trained infantrymen you will join
the ranks of the Aryan warrior brotherhood (online article by Peiper,
1999).
The military’s desire to investigate the prevalence of RWE today has waned since
the Congressional Hearings in the 1990’s because of the War in Iraq and Afghanistan
(Holthouse, 2006). Based on history in the examples given above, it is very important to
know how pervasive RWE in the military is, especially considering the large number of
Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans returning home. Once the prevalence of RWE in the
military is identified it is important to further examine why this relationship exists.
In my sample of RWT indictees with military experience (using the figure of 35%
because they are the “knowns”), 17% were founders of their RWT organization, 22%
were leaders in their RWT organization, and the remaining 43% were core members of
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their respective RWT organization. The majority were enlisted in the Army (44%), 17%
Navy, 9% Marines, 9% Air Force, 13% served in more than one branch, and 9% are
unknown which branch(s) they served in. While over 40% of those indictees with prior
military experience were core members, ultimately an additional 40% were the principal
role players in their RWT organization in question (founders and/or leaders). Stated
differently, over 80% of those indictees with prior military experience were not merely
average members of RWT organizations, but rather played a significant role in their
respective groups.
Due to the time period of this sample, some observers have argued that an
attraction to paramilitary/militia behaviors and groups was a larger cultural trend that
emerged in the post-Vietnam War Era (Gibson, 1994). Gibson (1994) argues that during
the 1980’s American culture became characterized by a paramilitary emphasis and a new
definition of war and warrior. He argues that this was a bi-product of America’s failure
in Vietnam, which led to an explosion of military, anti-government, and world
domination themed media consumed by popular culture (films like “Rambo,” “Mad
Max,” “Patriot Games,” “The Hunt for Red October,” etc.). The country’s military defeat
in Vietnam after a long history and reputation as the strongest military in the world
contributed to a “cultural identity crisis” among White American men (Gibson, 1994).
Gibson’s (1994) argument is that this crisis led to a desire to consume movies, shows,
and games that were violently themed with wars portraying white men as the “ultimate
victor.” The civil rights movement and other progressive social movements, changing
demographics, rising national debt and crime rates compounded the white male identity
crisis (Gibson, 1994). Prior to the 1970s, the cultural identity of white males was
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associated with domination and privilege in all spheres of life. As Gibson (1994) points
out however, “customary male behavior was no longer acceptable in either private
relationships or public policy…Men had to change, but to what? The vast proliferation
of warrior fantasies represented an attempt to reaffirm the national identity” (pp. 11-14).
The current political climate in the United States is not unlike the climate twenty
years ago, including the stress of a long and costly war, the immigration of non-white
populations, a sizeable national debt, and additionally, the election of the first AfricanAmerican president. In fact, there has been a noticeable increase in right-wing militia
groups in the past two years, including over 50 newly identified organizations (D'Oro,
2009; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Further, several of the groups recently founded have been
started by military veterans (D’Oro, 2009). With a current political climate that is
strikingly similar to that discussed by Gibson (1994), what can be learned from some of
the personal accounts of the RWT indictees in my sample?
There are three themes of military experience as an impetus to participation in
RWT: military rejection, internal military conflicts, and embittered veterans. Two RWT
indictees in particular became involved in anti-government behaviors almost immediately
after leaving the military which coincided with their failure to secure a position in Special
Forces Units (Hamm, 2002). In other words, these RWT indictees suffered from military
rejection. William Guthrie, a leader in the Aryan Republican Army (ARA), spent over 3
years in the Navy ending his career with a dishonorable discharge (2002) (RWT Indictee
#6). Guthrie, viewing the Navy SEALS as “the toughest military training in the world”
(as cited in Hamm, 2002, p. 122), eagerly started his training in the Special Forces Unit
shortly thereafter being rejected due to physical agility failures (2002). Following his
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dismissal from the Special Forces Unit, Guthrie became deeply angered at the U.S.
government and went AWOL (2002). During his return to serve time for his AWOL
episode, a fellow Navy man loaned him the white supremacist book The Turner Diaries
(2002). After reading the fictional race war novel, Guthrie painted a large swastika on
the side of his ship (2002). Subsequently, Guthrie received a dishonorable discharge
after his court-martial hearing (2002). According to one of his closest friends and Aryan
Republican Army founder Pete Langan, “Guthrie’s major gripe with the U.S. government
was that he did not become a Navy SEAL. After getting kicked out of the Navy, he
began a one-man vendetta against the government” (as cited in Hamm, 2002, p. 122).
Timothy McVeigh found himself in similar circumstances with the U.S. military
(2002) (RWT Indictee #57). Contrary to Guthrie, McVeigh had some previous
introduction with anti-government ideas prior to joining the U.S. Army in 1988 (Michel
& Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). McVeigh was especially concerned with the
government violating his 2nd Amendment rights and gun-control laws; indeed neighbors
and family friends later interviewed after the Oklahoma City Bombing recall him being
quite interested in firearms and paramilitary lifestyle from an early age (Michel &
Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). From the time McVeigh joined the military he was
recognized as being a disciplined soldier by his superiors and peers as well (Michel &
Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). Former military peers also have commented that while
McVeigh was a model soldier he seemed to have an abnormal lack of interest in social
aspects of life during routine furloughs and breaks (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright,
2007). When other soldiers were going out drinking, McVeigh would remain on base
cleaning his personal arsenal of guns (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). After
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coming back from the Gulf War as a decorated soldier, McVeigh joined the Army’s
Green Berets and like Guthrie’s experience with the Special Forces, McVeigh was
quickly “washed out” and returned to basic infantry (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright,
2007). McVeigh then decided to leave the Army to return to civilian life as a security
guard (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). Through this period of dealing with
rejection from the military, McVeigh’s disapproval of the U.S. government grew to
disdain (Hamm, 2002; Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). As with Guthrie,
McVeigh was rejected by a government that he had wanted to represent as an elite
soldier. McVeigh was also inspired by Pierce’s “The Turner Diaries” and he ultimately
sought out the company of likeminded individuals who helped him blow up the federal
building in Oklahoma City (Hamm, 2002).
In another indictee’s case, an Order member found that internal military conflicts
could partly account for his path into a RWT organization. Although he respected the
military and wanted to join, after he entered the military he became disillusioned and
opposed much of what he encountered in the military. Contrary to Guthrie and
McVeigh’s initial introduction to WSM ideas taking place while active in the U.S.
military, the Order member recalls being exposed to such ideas as far back as elementary
school (interview with Order member). He states that his first experience with thinking
about white supremacist ideas was during a 6th grade class focused on the Civil War Era
(2004). He stated:
My social study [sic] text was vilifying the Ku Klux Klan because it stood up for
the interests of white southerners. And I thought to myself “what’s wrong with
that”? I seen [sic] Mexicans, Indians and blacks promoting their race and yelling
racial slogans all throughout the 1960’s. So I was confused! Why is it okay for
non-whites to be proud and cultivate their race, but it was wrong and evil for me
to be proud of my race? And from my point of view, it seemed my race had the
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most to be proud of! So, from then on I wondered if groups such as the KKK still
existed, and how could I find them (interview with Order Member, 2004).
He recollects however that his feelings of minority inferiority and white superiority were
developed during his time in the US Marine Corp. In 1973, after being arrested for a
felony property crime, a judge offered him a choice between going to jail or enlisting in
the US Marine Corp. Though he went AWOL in less than 3 years of service, the Order
member insisted that his experiences with black Marines and the differences in treatment
towards blacks and whites by the military set the basis for his later beliefs about race and
the US Government. He recalls about going AWOL:
The best fighting force the world ever seen [sic] was destroyed by
negroes…White Marines did all the work while blacks lazed around…They did as
they please. But whites were expected to be shipshape 24/7. I was fed up with
the hypocracy [sic], negroes, and the Marines…I don’t blame blacks, I blame the
administrators of the Corps for letting down the good Marines to appease the
blacks, who were known throughout the Corps as being “shitbirds”. That was
basically when I turned my back on society. Because it wasn’t just the Marine
Corps that mollycoddled the blacks, but all of society (interview with Order
member, 2004).
After he went AWOL, he returned to Arizona and began committing property
crimes with his younger brother to “make ends meat” (interview with Order member
2004). By 1974, he was finally caught and given a sentence of 5-8 years in the Arizona
State Prison. His negative experiences in the Marine Corps with blacks were exacerbated
during his time in prison. He recalls:
Prison was a powder bag of racism, and it was there that I decided I did not want
non-whites around me, at all. They tried to kill me twice, once by knives, and
once by trying to set me on fire while I slept. It is ironic that it is in that prison at
that time that I found the add in “Easy Rider” [magazine] for white racial
organizations…including the K.K.K. By this time, yes, I hated all non-whites
(interview with Order member, 2004).
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His experiences in the Marine Corps, coupled with his experiences in prison,
created a strong hatred for both the US Government and minority populations. Prior to
either the military or prison, however, his initial exposure to WSM ideas was in the sixth
grade when learning about the Ku Klux Klan. Although in the sixth grade he was already
sympathetic to the WSM he had no life experiences that actually “pushed” him into
actively pursuing the movement. Less than 15 years later, after a variety of negative
experiences with minorities, he was again introduced to the KKK. It was this second
introduction that pushed him into actively seeking entrée into the WSM. Without his
personal experiences in the military however, he says he would not have had such a
disdain for the US government (interview with Order member, 2004).
The founder of the Order, Robert Jay Mathews (RWT indictee #35), also
struggled with an internal conflict toward the US military. Mathews’ dream of going into
the military, however, never came to fruition because of a particular personal conflict.
Having grown up during the late 1950’s and 1960’s, Mathews developed a strong
interest in politics at a young age (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). At the age of 11 Mathews
found a newspaper article advertising The John Birch Society45 (JBS) leading him to
become fearful of communism and even more interested in joining the fight against it
(1995). Mathews soon became a dedicated and valued young member of JBS and
continued to radicalize his conservative beliefs (1995). Facilitating this radicalization,
Mathews also began studying the Book of Mormon and going to Temple with some of
his high school friends raised in the religion (1995). Mathews soon began to become
obsessed with their straight-laced lifestyle and viewed them as “model teenagers,
45

The Southern Poverty Law Center defines this group as a “Patriot” group of the far right-wing adopting
strong opposition against big government. In other words, this group supports limited government, and is
very anti-communist, socialist, and opposes wealth redistribution and taxes (SPLC, 2010).
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industrious, clean-living kids with whom he shared a conservative…philosophy” (1995,
p. 42). He began to become regimented in this lifestyle and, at the same time, suspicious
of any persons not involved in his new found organizations that opposed ideals like
communism and even taxation (1995). He began to argue with his parents that his
teachers in high school were promoting their own agendas and that a university setting
would be even worse referring to colleges as “hotbeds of communism” (as cited in Flynn
& Gerhardt, 1995, p. 44).
He advised his parents that “there was one institution that was perfect for
him…the U.S. Military Academy at West Point” (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 45).
Though his father, an Army veteran, would have rather he attend a civilian college or the
Air Force Academy, he wrote letters to the Senate and Congress and helped his son
obtain a West Point entrance exam (1995). Mathews’ father was relieved that his son’s
anti-government sentiments were diminishing (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). However,
Mathews’ trust of the government collapsed following the infamous My Lai massacre of
1968, which involved the mass murder and torture of an estimated 500 Vietnamese
women and children in South Vietnam during the war (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Gibson,
1994). It was not, however, the massacre that affected Mathews. Instead, it was the 1971
court-martialing and later murder conviction of Lieutenant William Calley of the US
Army that bothered Mathews (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Gibson, 1994). Mathews found
his conviction to be an example of the US government using Calley as a “scapegoat”
(Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 45). What further disturbed Mathews was how the incident
at My Lai helped turn public opinion against the war (Gibson, 1994). Shortly before he
was to take his entrance exam for West Point, he told his father that he felt the military
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was too corrupt and no longer aspired to be a part of it (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). The
My Lai incident changed Mathews’ view of both the US government and especially the
US military forever, leading him down a path to right-wing radicalization that would
eventually make him one of the most notorious RWT group leaders in the WSM.
Finally, embittered veterans are likely the greatest concern considering the current
political climate as it relates to immigration reform, the election of our first black
president, and the lack of support for the war in the Middle East (D'Oro, 2009; DHS,
April, 2009; Gibson, 1994; Simi & Futrell, 2010; SPLC, 2006). Two RWT indictees
provide examples of embittered combat veterans: James Sherman Dye (RWT Indictee
#11) of the Order and Kent Yates (RWT Indictee #49) of the Covenant, Sword, and Arm
of the Lord (CSA). Both men were Vietnam veterans and were severely impacted by
their experiences not only during the war, but especially upon their return home to the US
(Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Gibson, 1994; Noble, 1998, 2004). Dye was severely injured
in Vietnam by shrapnel from a mortar explosion which left him with a metal plate in his
head (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). Dye was proud of his combat status and considered it
“his red badge of courage” (1995, p. 195). However, after returning home, he quickly
learned that the people he thought he was protecting and fighting for in the US were
anything but grateful:
…he was treated with scorn for having served bravely and with honor in the
Marine Corps. He came to believe that it was a useless war and the men who
fought it had been pawns in a rich man’s game. The experience embittered him,
weakened his self-esteem, and drove him to drink (1995, pp. 195-196).
Dye began to resent his combat status, and particularly the injuries he suffered for a
country that not only did not appreciate his personal sacrifices, but in his view hated him
for it (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). Not only did Dye develop an alcohol problem, he was
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also underemployed and looking for someone to blame (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995).
Surrounded by friends in similar circumstances, they started to place blame on minority
groups (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). At the age of 36, Dye joined his first WSM group, a
local chapter of the KKK (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). Within months, Dye would meet
Mathews through his links within the WSM (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). By this time,
Mathews had already established the Order, and was actively seeking out like-minded
men who desired vengeance against a government that had wronged them (Flynn &
Gerhardt, 1995). Dye’s military training and experience would not only be appreciated,
but sought after as an extremely valuable commodity (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995).
Similar to Dye, Kent Yates of CSA was a Vietnam veteran who served in the
Army (interview with CSA member, 2004). Interestingly, Yates achieved what McVeigh
and Guthrie could only dream about, and, in fact, made it into the Special Forces, the elite
Green Berets (Wright, 2007). Much like Dye, his skills were especially valued by his
respective RWT organization (interview with CSA member, 2004). Jim Ellison (RWT
Indictee #36), the founder of CSA recruited Yates to be the group’s munitions expert and
run the compound’s armory (interview with CSA member, 2004). Though CSA never
carried out their plans to bomb the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
Yates was responsible for successfully developing the explosives to do it46 (Wright,
2007). Yates too was disappointed with his homecoming to US soil after the Vietnam
War (interview with CSA member, 2004). Like Dye, he felt he had made a great deal of
sacrifice in his military service (2004). Instead of returning home to a hero’s welcome,
he returned home to hostile territory. Tired of the public’s lack of support for the war and

46

See Appendix B, List 1 for more information regarding CSA’s failed plans to bomb Oklahoma City, but
many other successful terroristic acts and attacks.

84
its soldiers, Yates moved his wife and children to a religious extremist compound in
Indiana known as Padanaram (2004). While this compound served to separate them from
society, it was generally peaceful and had no anti-government ideals. Finding his place
in CSA fulfilled his desire to wage war on a government that he felt had failed him
(2004).
Clearly there are a disproportionate number of RWT indictees with prior military
experience. Over the past decade, leaders within the WSM have discovered the value of
military experience as it relates to tactical knowledge of warfare, weapons, and
discipline, and for the past several years have been heavily advertising this value to “foot
soldiers” of the movement encouraging them to enlist (Holthouse, 2006). This is
interesting because the timeframe of the sample under analysis here had little
encouragement from the WSM or other RWT groups to enlist, yet still had a highly
disproportionate pool of ex-military within their ranks. This likely occurred for a variety
of reasons as Gibson (1994) has argued, including the lack of support for and loss of the
Vietnam War, a poor economy, social changes in minority rights, immigration, and the
changing nature of the American male’s role in society. Considering the US is currently
engaged in a costly and long war in the Middle East with dwindling support, has an
economy defined by a widespread mortgage crisis, inadequate healthcare, and high
unemployment rates, is divided about immigration reform, and is adjusting to the
historical election of a minority president, the logical extension is that the WSM and
RWT organizations will soon have an even higher proportion of skilled/trained military
vets than the sample under current analysis. Those individuals already involved in the
WSM are being influenced to join the military for the experience, and those coming
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home from tours of duty receiving their discharge papers are being targeted as potential
recruits in the WSM and RWT groups (D'Oro, 2009; DHS, April, 2009; Gibson, 1994;
Holthouse, 2006; Noble, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Based on the RWT indictees in
my sample, their experiences with the military were pivotal in their later involvement
with the WSM and their respective terrorist organizations.
There is definite link between WSM and/or RWT groups and individuals with
military/combat experience. The need to better understand this relationship between
extremist group involvement and military experience is critical given current
circumstances (DHS, April, 2009). Military personnel returning may also be especially
unique compared to those veterans of past conflicts because a majority of soldiers are
serving an average of more than one tour, each of which is a longer period, and time off
between deployments has been shorter (Hosek, Kavanagh, & Miller, 2006). As the
Department of Homeland Security has warned, embittered military veterans from the
Iraq/Afghanistan war coming home to a less than favorable political climate may be a
serious threat to the US (DHS, April, 2009).
To briefly summarize the structural components of the recruitment process,
certain variables illustrate very well what the recruitment process looks like. Most
indictees were introduced to the WSM in general after the age of 19 (sometimes by an
authority figure and sometimes by coincidence) and a vast majority joined their
respective RWT organization after the age of 25. Those serving as recruiters appeared to
be approximately the same age or slightly older than those they recruited, the majority
being over the age of 25. Nearly three-quarters of all RWT indictees were recruited
directly, face-to-face with their recruiter(s). Also, three-quarters of the time this process
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took place behind the closed doors of a private home. Finally, an extremely
disproportionate amount of RWT indictees (possibly half, but at least 35%) have military
experience. These indictees have had a very difficult time assimilating back into civilian
life after their discharges, and in many cases their affinity for the WSM began during
their time in the military.

Family Dynamics of Involvement Process
In the second research question I asked, “What is the influence of family
dynamics on the involvement process?” The following are the areas in which my sample
was most heavily clustered47: marital status (57.6% married), children (42.4% yes),
parental involvement (39.4% yes), family members involved in WSM (50% yes), number
of family members involved in WSM (36.4% one), relation of first family member
involved (28.8% spouse).
Table 2: Research Question 2 Clusters
Variable
Marital Status
Single (never married)
Married
Divorced
Children
No
Yes
Parental Involvement
No
Yes
Family Members Involved in WSM
No
Yes
Number of Family Members Involved in WSM
1
47

Frequency

%

12
38
10

18.2
57.6
15.2

19
28

28.8
42.4

2
26

3.0
39.4

% unknown
7.6

28.8
28.8
22.7
18
33

27.3
50
22.7

24

36.4

Refer to Appendix C, Table 2 for Research Question 2 Frequencies in their entirety.
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2
Relation of Family Members Involved 1
Parent
Sibling
Spouse

7

10.6

6
4
19

9.1
6.1
28.8

22.7

Nearly 60% of RWT indictees in this sample were married and nearly half had
children. Of those that had children, 40% were actively involved in raising their families.
This is interesting because the idea that these indictees were bound to families is contrary
to most of the research on one’s likelihood to become involved in a SM (McAdam, 1986;
Oliver, 1997), NRM (Levine, 2003; Lofland & Stark, 1965), or terrorist group (della
Porta, 1995). In his analysis of Salafi Mujahedin Muslim terrorists, however, Sageman
(2004) found that at least 73% were married with children. He notes the uniqueness of
this finding compared to previous research, but also mentions that this pattern is
consistent with the culture and tenets of the religion (2004). Further, aside from
Sageman’s (2004) analysis, little research within terrorism studies has focused on
variables involving parenthood.
What does the qualitative data collected in this analysis help to uncover as to why
a majority of RWT indictees are “married with children”? Similar to the jihadists
Sageman studied, I argue that having an Aryan wife and bearing Aryan children are
central tenets of the WSM, a movement that was the beginning of the indictees’
radicalization into RWT organizations (Blee, 1991, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile,
2000). The WSM has utilized the ideals of Aryan procreation in propaganda and
recruitment strategies for decades (Blee, 1991, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000).
This is partly due to the fact that the ideology of the WSM requires movement followers
to not only replenish but increase the “pure” white population to combat an increasing

88
minority population which they perceive as a threat to the existence of the “white race”
(Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000)48. In fact, the “14 Words,” a movement mantra which
was penned by David Lane, a member of the Order, while imprison has become one of
the most popular slogans and a common tattoo within the WSM (Dobratz & ShanksMeile, 2000). The “14 Words” stands for the following phrase: “We must secure the
existence of our race and a future for White children” (as cited in Dobratz & ShanksMeile, 2000, p. 17). As many WSM scholars have pointed out, this phrase is at the
“core” of WSM ideology, which helps to explain why a majority of the RWT indictees
under analysis here are “family men” (2000). One WSM member had the following to
say regarding families and children: “We all know the movement begins with the family.
If you can’t save your family, then what’s the point? Keeping your families pure and
raising your kids among your kin is what we fight for” (as cited inSimi & Futrell, 2010,
p. 19).
Robert Mathews’ (RWT Indictee #35), founder and leader of the Order, entry into
RWT illustrates the familial aspect of white supremacist ideology. In the late 1970’s,
having read a book by right-wing leader, William Gayley Simpson, Mathews learned that
“abortion, birth control, and zero population growth, readily embraced by many whites,
were the knives with which the race was slitting its own throat…minorities write the law
of the land…” (as cited in Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 106). Finding a wife and bearing
children soon became one of Mathews’ most sought after goals:
…Debbie [Mathews’ wife] and Bob suffered together through several
miscarriages in the first four years of their marriage. It was devastating for a
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See Appendix A, Figure 3 for an advertisement from Aryan Nations. The blond-haired, blue-eyed,
Aryan girl is supposed to incite concern in movement members in an effort to become involved in the
WSM and grow their families for the impending ‘race-war’.
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couple to whom children meant everything. Bob wanted as large a family as he
could support (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 107).
While trying to bear children naturally, the Mathews’ decided to register with an adoption
agency and, in 1981, the couple received news they would be adopting a baby (Flynn &
Gerhardt, 1995). Following David Lane’s 14 Words, preserving a white future for his
new son, Clinton, became Mathews’ primary concern. According to another member of
the Order, Ken Loff, Mathews emphasized “their children’s future, even when it was
about taxes, economics, school busing, affirmative action, or some other government
policy Bob was condemning” (as cited in Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 107).
In fact, Aryan children became the core theme of the ceremonious establishment
of the Order. Prior to making his fellow Order brothers take the Oath that he authored,
Mathews told them:
I would like to remind all of you what is at stake here. It is our children…and
their very economic and racial survival. Because of that, I would like to place a
white child before us as we take this oath (as cited in Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p.
124-125).
Not only did Mathews place an Aryan baby in the center of the circle of the first 9 men to
join the Order, but he threaded the ideology of saving the future for Aryan children
throughout the Oath:
I, as a free Aryan man, hereby swear an unrelenting oath upon the green graves of
our sires, upon the children in the wombs of our wives…I have no fear of death,
no fear of foe; that I have a sacred duty to do whatever is necessary to deliver our
people from the Jew and bring total victory to the Aryan race…should one of you
fall in battle, I will see to the welfare and well-being of your family…and as true
Aryan men with pure hearts and strong minds face the enemies of our faith and
our race with courage and determination…we are in a full state of war and will
not lay down our weapons until we have driven the enemy into the sea and
reclaimed…the land of our children to be (as cited in Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p.
125-126).
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From a white supremacist perspective, forming a terror group is, in part, an effort to
defend the family unit. One of the co-founders of the CSA explained the prevalence of
RWTs with spouses and children in the following way:
…see most leaders don’t like singles because they’re not controllable, they have
no concerns, they can pick up and leave whenever they want to. Married with
kids are much easier to control, they’re more susceptible to the propaganda to
begin with and they can be controlled by propaganda, make ‘em think they’re
doing everything for their family and kids (interview with CSA leader, 2004).
Aside from the importance of one’s children in terms of motivating a person to
join a RWT group, other factors involving familial relationships may also affect the
process of joining a RWT group. As stated above, half of the RWT indictees had other
family members involved in the WSM movement. Nearly 40% of indictees had at least
one family member involved and another 10% had two or more family members involved
(spouse, 30%; parent, 10%; sibling 6%).
To briefly summarize findings regarding the involvement process and the
influence of family, I found that over 50% of RWT indictees were married with children
(and the 3 females in the sample were wives and mothers). Though it would seem that
these individuals would be less inclined to dedicate their lives to a violent organization
due to restricted biographical availability, it is clear that RWT is derived from a SM that
promotes traditional ideals related to familial relations. That terrorists connected to leftwing social movements tend to be single and childless (Smith 1994) reflects, in part, the
different ideological orientation toward families that differentiates left and right-wing
movements. Thus, a social movement’s ideological composition creates a “demographic
funnel” where certain types of people with certain types of demographic characteristics
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are more likely to become active in the movement. It is from this point of initial political
activism where individuals may eventually gravitate toward terrorism.

Non-familial Relationships of Involvement Process
In the third research question I asked, “What is the significance of one’s nonfamilial relationships on the involvement process?” The following are the areas in which
my sample was most heavily clustered49: relational contact between recruited and
recruiter (54.5% friend), prior knowledge of WSM (87.9% yes), prior extremist/terrorist
group membership (65.2% yes), prior number of WSM group memberships (39.4% one),
prior types of WSM group memberships (16.7% Christian Identity, 15.2% hybrid, 21.2%
combination), highest level of involvement in prior group (42.4% member), and joined as
clique (63.6%).
Table 3: Research Question 3 Clusters
Variable
Relational Contact between Recruited &
Recruiter
Friend
Prior Knowledge of WSM
No
Yes
Prior Extremist/Terrorist Group Membership
No
Yes
Prior Number of Group Memberships
1
2
Prior Types of Group Memberships
Christian Identity
Hybrid (single group of many types)
Combination (various group memberships)
Highest Level of Involvement in Prior Group
49

Frequency

%

36

54.5

% unknown
10.6
1.5

7
58

10.6
87.9

22
43

33.3
65.2

26
9

39.4
13.6

1.5
1.5
1.5
11
10
14

16.7
15.2
21.2

Refer to Appendix C, Table 3 for Research Question 3 Frequencies in their entirety.
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Core
Member
Joined as Clique
No
Yes

7
28

10.6
42.4
6.1

20
42

30.3
63.6

Relational Contact
Individuals who join RWT groups are typically recruited through pre-existing
friendship networks. These friends recruited approximately 55% of RWT indictees into
their respective RWT organization50. Recruiters may use a target’s children as a “hook”
to influence the recruitee. For many potential recruits, the person presenting the “hook”
is just as important as the “hook” itself.
Psychological studies of terrorism refer to these as “lures” or “pull factors”
(Horgan, 2008, p. 90). Some scholars contend that the lures are not necessarily valuable
by themselves and must be presented to a target by the “right person” in order for the
recruitee to influence them to progress in their level of involvement with the organization
(Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005). If the target views the recruiter as a “role model” in
addition to their friendship then “a source of authoritative legitimacy for the justification
of…engaging in violent acts” has been established (Horgan, 2008, p. 88). Many RWT
leaders seem to have a deep understanding of the value of loyal friendship. When a
valued friendship with a role model is combined with a valued lure (whatever the target
values as most important like children), one of the highest predictors of joining a terrorist
organization has developed (Horgan, 2008; Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003). In other
words, the lure can be significantly more valuable when it comes from a person that one
is already emotionally close to and respects.
50

The next highest frequency were for those individuals that sought the RWT organization out on their own
with no person actively recruiting them (12% of RWT indictees).
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Order leader Bob Mathews (RWT Indictee #35) understood the value of lures and
friendship. This was illustrated in the relationship he had with his close friend Ken Loff
(RWT Indictee #17). Loff, a man who was extremely devoted to the well being of his
wife and children, recalls that prior to his decision to join Mathews as part of his terrorist
plans “talk mostly centered on their children’s future…” (as cited in Flynn & Gerhardt,
1995, p. 107). By all accounts, Mathews was not only charismatic but had a knack for
understanding people’s lures. Where Loff could be manipulated with discussions of his
children’s future, Mathews could speak to and adapt to the unique needs of other
members (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). For example, another Order member talked about
how important his friendship to Mathews was in becoming a member of the terrorist
organization:
…I felt Bob [Mathews] was a father figure or more appropriately, the older
brother. He was 10 or 12 years older than me. He never met me before, yet he
welcomed me into his home. Helped me purchase my first vehicle; taught me to
operate heavy machinery; gave me a place to live; helped me find gainful
employment. Where my Father was all about “you can’t do such-and-such
because…” I wasn’t properly trained…or I lacked funds…or it wasn’t socially
acceptable. Robert Mathews on the other hand would get excited about my ideas
and help figure out ways to implement them or offer a different spin, but he’d try
his damndest to make it work…I looked up to him (interview with Order member,
2004).
This Order member was open to Mathews, in part, because his relationship with his father
lacked closeness and was deficient in a number of ways. Mathews morphed into the
father that the Order member perceived he never had. Indeed, Mathews was involved in
several experiences akin to “rites of passage” (i.e., getting his first car, teaching him how
to use tools and machinery, providing shelter, and helping him get on his feet with a job)
that a parent often facilitates for his/her child. For the Order member, seeing Mathews
perform these parental duties established a strong bond between the two. In return, he
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provided Mathews and the Order a high level of loyalty and obedience. In fact, when
Mathews asked this member to kill another member suspected of working with law
enforcement, the Order member faithfully obliged (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995).
The fact that over half of the sample was recruited into their RWT group by a
friend should be analyzed in relation to the existence of the other non-familial
relationship variables such as, prior knowledge of the WSM, prior WSM and/or RWT
group memberships, the amount of prior memberships, and finally, whether an individual
joined by themselves or with one or more friends.

Knowledge & Memberships in the WSM
Knowledge without prior WSM memberships
In addition to pre-existing friends recruiting over half of the indictees, 90% of the
subjects also had prior knowledge of the WSM and more than 65% had prior membership
in a RW extremist or terrorist group (25% of which had two or more memberships). This
suggests a progressive process of entry into RWT groups. This progressive radicalization
of involvement follows the most recent psychological research arguing that one’s
involvement in terrorism is likely a succession of extremist behaviors (Horgan, 2008;
Moghaddam, 2005). As discussed earlier, previous research in SM and terrorism
(specifically left-wing) has also found that the more memberships a person has had or
does have within a particular movement, the more likely they will be to join a more
radicalized group and engage in aggressive activities to further the goals of that
movement (Almeida, 2005; della Porta, 1995).
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For the minority of indictees that had prior knowledge of the WSM but had no
formal memberships to RWE or RWT organizations, the data indicate that most of them
were aware of the WSM from various types of media sources. Some were introduced to
the WSM media happenstance. This again is an example of coincidence, similar to
Merton’s science of serendipity (Merton & Barber, 2004). As discussed above, an Order
member revealed in his interviews that learning about the Ku Klux Klan in 6th grade
history class was his first introduction to the WSM. An unintended consequence of his
educational introduction to the WSM was that it peaked his interest enough to seeking out
WSM materials and propaganda. This self-education led him into becoming a
sympathizer with the WSM prior to any formal memberships.
For others, their introduction to the WSM was from another person. Both
William Guthrie (RWT Indictee #6) of the ARA and Timothy McVeigh (RWT Indictee
#57), the core conspirator of the Oklahoma City Bombing, were given WSM materials by
people they were quite minimally associated with even after the fact (Hamm, 2002;
Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). Guthrie was given The Turner Diaries by a
fellow Navy bunkmate to read to pass time (Hamm, 2002), while McVeigh was given
WSM propaganda for the first time while trying to become an activist for the protection
of 2nd Amendment gun rights (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007).
Some were introduced to the WSM and motivated to join by actual news reports
of the WSM. A CSA leader stated that 2 members, David McGuire (RWT Indictee #39)
and Timothy Russell (RWT Indictee #42), came to join the organization and moved their
families to the CSA compound after viewing news media coverage on TV of the
organization. These two individuals had no prior associations with the WSM or RWE

96
groups. It warrants mentioning that Russell was a member of a gun club organization and
a CSA leader states that he went to local gun shows in the area of CSA inquiring about
CSA after the media coverage. For Russell, it was a combination of both being in the
“right place” (gun shows) at the “right time” (during CSA media coverage) (interview
with CSA leader, 2004; Noble 1998).
In some cases, subjects frequented locations that while not exclusively right-wing
extremist are used by RWEs for the purposes of recruitment because these locations are
known to attract individuals with certain leanings or inclinations toward RWE. Several
RWT indictees became aware of the WSM after having memberships to gun clubs and
gun activist organizations. Such organizations are not generally considered to be
extremist groups and do not endorse any political stance other than that of the 2nd
Amendment; an American citizen’s right to keep and bear arms51. While these
organizations are legal and are not formally affiliated with any other type of SM, they are
known as spaces which attract far right adherents. Though it would be inaccurate to
allege that the majority of those that frequent gun shows or hold memberships in gun
clubs are likely to be RWE, a minority of enthusiasts are indeed related to these groups
(interview with CSA leader, 2004). The CSA leader warns when speaking of RWT
recruitment “…if you’re going to go to places like gun shows, you have to know how to
handle yourself so you don’t get sucked in” (interview with CSA leader, 2004). By
“sucked in,” he is referring to joining a RWE or RWT group and, in fact, CSA recruited
at least four members in this way (interview with CSA leader, 2004). CSA members
51

According to a CSA leader among other sources, eight RWT Indictees were members of gun
clubs/organizations prior to RWE involvement (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Noble,
1998; Wright, 2007). Indictees were from The Order, CSA, and conspirators in the Oklahoma City
Bombing. Gun organizations included the well-known National Rifle Association (NRA) and the
American Pistol & Rifle Association (APRA).
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Timothy Russell (RWT Indictee #42), Richard Snell (RWT Indictee #43), Ivan Wade
(RWT Indictee #46), and William Wade (RWT Indictee #47) were all known members of
gun organizations prior to their involvement with RWE and RWT organizations.
Finally, another interesting case is of another Order member. He was also
recruited into the terrorist organization (the Order) by his closest friend Bob Mathews
(RWT Indictee #35). But his pre-RWT involvement is also illustrative of the relationship
between friends and gaining initial knowledge of the WSM. Growing up he recalls being
in high school at the same time as a later associate of the Order52 (interview with Order
member, 2004). Though originally meeting him during his 6th grade school year in a
“live government” class, this associate was a couple of years older than him and it was
not until high school when they played on the same basketball team for two years that
they really got to know one another (2004).
[Order associate’s] Dad helped coach my junior high school basketball team and
we played on the same team our freshman…and sophomore years of high school.
We had many friends in common but we didn’t really hang out together until after
we graduated from high school (interview with Order member, 2004).
Once he graduated high school he maintained close contact with this associate
(2004). By this time, the associate had found his way into the WSM and was an active
member of a RWE organization known as the National Alliance (2004). In 1982, the
Order member was taking a political science class in college and was assigned to
interview someone that was involved in political activism (2004). He knew that this
associate was involved in the National Alliance but generally did not understand what,

52

This other Order member never took the organization’s oath, nor was he ever made into an official
member of the organization after the fact (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). He was however a known member of
the RWE organization known as the National Alliance and he was also known to many members of the
Order, especially the Order member providing the interview. This associate was never federally indicted
for any crimes relating to terrorism.
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and more importantly how the group was fighting for social or political change (2004).
What he learned about the WSM from his associate and the National Alliance appealed to
him as he too wanted to be part of something. The Order member, however, was
searching for more than the kind of diagnostic assessments that groups like the NA
provide, he was also looking to actively resolve these problems.
I know my journey [into the WSM and RWT] started with a term paper I wrote
for a Poli-Sci class…The gist of my term paper was that the N.A. [National
Alliance] had many valid points. Yet people like [the Order associate] were good
at throwing stones and identifying a problem but they were short on solutions. It
seemed as if they’d rather knock the system, point fingers at the flaws of others
and yet they seldom had something better to offer. Robert Mathews was
different…(interview with Order member, 2004).
For his term paper, the Order member tagged along with his associate to a National
Alliance convention. It was at this convention that the “Order member” met and
immediately gravitated to Bob Mathews (2004).
When I first met him [Mathews], he was a member of N.A. He was trying to
entice like-minded people to form a community in Eastern Washington that he
dubbed W.A.B. for White American Bastion. He was looking to create jobs. He
was willing to give of himself. He didn’t claim to have all the answers…Bob
wanted to assist them [the WSM] in helping them achieve their goals, let them do
all the long range planning, let them determine how to get there, Bob would
simply bring like-minded people together and hopefully build a tight community
dedicated to the preservation of our race (interview with Order member, 2004).
He was so taken with Mathews that he declined a membership into the National Alliance
and instead followed Mathews to Washington. In less than two years from this first
meeting, the White American Bastion Mathews spoke of had become the Order, and this
Order member was not only swearing into the group’s terroristic oath, but he was acting
it out.
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Knowledge and prior WSM memberships
Of the 65% with prior memberships, 40% had more than one membership. This
finding is important because as Almeida (2005) found the more organizations that
activists are a member of within a particular SM, the more likely they are to become
high-risk activists53. Almeida (2005) defined this as “multi-sectoralness” and argues that
it can be one of the greatest strengths to the longevity and success of social movements
explaining, “the more a person is structurally connected to multiple organizations and
sectors of the opposition, the more credible is the call for protest participation in a
popular movement” (Almeida, 2005, p. 76). Similarly della Porta (1995) found that a
majority of her cases of left-wing terrorists in Europe had been in the SM and the SM’s
extremist groups for several years prior to becoming radicalized into a terrorist
organization. Multi-sectoralness provides one indication of how embedded an individual
is within extremist networks. As others have already pointed out (Almeida, 2005;
Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005), the dimension of multi-sectoralness is often missing
in much current psychological research that has been used to develop terrorist profiles.
Studies that neglect the dimension of multi-sectoralness are ignoring a significant aspect
of the radicalization process.
Most of the RWT groups in my sample are comprised of members with prior
extremist affiliations. For example, the largest RWT group in my sample, the Order, was
comprised of members from the American Pistol and Rifle Association (APRA), the John
Birch Society (JBS), several small Christian Identity (CI) churches nationwide, Aryan
Nations (AN), National Alliance (NA), various chapters of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK),
53

High-risk activism in Almeida’s (2005) research means a person has transitioned from legal/peaceful
forms of activism (e.g., peaceful protests, petition signing) to activism behavior that borders on being
illegal to outright violent forms (e.g., stalking, property destruction, physical attacks on personal targets).
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and, in fact, several were former members of the Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord
(CSA). CSA is the second largest terror group in my sample and several CSA members
were tax resistance activists, former members of various CI churches, members from AN,
KKK chapters, and other militia/paramilitary organizations. The results of my data
confirm that a high level of multi-sectoralness is significant dimension of the
radicalization process, in part, because it represents a “closing off” of the person from
non-extremist social networks.

Joined as Clique
Nearly 64% of the RWT indictees joined their respective RWT group with at least
one or more individuals. This recurrent pattern was also found in della Porta’s (1995)
data with left-wing terrorists. Della Porta referred to the process as “block” recruitment
where several members of one group would join a terrorist group together (1995, p. 168).
In fact, one of the terrorists she interviewed stated “A choice made in cold blood, such as
‘now I will become a terrorist’ does not exist. It was a step-by-step evolution, which
passed through a kind of human relation…with the people I worked with” (as cited in
della Porta, 1995, p. 168).
The Order is a good example of block recruitment. For example, husband and
wife Robert and Sharon Merki (RWT Indictees #19 and #20 respectively) joined the
organization as a couple. The Scutari brothers, Richard and Frank (RWT Indictees #29
and #28 respectively) joined together. Charles Ostrout (RWT Indictee #23) and Ronald
King (RWT Indictee #15) were co-workers and friends at Brinks working with armored
trucks and moved to Washington and joined together. Ostrout and King became
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instrumental in planning the armored truck car robberies for the group. Jackie Norton
(RWT Indictee#23) and Randall Rader (RWT Indictee #27) were members of CSA
together and collectively decided the Order was a better fit for them and moved to
Washington to join the group. Denver Parmenter (RWT Indictee #25) and his best friend
Randolph Duey (RWT Indictee #10) left a bar one afternoon after an in-depth
conversation about the WSM and joined AN together and shortly after joined the Order
together. Andrew Barnhill (RWT Indictee #7) helped founder Bob Mathews (RWT
Indictee #35) recruit Sherman Dye (RWT Indictee #11). Dye would soon bring with him
William Nash (RWT Indictee #21) and George Zaengle (RWT Indictee #34). Clearly,
block recruitment, or what I refer to as joining as a clique, characterized the process of
joining the Order. This same pattern was found across the ten RWT groups in my
sample. After further examining this pattern across all of the organizations, I found that
even though there was nearly two decades of time between some of the group’s
formations and activities, each of the ten groups could be linked to one another by at least
one member in less than two degrees of social separation. In other words, over a 22-year
analysis period, nearly one member of each group knew at least one member of another
group. This suggests that the subculture of RWT may be characterized as a “small world
network” (Watts & Strogatz, 1998, p. 440) where nodes (in this case people) not
connected to each other are linked by a small number of connections. Further research is
needed to more closely examine the social network properties of US RWT groups (1998).
To briefly summarize the findings regarding involvement and the influence of
non-familial relationships on the involvement process, social friendships were a crucial
factor for the process of joining RWT groups for the indictees in my sample. Over half
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of the indictees were recruited into their RWT group by a friend whom they considered to
be one of their closest and most valued personal relationships. It is also the case that their
close friend, the recruiter, offered a valued lure to gain the indictee’s membership. Over
65% had previous memberships in various WSM groups prior to their joining the RWT
organization providing a broad overview of the WSM as having a high degree of multisectoralness. This multi-sectoralness has made the movement, and especially the RWT
organizations, a small, interconnected world across time (decades apart) and space
(nationwide). Also, the majority of RWT indictees join their RWT organizations with at
least one friend.

Biographical Availability Variables
As stated earlier, some characteristics of one of my analytical tools, biographical
availability, have proven to be significant influences on joining yet do not fit one of the
three research question categories. Despite this, I argue it necessary to have collected and
analyzed data for these variables. The following are the areas in which my sample was
most heavily clustered54; current socio-economic status (24.2% middle class, 22.7%
working class, 36.4% lower class), education level (15.2% less than high school, 22.7%
high school diploma/GED, 22.7% some college), chronic unemployment (47% no),
current occupation (10.6% clerical, 16.7% service, 10.6% skilled, 12.1% unemployed),
current religious preference (54.5% Christian Identity), life turning points (34.8% yes).

54

Refer to Appendix C, Table 4 for Biographical Availability Variable Frequencies in their entirety.
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Table 4: Biographical Availability Clusters
Variable
Current Socio-Economic Status
Middle Class
Working Class
Lower Class
Education Level
Less than High School
High School Diploma or Equivalency
Some College
4-Year College Degree
Trade or Vocational School
Chronic Unemployment
No
Yes
Current Occupation
Professional & Higher Administrator
Clerical
Sales
Service
Skilled Worker
Unskilled Worker
Farm
Unemployed
Retired
Current Religious Preference
Christian Identity
Odinism
Other
None
Life Turning Points
No
Yes

Frequency

%

16
15
24

24.2
22.7
36.4

% unknown
16.7

27.3
10
15
15
6
2

15.2
22.7
22.7
9.1
3.0

31
8

47
12.1

40.9
34.8
3
7
2
11
7
3
1
8
1

4.5
10.6
3.0
16.7
10.6
4.5
1.5
12.1
1.5
34.8

36
1
1
4

54.5
1.5
1.5
6.1

3
23

4.5
34.8

60.6

As a reminder, biographical availability is best defined as “the absence of
personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation…”
meaning indictees in my sample joined their RWT group because along with their
ideological beliefs, they were simply available to do so (McAdam, 1986, p. 70). Given
the current pressure placed on terrorism scholars to develop a terrorist profile (Horgan,
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2008), and the fact that the majority of terrorist profiles involve individual level variables
(Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005) the implication of the above findings lead to an
important conclusion. In agreement with other terrorism scholars, a useful profile cannot
be developed on individual level variables alone (Almeida, 2005; della Porta, 1995;
Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005). The diversity in backgrounds of RWT indictees in
my sample illustrate that the recruitment potential for RWT organizations stretches across
a variety of individual circumstances. Indictees in my sample come from every socioeconomic status, every education level, are not chronically unemployed and come from
various occupational fields.
Two variables do however have significant clustering around single measures.
The first is that over half of the RWT indictees religious preference at the time of joining
their respective organization was Christian Identity (this warrants little discussion here as
it has been covered in the previous sections). The second is that at least 35% of indictees
were experiencing life turning points at the time they joined their RWT group55. To
reiterate, life turning points can be understood as a point in a person’s life when, in their
opinion, their current trajectory is no longer suitable and “they were faced with the
opportunity or necessity for doing something different with their lives” (Lofland, 1966, p.
50; Lofland & Stark, 1965, p. 870).
In recollecting about his own path to the Order, one member discussed how he
was unhappy with his life and knew he wanted to do and belong to something different:
“I was searching…but not [specifically] searching to become involved in the things I
segued into…” (interview with Order member, 2004). This member stated he was
55

For 60% of the cases there was not enough available information to make a conclusive judgment as to
whether they were experiencing a life turning point. However, it is likely that more than 35% of the
indictees were at the time that they joined.
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looking for something to belong to even though he did not set out to become a member of
a RWT group. For him, his journey started on an individual level because of life turning
points, and “segued” into becoming a RWT because of factors on a social level (i.e.,
friendships and networking within the WSM). Similarly, the CSA leaders Kerry Noble
(RWT Indictee #41) discussed in his autobiography how he was unhappy early on in his
young adult life and was ready for a change when he chose to uproot his wife and child
and move to the CSA’s compound in Arkansas (Noble, 1998). These two examples
illustrate the 35% of indictees that were in a general state of unhappiness about their
current situations and actively decided to find something to belong to and redefine the
course of their lives. Rarely could one factor be identified as to why these particular
indictees were unhappy, but some examples include loneliness, concerns about politics
and the state of particular rights/laws (e.g., gun laws, crime rates, immigration), divorce,
professional failures, and lack of assimilation into mainstream society (e.g., military
veterans)56.
The most important point to take away from this discussion of factors related to
biographical availability is that while the above measures are often used in terrorist
profiles, they are not enough. The structural components, family dynamics, and peer
relations also have a significant impact on whether a person joins a terrorist group. While
things like education and socio-economic status should be measured and analyzed for
patterns, analyses must be more complex.
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These factors also have been known to lead to other deviant behaviors such as substance abuse and more
common types of criminality.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS
The study of terrorism is one of the fastest growing fields within the social
sciences (Schmidt and Jongman 1988). This study used a mixed methodological
approach to analyze 66 federally indicted RWTs in the United States. I empirically
examined how individuals become involved in RWT organizations. Specifically, I tried
to identify and isolate characteristics of the involvement process by focusing on three
interrelated questions; (1) What are the “structural components” of the involvement
process? (2) What is the influence of family dynamics on the involvement process? (3)
What is the significance of one’s non-familial relationships to the involvement process? I
began the dissertation by providing an overview of the white supremacist movement, the
social movement from which most right-wing terrorists emerge. I also explored past
studies of terrorism and how previous research informed my study.
Though there remains disagreement on how to precisely define the term terrorism
or who qualifies as a terrorist (Crenshaw, 1992; Hoffman, 2006; Schmid & Jongman,
1988), the necessity of studying terrorism is of critical importance57. Terrorism,
generally understood as dissident violence (or threat of) inciting fear in a country’s
government and its citizens for the purposes of producing political or social change
(Schmid & Jongman, 1988), has existed for centuries. In the advent of new technologies
in a global economy however, the destructive potential of terrorist attacks has never been
so significant (Laqueur, 1999). Two characteristics of contemporary society are related
to the profound destructive potential of terror attacks: technology and the existence of a
global marketplace (1999). Technology has decreased the difficulty involved with
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Defining terrorism and a terrorist is a very complex field of research and remains controversial not only
an academia but also in legal realms. The intricacies of this topic were far beyond the scope of my study.
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obtaining weapons of mass destruction (Laqueur 1999). Further, the modern world has
made international borders almost non-existent for the purposes of terrorist acts. In
addition to the murder of civilians, terror attacks produce a variety of other consequences.
For example, the attacks on September 11th, 2001 shut down airport travel for weeks, left
people stranded away from their homes, and triggered an economic crash in many world
markets. The impact of 9/11 was felt on an international scale despite the attack
occurring in a single country. The attacks in London on July 7th, 2005 and Mumbai on
November 26, 2008 had similar consequences.
Recent activity by terror groups like al Quaeda has created a situation where the
term “terrorism” is nearly synonymous with the Middle East and Islamic religion (Ferber,
2003, p. 64). Because of this, a disproportionate amount of research has focused on
Islamic terrorism. The focus on Islamic terrorism has resulted in a neglect of other types
of terror (Vohryzek-Bolden, 2003). Additionally, I argued that there are at least six other
justifications for studying RWT, all of which signify that this marginalized extremist
movement are mobilizing. First, Christian Identity has been making inroads into prison
ministries nationwide and recruiting a number of violent offenders (Smith, 1994). The
second is the significant amount of concern over illegal immigration and the WSM’s
capitalization of it as a “fear tactic” to recruit more members (ADL, 2007b, 2007c; Avila,
et al., 2007; DHS, April, 2009). The third is the recent expansion into what can be
considered for the WSM to be non-traditional forms of criminal enterprise. There is a
great deal of evidence indicating the involvement of skinhead and neo-Nazi gangs in the
drug trade (Simi, et al., 2007; Smith, 1994). Fourth, a recent financial alliance has been
forming among certain WSM groups and Islamic terrorists in the Middle East (Kemp,
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2007; Simi, et al., 2007). Law enforcement intelligence suggests that groups within the
WSM have been filtering large amounts of money to the Middle East (Kemp, 2007; Simi,
et al., 2007). Fifth, the economic crash of 2008 is still having an impact on families
across the US. This economic instability provides another source of frustration that the
WSM tries to manipulate for recruitment purposes (Blazak, 2001; Smith, 1994). Finally,
the historic presidential election in 2008 presents two issues that the WSM is contending
with. The fact that it is a democratic president raises concerns regarding firearms laws,
governmental assistance programs, and more lenient immigration laws. And, Barack
Obama is the country’s first African-American president. Since Barack Obama has taken
office, there has been an increase in newly formed WSM groups, membership in
established organizations, increased production of propaganda, and terroristic threats
made on government officials including the president (DHS, April, 2009; Montopoli,
2009). Researchers and law enforcement need to start devoting attention and resources
specifically to the analysis of RWT.
While there are many types of terrorism, and many subtypes of RWT, most
RWTs stem from the WSM. The WSM can be further delineated into four core branches;
Ku Klux Klan, Christian Identity, neo-Nazis, and skinheads (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile,
2000)58. Though there are some areas of discord between the four branches, and even
within, there is also substantial overlap among the branches.
In order to provide a starting framework for analyzing the joining process of a
terrorist, I reviewed previous research on the process of joining in three fields of study,
social movements (SM), new religious movements (NRM), and terrorism. Because
terrorism research is in its “infancy” (Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004, p. 51) and a majority of
58
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conclusions are impressionistic (Laqueur, 1999) it was necessary to review previous
findings in SM and NRM. From this literature review, I was able to develop a more
detailed conceptualization for my research questions. Individuals joined deviant groups
due to either 1) biographical availability or 2) social networks, and possibly a
combination of both. Biographical availability can be understood as “the absence of
personal constraints…” leaving a person available to be involved in an organization
(McAdam, 1986, p. 70). Social networks can be understood as measuring the amount
and strength of social ties a person has to the dissident group, the amount of memberships
a person has to related organizations of the dissident group, and finally any social ties the
individual has external to the dissident group, which may delay or stop the person from
joining.
Using a mixed methodological approach, I analyzed 66 federally indicted RWT
representing 10 RWT organizations in the United States from 1980-200259. Data for each
of the 66 cases and their RWT groups were derived from secondary source materials60
and ethnographic data collected by direct interviews, phone interviews, and participant
observations in private homes, social gatherings, and WSM events from 1996-200561.
Two databases were created, qualitative narratives were placed in Excel and quantitative
variables were coded into SPSS. This was an exploratory, inductive based study so
developing variables and coding them was a fluid process as the nature of the data was
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Indictees were selected for inclusion from The American Terrorism Study (ATS) Database by a filter
process (Smith & Damphousse, 2006). The filter process for inclusion required that an indictee had to 1)
be a WSM RWT, 2) be indicted for committing an actual terrorist attack or an instrumental crime to further
a future terrorist attack, and finally 3) have enough available secondary data to analyze.
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Sponsored Programs.
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constantly changing. To answer my research questions, I specifically sought out
measures to paint a picture of the involvement process. Some measures were derived
based on prior research in SM, NRM, and terrorism while others were developed on
common practice that they may become relevant. Research question one regarding the
structural components of the involvement process involved 20 variables and included
several measures to analyze the biographical availability of indictees. Research question
two regarding family dynamics involved six variables and included measures to analyze
both biographical availability and social networks. Research question three regarding
non-familial relationships involved seven variables and included measures to analyze
social networks. Additionally there were six biographical availability variables that I
addressed in the analysis that did not fit one of the three research questions. They were
included due to the fact that prior research has found them to be significant influences62.
Frequencies and cross-tabulations were run on the quantitative data as a means to
understand the distribution of my data, however no predictions or generalizations were
made based on these analyses. The results of the quantitative analyses helped guide my
in-depth case analysis of the data. Through this direction, I was able to uncover recurring
patterns in my data on the joining process of RWT indictees.

Theoretical & Practical Implications
Theoretical Implications
What are the theoretical implications of the factors analyzed that “tip” a person
over the line, dividing non-terrorists from terrorists? There are suggestions for
theoretical research based on results from each of my research questions.
62
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Structural Characteristics and Theoretical Implications
Gender
Based on my sample, RWT joiners and recruiters are almost always men. This
finding follows conclusions from past research on SM, NRM, and in terrorism for all
typologies (Aho, 1990; della Porta, 1995; McAdam & Snow, 1997; Sageman, 2004). The
implication of this finding is that the greater amount of attention placed on men in
research and counterterrorism strategies are warranted. This is not to say that female
members and potential recruits should be ignored, and indeed to do so could lead groups
to mobilize females as perpetrators more often which, while still rare, is starting to
happen (Blee, 2005; Ness, 2005). But if there is one generalization that can safely be
made it is that, like criminality, men are significantly disproportionate joiners and
perpetrators of terrorism. In general, researchers have taken for granted the fact that
terrorism is predominantly male perpetrated. In his examination of the increases in
violence and paramilitary-based groups for white men, Gibson (1994) analyzed political
and popular culture in the US post-Vietnam and indeed concluded that the increases were
a symptom of a cultural identity crisis for white males. Researchers should continue to
look into broader cultural patterns like Gibson (1994). Concerns have been expressed on
the current cultural changes in the US both politically and economically that could lead to
increased levels of violence and RWE and RWT organizations (DHS, April, 2009).

Age
The majority of indictees learned about the WSM and joined groups in the
movement during adulthood. Consequently, the RWT organizations that they joined also
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occurred in adulthood. This contradicts past SM and NRM research, but seems to
confirm some previous findings from studies of terrorism (Sageman, 2004; Smith, 1994;
Victoroff, 2005). I argued that these cases particularly were influenced by the dynamics
of family and friends, which likely account for the older ages (implications for these
cases will be covered later). Various indictees were introduced to the WSM during
childhood however. Even in these cases, the majority did not actually join RWT
organizations until they were in adulthood. Further, when it came to the point of joining
a RWT organization, these same indictees were predominantly influenced by either
family dynamics and/or non-familial relationships in their adult lives. This finding
confirms previous in-depth case studies of left-wing and Jihadi terrorism (della Porta,
1995; Sageman, 2004).
The indictees introduced to the WSM in childhood spent many years
progressively becoming acquainted with the movement and achieved increasingly radical
memberships in various organizations. This finding has several theoretical implications.
The most recent psychological research on terrorism suggests that joining a terrorist
group is a deliberate process of radicalization (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; Silber
& Bhatt, 2007). The indictees that were introduced to the WSM in childhood entered
into a phase of self-identification with movement ideology at the time of introduction
(Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 30). They began to identify with the messages of the WSM,
independently examine the ideas through propaganda or seeking out representatives of
the movement, and eventually began “slowly migrating away from their former identity”
and “re-defining” themselves as WSM activists (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 30). As they
became further engulfed in the WSM, they started a radicalization process where each
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group they associated with was more extreme than the last. Eventually, anything other
than the actual goals of the movement became less relevant in their lives (Horgan, 2008).
Moghaddam (2005, p. 161) utilizes a “staircase” analogy of climbing six floors of
radicalization from self-identification to committing terrorist acts. Following the theories
of radicalization offered by Horgan (2008) and Moghaddam (2005), the RWT indictees
in my sample that were introduced in childhood and were recruited into terrorist
organizations as adults, progressively became more isolated from their former lives and
more intimate with the ideology and people (non-familial relationships) in their new
lives. Ultimately, this led to making the decision to climb that final level of stairs into
their respective RWT group and commit acts of terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005).
The theoretical implication here is that future terrorism research must continue to
analyze it as a progression of behaviors. The most effective method for gaining insight
into a terrorist’s decision to join a group and commit acts of terrorism are in-depth case
analyses of their lives, like Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) and the present analysis. Terrorism
is too complex of a process to be explained with simplistic variables that are measured
from the time an individual joined a group and committed an act of terrorism (Horgan,
2008; Moghaddam, 2005). Researchers must start to analyze the events in a person’s life
that shape that person’s availability and progression into radicalization (Horgan, 2008;
Moghaddam, 2005).

Social Location of Recruitment
Almost three-quarters of actual recruitment into a RWT organization took place in
a private home. Because joining a violent, criminal organization like a terrorist group is a
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high-risk behavior, these results would seem logical that terrorists would seek the
security of a private home. However, past research on SM, NRM, and terrorism have
found that recruitment more often takes place in public or semi-public settings like
prison, school, work, rallies, music shows, and churches/mosques (Aho, 1990; Almeida,
2005; della Porta, 1995; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Gould, 1997; McAdam, 1986; Oliver,
1997; Sageman, 2004; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Simi & Futrell, 2006). Joining a SM or
NRM is lower risk than joining a terrorist organization, but my results differ from past
research on other types of terrorism as well63. The implication of this is that future
research must explore the differences between particular types of terrorism and common
locations of recruitment. Certain typologies may be more or less marginalized from the
mainstream society with which they are operating. To the extent that this is true, certain
terrorist types may perceive their recruitment operations as requiring more or less
secretiveness. In the United States, the groups that comprise the WSM are highly
marginalized from the mainstream and are viewed as socially repugnant. The indictees in
my sample appeared to be well aware of this and thus it makes sense that as their
extremist ideology and behaviors radicalized, they would seek the refuge of private
homes and compounds. Future research should compare terrorist typologies in this
respect.

Type of Recruitment
The majority of RWT indictees were recruited with face-to-face methods. Media
sources and technology played a minimal role in most indictees recruitment. Although
63

One exception to this is the case study by Silber and Bhatt (2007). However, while I found a majority of
my sample was recruited in a private home, Silber and Bhatt (2007) found that private homes were used far
less than public and semi-public settings like mosques, gyms, and bookstores.
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the WSM is well known for their production of propaganda materials for the purposes of
recruitment, the level of terrorist recruitment may mean that additional materials teaching
about the broader WSM are unnecessary as most of the individuals joining RWT groups
were already familiar with its goals and teachings.
This finding lends even more support to the psychological research suggesting
that involvement in terrorism is a progression of radicalization (Horgan, 2008;
Moghaddam, 2005; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Many of the RWT indictees under analysis
were aware of the WSM’s propaganda materials prior to their contact with their
respective RWT organizations. It may be that indirect tools played a role in the selfidentification phases or “floors” of their radicalization process (Horgan, 2008;
Moghaddam, 2005; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Finally, technology-based recruitment via the
internet was not present in my sample simply based on the time period under analysis.

Military Experience
A significantly disproportionate amount of the RWT indictees had prior military
experience compared to the general population. I found that their military experience
highly influenced the radicalization process. Based on my qualitative analyses, I found
themes of perceived rejection by the military, internal conflicts with how they were
treated by the military, or embitterment based on the treatment received by civilians after
leaving the military. While there is a great deal of watchdog group based bulletins (ADL,
SPLC) and government intelligence reports (DHS) that discuss extremism within the
military, there is little social scientific research in this area. Because there are large
populations of soldiers returning from military conflicts that the US has been involved in
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over the past decade (DHS, April, 2009), and there is evidence of the WSM encouraging
members to join the military to gain tactical and weapons training, it is imperative that
researchers start examining the link between military experience and joining terrorist
groups. Are certain types of people who become RWT attracted to joining the US
military? Are there certain characteristics about the military that somehow create RWT?
These questions need to be empirically explored.

Family Dynamics and Theoretical Implications
Well over half of the RWT indictees in my sample were married and raising
children at the time they decided to join their respective terrorist group. This differs from
most previous research on SM, NRM, and terrorism (della Porta, 1995; Levine, 2003;
Lofland & Stark, 1965; McAdam, 1986; Oliver, 1997; for an exception see Sageman,
2004). Though Sageman (2004) did not have a great deal of qualitative data to explore
why his sample were mostly married with children, he suspected it was related to the
centrality of family life within the Muslim religion. Similarly, having an Aryan wife and
bearing Aryan children are central tenets of the WSM and indeed terrorist recruiters
emphasize the value of family to gain membership. Future research should continue to
explore the ways in which terrorist movements utilize the family as a means to recruit
members and gain obedience to commit terrorist acts. It is likely that in movements
where being married and having children are not central to the ideology, fewer of its
members will be bound to families. If this is the case, biographical availability specific
to not having a family may be a more predictive factor for the decision to join a terrorist
group.
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Non-familial Relationships and Theoretical Implications
Non-familial relationships were a prevalent factor in the process of joining RWT
groups for the indictees in my sample. A close friend recruited more than half of the
indictees into their respective terrorist organization. This confirms a great deal of prior
research in SM, NRM, and terrorism (Aho, 1990; della Porta, 1995; Lofland, 1966;
Sageman, 2004; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Stark & Bainbridge, 1980). Friendship seemed to
be more valuable to an indictee when coupled with “lures” that were important to them
offered by the recruiter (Horgan, 2008, p. 90). The theoretical implications of this
finding confirm what many scholars have argued, namely that the decision to join a
terrorist group is a complex process (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005). Future research
should focus on gathering rich qualitative data that can more fully describe the friendship
between a terrorist and their recruiter, and the use of lures, if any, across terrorist
typologies. It is likely that the strength of a friendship and the use of lures may be more
or less important based on the type of terrorism. In other words, it is possible that
individuals attracted to joining certain types of terrorist groups may be motivated more
intrinsically than others and not require the strong bonds evidenced in my results. This
certainly seems like the case for lone-wolf terrorists. Nonetheless, it is an empirical
question that requires further analysis.
The results of this analysis also indicate that there is an extremely high degree of
multi-sectoralness within the WSM. For past research that does measure this concept,
my results coincide with previous findings (Almeida, 2005; della Porta, 1988; Sageman,
2004). Future research should analyze dismantled groups in order to see if they have
links to newly formed organizations. This type of research could help in the development
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of theories of disengagement and, based on results similar to mine, the reestablishment of
the same individuals (or those closely linked to them) in new organizations.
Lastly, in regard to non-familial relationships, a majority of RWT indictees joined
their RWT organization with at least one or more of their friends. There is not a great
deal of research in this area in SM, NRM, or terrorism, but for the research that has been
done, my results confirm past findings (della Porta, 1995; Sageman, 2004). This pattern
of “block recruitment” (della Porta, 1995, p. 168) or as I refer to it as clique joining,
consistently turned up in my qualitative narratives. Again, the implication of this is that
more research needs to be done, across terrorist typologies, using a qualitative case study
approach. This information for most of the RWT indictees in my sample would not have
been uncovered in a purely quantitative analysis. Such patterns would not have been
found in della Porta’s (1995) analysis of left-wing terrorists (LWT) either as it was
through case narratives that she discovered this same pattern. Are there some terrorist
typologies that rely more or less on friends to climb that last set of stairs to terrorism in
the involvement process (Moghaddam, 2005)? A LWT in della Porta’s (1995) sample
stated clearly that becoming a terrorist was an “evolution” of “human relation” with the
people he associated with (p. 168). Sageman (2004) similarly found consistent patterns
of small clusters of friends joining sects of the Jihadist terrorist movement. Though he
did not have a great deal of qualitative data to illustrate these relationships, he argued that
bonds of joining with friends were a critical element to ideological commitment and in
fact “…it may be more accurate to blame global Salafi terrorist activity on in-group love
than out-group hate” (Sageman, 2004, p. 135).
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The clearest finding from my analysis is that joining a terrorist group is a process
of radicalization not occurring at the point of officially joining, but rather occurring over
a period of time and experiences, as some terrorist scholars have already suggested
(Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005). There has been a great deal of effort to develop
profiles of terrorists that have predictive abilities. The intricate nature of friendships,
multi-sectoralness, and clique joining (as well as some structural components and the role
of family) has yet to be included in a terrorist profile (Horgan, 2008). Most profiles
involve individual level variables that have been quantitatively analyzed. As Horgan
(2008) argues, “when we assume static qualities of the terrorist (a feature of profiles), we
become blind to the qualities of the dynamics that shape and support the development of
the terrorist” (p. 84). In other words, future research should shift its framework for how
profiles have previously been constructed to fit the terrorist. Instead, we need to profile
the process, not the terrorist (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005).

Practical Implications
What are the practical implications of the factors analyzed that “tip” a person over
the line that divides non-terrorists from terrorists? There are real-world suggestions that
could be put into practice based on results from each of my research questions.
One could argue that the practical implication of my results should be to explain
why RWT manifests within a society at all. This would include getting to the root causes
of the broader SM to which terrorists are ideologically connected, like the WSM. While
this is undoubtedly an important implication, I start with the assumption that hateinspired, marginalized groups like the WSM are likely to always exist as long as there are
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individuals that have complaints and frustrations with their lot in life. Further, segments
of these populations will radicalize themselves into terrorists (Moghaddam, 2005).
Though hateful SM and terrorist groups may always exist, the execution of their
violent acts can be detected and prevented. It is important however to consider the
consequences (intentional and unintentional) of prevention and intervention efforts. Simi
and Futrell’s (2010) analysis of the WSM and spaces of hate (i.e., rallies, white power
music shows, homes, home-schooling, compounds, churches, etc.) poses the following
question: “…how much [should] a democratic society tolerate from Aryans and other
extremist groups” (p. 124). Outright repression of WSM activity, proposed by watchdog
groups (e.g., SPLC) and even federal law enforcement (e.g., DHS), the authors warn
could actually increase violent activity within the movement because the movement’s
hate spaces provide an outlet for them to freely voice their frustrations (Simi and Futrell,
2010). It is a very real possibility that without these spaces even more members of the
WSM would transition into the underground and begin their journey of getting involved
in a RWT organization (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; Simi & Futrell, 2010). As
Simi and Futrell (2010) consider, we must also be very cautious in continuing to expand
governmental powers that border on infringing constitutional protections as a practical
means of thwarting extremist and terrorist action64. That being said, are there practical
implications based on my results that do not include outright repression or greater
expansion of state powers?
The greatest practical implication is that law enforcement must be educated on the
process of joining a homegrown, RWT group. While many law enforcement agencies
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PATRIOT act that have been contested as being unconstitutional (most importantly, new policies and
practices on surveillance and privacy rights) (Simi & Futrell, 2010).
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may be aware of some of the existing intelligence reports regarding terrorists, this is most
often occurring at federal levels in regard to Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. This is
another negative effect of the term “terrorism” becoming synonymous with Muslim
based terrorist groups, which was discussed in detail earlier. Not only can other terrorist
typologies mobilize undetected, but they can do so simply because law enforcement
agencies are less informed about their characteristics. This knowledge needs to be
filtered down to law enforcement at all levels, but especially locally. Local agencies
know their communities best in terms of crime areas, crime problems, and the major
players in their criminal population. Further, this information needs to be passed down
beyond detectives in intelligence units who are no longer working the streets on a daily
basis. Patrol officers have the most current knowledge on the crime areas, problems, and
criminals within their jurisdictional boundaries. The street cop will be the first to
recognize unusual activity and unusual faces in his/her area. The implications that I
propose have nothing to do with outright repression or further infringement of
constitutional rights, rather, it has more to do with education of law enforcement and
intelligence gathering practices.

Basics of the WSM
Police departments nationwide have a certain number of in-service training hours
that are mandatory for their police officers. While it varies from state to state, officers
must be trained in firearms, defensive tactics, and most relevant here, various courses
(e.g., search and seizure law, surveillance/counter-surveillance, interrogation, gangs).
Police departments could have classes based on terrorism typologies and the identifiers of
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the broader SM from which they stem. While certain identifiers for branches of the
WSM are commonly known from popular media (e.g., “doc martin” boots with red laces,
red suspenders, shaved heads, swastikas), more obscure yet extremely common symbols
within the movement are less widely known in mainstream culture (e.g., “14 word”
tattoos, CI or Nordic based symbolism/propaganda, The Turner Diaries, “88” tattoos
signifying the numeric version of “Heil Hitler”, etc.). Offering such a class to educate
street level officers on some of the basics of SM and terrorist groups (specifically the
WSM and RWT groups here) is one initial practical implication of my results. After
learning some ways to help identify these individuals, what are the practical implications
specific to my results?

Social Location & Type of Recruitment
The fact that RWT indictees are usually recruited in a private home by face-toface encounters also bears practical implications for law enforcement officers. Law
enforcement officers can be proactive in gathering intelligence at the street level to pass
on to intelligence bureaus within their agencies and joint task forces (squads created that
have federal and local law enforcement officers working together). When police officers
encounter an individual they think may be a RWT they should conduct a field interview
with them to gain some basic, and to the extent possible, accurate personal information
about the individual. This is not an uncommon practice among law enforcement officers
already. For example, during the course of a legal vehicle or person stop, if there is
additional information that a police officer deems important to pass on for various
reasons that are beyond the scope of the original violations, he/she will simply conduct a
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brief field interview. This information is then passed on to the bureau section (i.e.,
property crimes, gangs, fraud/forgery, violent crimes) that is most relevant to whatever
suspicious circumstances arose and were observed by the officer.
This information gathering technique is quite brief and does not extend the time
of the initial stop to unreasonable levels. Further, the reasons for the questions asked
during a field interview do not have to be revealed to the target and if the target refuses to
give the requested information, they are released without any ramifications. Field
interviews are specifically relevant to private home-based recruitment strategies because
part of a field interview is to obtain a current address for an individual (which can easily
differ from their driver’s license or vehicle registration). Also, since most recruiting is
done face-to-face, officers can field interview the individuals that the target is with when
stopped (i.e., passengers in a vehicle). If friendships are as important as the present
results suggest, people that they are stopped with may also be members of the WSM that
are experiencing a radicalization process.

Military Experience
The practical implications of indictees with military experience are two-fold.
Based on the case narratives, several RWT indictees became radicalized during their time
in the military. Though the military purports a “zero tolerance” policy banning extremist
beliefs/behaviors, the reality is that military recruiters and officers have adopted their
own informal “don’t ask/don’t tell” practice on the issue (Holthouse, 2006). Because
there is great pressure on the military to increase and retain personnel due to conflicts in
the Middle East, numbers have become very vital. Military officials, like law
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enforcement officers, must be educated on how to identify these individuals. Further,
there must also be policy development regarding the identification of extremist military
personnel. If individuals are identified as extremist, should they be immediately
discharged? In other words, is a zero tolerance policy the best option or are there other
ones that could be developed (e.g., educational rehabilitation perhaps)? If a zero
tolerance policy is the best option, then the military must also develop policies of
accountability for military recruiters and officers that knowingly learned of extremist
individuals and behaviors, but turned a blind eye.
Discharged RWT indictees with previous military experience should be extremely
important to law enforcement. The military provides individuals with advanced
weaponry and tactical training, and in many cases this is better training than law
enforcement officers receive. Indeed, the very reason some RWE and RWT join the
military is due to encouragement from WSM leaders for this training: “As street brawlers
you will be useless in the coming race war. As trained infantrymen you will join the
ranks of the Aryan warrior brotherhood” (online article by Peiper, 1999). Based on
previous major incidents with RWE and RWT, including the 2011 Arizona active shooter
that included the murder of a US senator (rejected Army applicant), the 2009 Fort Hood
active shooter (Lt. Gen. in the US Army), the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing (former US
Army soldier), and the 1992 Ruby Ridge barricade/standoff (former US Green Beret),
encounters with extremists that have either been rejected by the military and more
importantly actually have military training, can be a major officer safety issue. One
implication is simply for officers to document prior military experience when conducting
a field interview with an individual that they believe to be a RWE. Should a standoff
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situation happen in the future with any individuals that have previously been field
interviewed and military experience is included, law enforcement charged with
neutralizing the situation may or may not need to change their tactics based on this
documented information.

Family Dynamics & Non-familial Relationships and Practical Implications
If we know that most RWT are married with children, most are recruited by their
most valued friend, most have multiple memberships within the broader WSM, and most
join a RWT with at least one or more close friends, these are all fairly simple
characteristics for law enforcement to document during the course of their regular duties
for intelligence building purposes. The idea is that this information would be forwarded
to whatever bureau is charged with intelligence gathering on deviant
groups/organizations in their jurisdictions65. The receiver of this information would
presumably begin a general work up of intelligence on individuals, specifically focusing
on those measures that have consistent patterns based on empirical research of being
influential as to whether a person joins a RWT group.
This should not be viewed as the government extending police powers. Indeed,
such practices are common and have been used for decades. The difference, however, is
that there has been a lack of education and attention towards domestic terrorism,
specifically from the RW. If the very purpose of terrorism research is to understand it
and the processes involved so as to be able to predict or prevent it, then the practical
implication of my results should be to assist in the education of law enforcement about
65

This could be a gang unit, a counterterrorism unit, a general intelligence bureau, and may even be the
local federal law enforcement field office for smaller police departments without the resources of a large
municipality to have their own investigative bureaus.
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RWT and enable their efforts to gather meaningful intelligence (Horgan, 2008;
Moghaddam, 2005; Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

Limitations
The limitations of my analysis are regarding the sample, data collection, and
methodology. The sample could not include any other RWT that were not federally
indicted by the US government66. This means that there are some missed cases that were
prosecuted on a state level between 1980-2002 that involved the same criminal behaviors
as the indictees in my sample. I was also limited in my data collection and methodology
based on the availability of information on each of the 66 RWT indictees. Some of my
frequencies did not always include information for every indictee per variable67. The
information that was collected was also subjectively coded into the variables I developed.
However, to minimize any threats to the data that subjectivity posed, a high degree of
intercoder reliability was achieved in terms of source triangulation and researcher
triangulation (Berg, 2004; Huberman & Miles, 1994)68. Finally, and not unique to this
study, it is unknown if my results can be generalized not only to other RWT, but terrorists
in general. However, the techniques I used provided a far greater in-depth analysis than
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The FBI terrorism definition provides the following: “The unlawful use of force or violence against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof,
in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Hoffman, 2006, p.31). Additionally, to be indicted
federally as a terrorist, a necessary condition is that they are conspiring with 1 or more people. Therefore, a
lone wolf like RWT Eric Rudolph was not included in The ATS database (Smith, 1994; Smith &
Damphousse, 2006; Vollers, 2006).
67
Previous similar research on terrorism like Sageman’s (2004), Silber and Bhatt’s (2007), and della
Porta’s (1995) encountered the same problems however. Regardless, a great deal of information was
obtained in these studies and in the analysis here providing rich findings that should not be rendered useless
when information could not be found equally across cases (Sageman, 2004).
68
An exceptional amount of secondary data sources and a wide variety of different types of secondary data
sources were obtained and harvested for their information. Further, myself and the principle investigator
on the NIJ grant worked side-by-side during the entire collection and coding processes for additional
protection.
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just a quantitative design could have. The richness of the narrative data has allowed for
the first detailed view of the involvement process for RWT, providing a valuable addition
to previous research on the involvement process of other types of terrorism (della Porta,
1995; Sageman, 2004).
What are the tipping points to terrorism? Joining a terrorist group is a complex
process that takes place over time and is influenced by many dynamic factors. Most
RWT indictees, were more influenced by the dynamics of family and friendships rather
than individual level factors. Terrorism scholarship must continue to view the process of
involvement as an intricate one that requires in-depth analyses of the life histories of
terrorists. Research must also continue to focus on RWT coming from the WSM. The
following quote from a RWT indictee leads one to consider the current political and
economical climate in the US and hopefully conclude that terrorism from the RW is a
real, not a perceived, threat.
…like the core CSA people, most people just really love God and their country;
and we loved God and our country. You find anybody at the right time in their
life when they’re unhappy and they’re recruitable [sic]. If you’re happy with your
life, you’re not recruitable [sic]. If you’re T’d [sic] off and you are in the right
places, like gun shows, you’ve opened yourself to being talked to and you’re
recruitable [sic]…Look, everyone has things they’re upset about or don’t like to
do, but for the most part we’re happy people…Plus, if you’ve never belonged to
something bigger than yourself it’s a good feeling…I think that’s what gets
people and keeps people too…And it’s so much easier to blame others for your
problems like blacks, minorities, etc. Another thing is when you’re out of hope, if
you don’t have hope that things can get better, like the government, you’re pretty
messed up. What keeps you in is belonging, no feeling of personal responsibility,
and no hope that it can get better (interview with CSA leader, 2004).
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Figures, Pictures and/or Photographs

Figure 1
This billboard (photograph retrieved from www.immigrantsolidarity.org) could be
found displayed in the city of Las Vegas, Nevada as of 2006 (SPLC, 2005). What is
important to note here is that the National Alliance is a very well known neo-Nazi
organization in the United States (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006; Smith, 1994). In fact, it was
the leading organization of the extreme right throughout the 1990’s (Berlet & Vysotsky,
2006). The founder, William Pierce, is the author of the well-known fictional book “The
Turner Diaries” which is often attributed as having heavily influenced Timothy McVeigh
in the Oklahoma City Bombing (Stickney, 1996). Having no knowledge of RWE groups,
let alone WSM organizations, this billboard looks fairly benign to the passing citizen.
What is clear is the plausibility of a non-racist and non-prejudiced individual that is
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interested in stopping the influx of immigrants calling the phone number for the National
Alliance and supporting or even joining the organization for reasons unrelated to the race
or ethnicity of immigrants.
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Appendix B: Informational Lists
List 1: Synopses of WSM Terrorist Groups69
Aryan Nations (AN)
Founded by the recently deceased Richard Butler, Aryan Nations (AN) was
technically an organization within an organization (Balch, 2002). Started in 1978, AN
can be referred to as the “political arm” of Butler’s Church of Jesus Christ Christian
established only 5 years prior in northwestern Idaho (Balch, 2006, p. 85). The core
ideology of the group was based on the Christian Identity religion, and indeed, Butler was
a very well-known proponent of the faith having been mentored by one of the most
influential preachers in the early expansion of Identity in the United States, Wesley Swift
(Balch, 2006; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Over time the organization began to
resemble a mixed bag of WS ideology beyond Christian Identity to also include an array
of neo-Nazi and apocalyptic practices and beliefs (e.g. military uniforms, survivalist
camps and training, etc.) (ADL, 2007a; Balch, 2006). During AN’s near 30 year tenure,
the 20-acre compound in Coeur d’Alene, ID was the site of many well-attended “Aryan
World Congresses” where Butler promoted the intermingling of the various factions of
the WSM from all over the country (Balch, 2006). In fact, such congresses would often
become the meeting, and even recruiting location for other RWT organizations,
especially the Order (Balch, 2006; Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). Membership estimates
ranged from an earlier following of approximately 6,000 members in the 1980’s to a

69

Names of individual indictees are normally not mentioned in this analysis to maintain the
confidentiality/anonymity of those indicted (even though one can consider federal indictments to be public
knowledge). However, some names are occasionally mentioned where an individual is the well known
founder of an organization or the case is so very infamous that it can be assumed to be common knowledge
regarding the individuals that are responsible for the acts of terrorism (e.g. Oklahoma City Bombing
Conspirators).
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mere 1,000 members prior to its collapse in 2004 (ADL, 2007a; Balch, 2006; Smith,
1994).
Balch (2006), finds that the downfall of AN can be attributed to a combination of
external and internal factors. Externally, the organization faced a great deal of opposition
from the community and local law enforcement that started in the 1980’s and greatly
intensified during the 1990’s (2006). Internally, the 1990’s were a time of transition from
the organization’s heyday a decade before. Membership turnover took a turn for the
worse in terms of the types of individuals attracted to the organization (Balch, 2006).
According to Balch (2006), the “family atmosphere” of the 1980’s was gone leaving
room for more unsavory characters in the broader movement to join (p. 100). The
turnover extended beyond followers to the organization’s leadership as well (2006). As
new members and new leaders came into the group, internal disagreement about goals
and power increasingly became the norm (2006). Most detrimental to AN’s ability to
sustain itself had to do with both internal and external financial problems (2006).
Internally, it suffices to say that over time the organization’s expenditures outweighed its
income (2006). Externally, AN was bankrupted by a lawsuit involving compound
security guards assaulting a mother and son on the perimeter of the premises (ADL,
2007a; Balch, 2006). Membership continued to dwindle upon sale of the AN compound,
and most especially Butler’s death in 2004 (ADL, 2007; Balch, 2006). Though other
groups in the country tried to claim the namesake of the organization, AN is now defunct
(Balch, 2006).
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Aryan Republican Army (ARA)
Arguably known as one of America’s most dangerous right-wing, domestic
terrorist cells, the Aryan Republican Army was established in the living room of one of
its three founders (Hamm, 2002). Within two years the group doubled in size, and
though still small, was responsible for well over 20 violent armed robberies (some
entailing rapes and murders) spanning from coast to coast (Hamm, 2002; MIPT, 1995).
More so than many other RWT groups, the ARA was probably most diverse in terms of
member demographic and social characteristics. Nonetheless, the glue that bonded them
was their racist, neo-Nazi and skinhead ideology (Hamm, 2002, 2004). While the group
had no formal or official location of operation, a farm in northeastern Pennsylvania and
the very well-known Elohim City70 in eastern Oklahoma became places of frequent
visitation and sometimes temporary residences for all members (Hamm, 2002).
Interestingly, the ARA’s notoriety as a terrorist cell did not really come from the crimes
its members actually committed, but rather from those that some of its members were
suspected of committing (Hamm, 2002; MIPT, 1995). Some of ARA’s members, as well
as Elohim City, became major sources of legal and media attention shortly after the
Oklahoma City Bombing (Hamm, 2002; MIPT, 1995). Though never charged in
connection with America’s most violent domestically perpetrated terrorist attack, many
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Elohim City is a white supremacist, Christian Identity based community that was founded by Robert
Millar in 1973 (Shook, Delano, & Balch, 1999). Located in eastern Oklahoma and still in existence today,
Elohim City has practically become a Mecca within the broader WSM. Nearly all of the most well-known
WST organizations can be connected to Elohim City (regardless of strength of tie), though it should be
noted that Elohim City has maintained a non-criminal image (Barkun, 1997; Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995;
Gardell, 2003; Hamm, 2002; Noble, 1998; Stern, 2003). In other words, while well-known terrorists have
been connected to Elohim (e.g., Timothy McVeigh), Elohim has never been legally connected to any
incidents of crime or terrorism. Further, not all individuals within the WSM are in agreement as to
Elohim’s relationship within the broader movement. While most scholars would argue that Elohim is a part
of the movement (Hamm, 2002), some groups and individuals within the movement and within the
community itself would not classify Millar’s community the same way (Noble, 1998; Shook, et al., 1999).
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still remain highly suspicious of some of its members (Hamm, 2002). The small group
collapsed upon their arrests and later indictments by 1997 (Hamm, 2002; MIPT, 1995).

Covenant, Sword, & the Arm of the Lord (CSA)
Located in northern Arkansas near the Missouri border, the terrorist organization
that would come to be known as the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord
(CSA) initially began as a religious community (Barkun, 1997; Noble, 1998). On over
200 acres of land, the 10-15 families that made up Zarephath-Horeb church enjoyed a
“…simple…although high…” standard of living (Noble, 1998, p. 65). Coupled with
strict dietary standards that included occasional, nonetheless extreme fasting, no drinking,
no drugs, and no smoking, the ‘congregation’ met for praise meetings and Bible studies
almost daily (Noble, 1998). The group’s founder, Jim Ellison, and some of its key
leaders or elders, including Kerry Noble, soon began making new interpretations of the
Bible that would lead their group down a dark path (Noble, 1998). By 1978, the group
was fully entrenched in Christian Identity religion (Noble, 1998). Soon after, the group
changed its name to the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, and adopted very
severe anti-government, anti-Semitic, and racist beliefs (Noble, 1998).
The CSA compound quickly became a paramilitary and survivalist training camp
where its members anticipated and prepared for the inevitable and looming race war
(which even included a mock city to simulate and practice urban warfare) (Flynn &
Gerhardt, 1995; Noble, 1998; Smith, 1994). While some members had legitimate jobs in
the local industries and commerce (i.e., sawmill, Wal-Mart), the majority were supported
by less than typical means (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Noble, 1998; Smith, 1994).
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Generating the most income for the compound was the production and sale of firearms
(including semi-automatic rifles), silencers, and explosives at local gun shows (Smith,
1994). Such a locale also provided extraordinary opportunity for finding and recruiting
new likeminded members (MIPT, 1995). Ellison also encouraged his followers to engage
in mostly petty theft, as well as pawning one’s personal goods that were not key to
warfare survival (e.g., wedding bands) (Noble, 1998; Smith, 1994). All of the funds
generated through the above means were used for stockpiling remarkable amounts of
weaponry, chemicals, and explosives, as well as more benign materials like food and
first-aid (Noble, 1998).
Interestingly, and largely unknown by many, CSA also planned to bomb the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City nearly twelve years before it
actually was destroyed in the most violent domestically perpetrated terrorist incident in
US history (Noble, 1998). Though the aforementioned plans were fortunately never
executed, CSA was responsible for some devastating events. Within one year, the group
had successfully carried out the bombing of a community church known to support
homosexuality in Missouri, a Jewish community center in Indiana, the detonation of
explosives near a natural gas pipeline in Arkansas, the robbery and murder of a Jewish
pawnshop owner, and the murder of an African-American State Trooper in Arkansas
(Noble, 1998; Smith, 1994). In addition to their violent crimes, a strong link between
themselves and arguably the most violent domestic terrorist organization in the nation’s
history, known as the Order, brought a great deal of attention to their compound (Smith,
1994).
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In April of 1985, CSA’s crime spree and cross-organizational networking was
brought to a less than abrupt halt when its members finally surrendered after a four day
standoff with federal authorities (Noble, 1998). In a search of the compound that would
last days, performed by a number of law enforcement officers from various agencies,
CSA’s allegiance to starting a race war would be illustrated. Nearly 200 firearms,
including machine guns and assault rifles, as well as thousands of rounds of ammunition
for each, and massive amounts of explosives were confiscated (1998). So vast was the
amount and types of explosives found that the government carried out controlled
detonations for three days (Noble, 1998, p. 172).

Fourth Reich Skinheads
Started and based in southern California, the Fourth Reich Skinheads were
established some time in the early 1990’s by two teenagers (MIPT, 1995). Though the
ultimate size of the group remains unknown, estimates range from approximately 20 to
50 young individuals, mostly men (MIPT, 1995). Regardless of membership numbers,
court transcripts and investigation records make it clear that only a handful of individuals
were responsible for the actual incidents of terrorism (MIPT, 1995). Indeed, only two
individuals were indicted and convicted of such crimes (MIPT, 1995).
The main goal of the group was to no longer wait for the race war to begin, but
rather instigate it to begin (MIPT, 1995). Aside from the groups elaborate plots to
assassinate influential African-Americans including Reverend Al Sharpton, Rodney
King, and Louis Farrakhan, the group did bomb a few homes in minority neighborhoods,
as well as a Synagogue (MIPT, 1995). Interestingly, most of the group’s conspiring
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conversations were taped as they had been under close federal surveillance with the help
of a cooperating witness for months (MIPT, 1995). In July of 1993 Fourth Reich’s most
active members, including its main leader, were arrested and indicted (MIPT, 1995). The
government found their crimes to be so grave that the organization’s youngest member
was transferred into the adult system (MIPT, 1995).

Oklahoma City Bombing Conspirators
Undoubtedly the most widely publicized and known RWT are the perpetrators of
the tragic Oklahoma City Bombing; Timothy McVeigh, Terry Nichols, and Michael
Fortier (MIPT, 1995). Usually coined as the worst domestically perpetrated terrorist
attack in U.S. history, it is said that McVeigh’s impetus for terroristic action was the
government standoff in Waco, Texas against the Branch Davidians in 1993 (Michel &
Herbeck, 2001; MIPT, 1995). Sickened by the excessive government use of force against
the religious branch, McVeigh enlisted the help of his two friends to take action against
the government (Michel & Herbeck, 2001). It is worth noting that McVeigh’s
disapproval and hatred for the government had been growing for many years before
Waco and was brought on by a host of issues. While not an exhaustive cataloguing, some
of the more well known inciting incidents for him include having been rejected by the
Army’s elite Green Berets, his growing disdain for the government imposing more gun
control laws in the 1990’s, and especially inspiring was the now infamous fictional novel
The Turner Diaries71 (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; MIPT, 1995). Waco however, was
certainly the last straw for McVeigh, and two years of planning culminated with the
71

The Turner Diaries (MacDonald, 1996, 1978), written under the pseudonym “Andrew McDonald”, was
authored by William Pierce the founder of the RWE organization known as National Alliance. It is an
account of a violent race war that ensues in the United States (MacDonald, 1996, 1978).
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bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on the anniversary
of the Waco siege (Michel & Herbeck, 2001). The significance of the date was not lost
on anyone, especially the extreme right which seems to hold a great deal of reverence for
4/19 (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Smith, 1994). McVeigh was executed in June of 2001,
while Nichols was sentenced to natural life in prison, and Fortier cut a deal with the
government and received only 12 years imprisonment in exchange for his testimony
against his co-conspirators (MIPT, 1995).

Oklahoma Constitutional Militia (Universal Church of God)
The Oklahoma Constitutional Militia was a small, Christian Identity based cell
established by Willie Ray Lampley in 1994 (MIPT, 1995). Like many RWT
organizations, Lampley had ties to Robert Millar’s white supremacist compound known
as Elohim City in the Ozark Mountains of Eastern Oklahoma. Lampley was known to
make frequent visits there to discuss white supremacist ideology and the threat of a
Jewish led New World Order (1995). In the early 1990’s, Lampley, his wife, and two
other co-conspirators began overtly planning to bomb a number of gay bars, abortion
clinics, and offices belonging to the Southern Poverty Law Center and the AntiDefamation League as a means to carryout what he believed to be God’s punishment on
such alleged sinners (MIPT, 1995). All plans were curtailed after their arrests in 1995
(MIPT, 1995). Found in their possession was significant quantities of ammonium nitrate
and the stockpile of various weaponry (MIPT, 1995).

150
Order (Bruder Schweigen/The Silent Brotherhood)
The group known as the Order narrows the gap with McVeigh and his coconspirators for being the most notorious and violent RWT group in U.S. history. Also
like McVeigh, its founder Robert Jay Mathews was inspired by The Turner Diaries
(Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995), especially the fictional rebel organization starting the race war
which called themselves “the Order” (MacDonald, 1996, 1978, p. 73). In the Fall of
1983, Mathews had formed his Order, and even though the group had a relatively short
lifespan, they were responsible for a remarkable inventory of terroristic acts (Flynn &
Gerhardt, 1995; Smith, 1994). The majority of their crimes, and certainly what they are
best known for, were a string of armored truck armed robberies that raised upwards of $4
million dollars for the group (a great deal of the money was funneled to other WSM
organizations) (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Smith, 1994). The group was also involved in a
rather large counterfeiting operation, smaller armed robberies, and even murders,
including the assassination of Alan Berg, Denver’s Jewish radio talk show host (Flynn &
Gerhardt, 1995; Smith, 1994).
Many of its members came from Butler’s Aryan Nations (Smith, 1994). In fact,
some have considered the Order to be a radicalized, underground terrorist cell of Aryan
Nations which is entirely inaccurate considering Butler is presumed to have been
unaware of the Order’s actions (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Smith, 1994). Mathews’
innermost circle of initial members was approximately 9 individuals, though the group
would expand to nearly 30 within months (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). The Order would
weave a complicated web of network ties with other RW persons and groups nationwide
that would provide not only more criminal opportunities on a larger scale, but also shelter
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and safe house locations (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). Like Aryan Nations, the Order was a
mixed bag of WS ideology, some claiming Christian Identity or another form of Nordic
based faith (e.g. Odinism, Asatru, Paganism), whereas others were more secular in their
racist beliefs (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Gardell, 2003; Hoskins, 1990). In less than two
years, the Order was abruptly dismantled by the government with the help of an
informant that was a relatively close associate to the group though never a member
(Martinez & Guinther, 1999; Smith, 1994). While most Order members were arrested,
indicted, and convicted, Mathews’ reign ended less quietly. After a two day standoff
with federal authorities on Whidbey Island, WA, Mathews was killed in a house fire
started after federal authorities shot flares inside (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; MIPT, 1995).
Obviously no longer in existence today, many former Order members can be contacted
by mail as evidenced on their own website www.freetheorder.org (Pierce & Scutari,
2004-2006).

Order II (Bruder Schweigen Strike Force II)
As the name suggests, the group known as the Order II perceived themselves to
be an extension of Mathews’ original Order (Smith, 1994). Established in 1986 in Idaho,
the group’s membership only totaled 7 individuals, all of which were or had been
members of Aryan Nations (Smith, 1994). Further, all of the members of Order II were
not only sympathetic to the Order’s cause, but had also been friends with many of them
(Smith, 1994). The group’s leader, David Dorr, was so inspired by Mathew’s that as
Smith (Smith, 1994) states, “…the group imitated on a local scale what Mathews had
attempted nationally” (Smith, 1994, p. 79). Dorr’s Order was responsible for a least six
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bombings and at least two murders, all of which were local crimes (1994). A rather
interesting distinction for the group is that three of its members (including its founder)
appeared on Oprah to represent and defend the WSM that same year (Smith, 1994, p.
78). Also quite interesting is that as of 2006, twenty years later, Oprah had referenced
that very same show with deep regret saying that in retrospect she had done nothing but
give the WSM a platform to advertise their hateful viewpoints (Winfrey, 2006). By
1988, the group’s remaining five members (one was already in prison for unrelated
crimes, another murdered by the group presumably for snitching) were all convicted for
actions that in their eyes never came close to those of the original Order (Smith, 1994).

Phineas Priests
The Phineas Priests present an interesting predicament for law enforcement and
also distinguish themselves from other groups in this sample. The Phineas Priests are
more of an unorganized organization, what some may refer to as a group of “leaderless
resistance” (MIPT, 1995). Leaderless resistance can be described as rather small cells of
individuals, or even an individual, acting on behalf of a broader organization’s or
movement’s goals without a directive or blessing, and possibly without even their
knowledge (Blazak, 2001; MIPT, 1995). The indictees in this sample, upon arrest and
indictment, have claimed to be members of the Phineas Priesthood (Gardell, 2003; MIPT,
1995). The concept of being a Phineas Priest can be found in the Bible in Numbers 25,
though most self-proclaimed priest holders were likely inspired by Identity follower
Richard Hoskin’s book Vigilantes of Christendom (1990) (Gardell, 2003). Hoskin’s
(1990) interpretation of Numbers 25 provides Christian Identity believers with the

153
justification to commit acts of violence on others that they perceive are an abomination to
the chosen people of Israel (i.e., pure Aryans). Targets of course could include interracial
couples, abortion clinics, any ethnic or racial minorities, synagogues, etc. (Gardell, 2003;
MIPT, 1995). For the individuals in this particular cell of Phineas Priests, their actions
included bank robberies and bombings (MIPT, 1995).

White Patriot Party
Founded in 1980 by Frazier Glenn Miller, the White Patriot Party (WPP) was a
RWT organization that transitioned out of the former North Carolina Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan (MIPT, 1995; Ridgeway, 1995). Considering the violent objectives of RWT
organizations, the WPP was exceptionally large for being more than a radical social
movement group with estimations around 3,000 members (MIPT, 1995). Like his white
supremacist counterparts in the Pacific Northwest, his plan was to create an all-white
nation but instead to do so in “mother Dixie”, otherwise known as the South (Ridgeway,
1995, p. 119). Along with many other R(Miller, 2008)WT groups during this time
period, Miller’s WPP was one of the beneficiaries of the Order’s most infamous crime,
the Ukiah robbery, receiving $300,000 of the $3.6 million stolen (Flynn & Gerhardt,
1995; MIPT, 1995). The WPP was dismantled in the mid-1980’s after plans for the
assassination of Morris Dees, a famous civil rights activist for the SPLC, were discovered
(MIPT, 1995). Shortly after in 1988, Miller turned state’s evidence and testified in a
Sedition trial against more than a dozen RWT from three different RWT groups in the
United States (MIPT, 1995). After his testimony, Miller was perceived as a turncoat to
the WSM by many (MIPT, 1995). As of 2008, Frazier Glenn Miller remains
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tremendously active in the WSM and is currently campaigning in Missouri for a seat in
the United States Congress (Miller, 2007; MIPT, 1995).
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List 2: Variables
General Information
Variable 1 - - GRPNME
Group Name
Variable 2 - - RCTNME
Recruit Name
Research Question #1: Structural Characteristics
Variable 3 - - GENREC
Gender of Recruited
0=Female
1=Male
99=Unknown
Variable 4 - - DOB
Date of Birth
Variable 5 - - AGECONT
Age at Initial Contact with Movement Ideas
0=Childhood (0-12)
1=Adolescence (13-18)
2=Young adult (19-24)
3=Adult (25-40)
4=Mid-life (41 -55)
5=Retirement Age (56 and Over)
99=Unknown
*if exact year or timeframe is known record in ( ) in Excel only.
Variable 6 - - AGECONTGRP
Age at Time of Joining Group
0=Childhood (0-12)
1=Adolescence (13-18)
2=Young adult (19-24)
3=Adult (25-40)
4=Mid-life (41 -55)
5=Retirement Age (56 and Over)
99=Unknown
*if exact year or timeframe is known record in ( ) in Excel only.
Variable 7 - - GEOLOC
Geographic Location
City, State
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Variable 8 - - SOCLOC
Social Location of Initial Contact
0=Home
1=School
2=Work
3=Church
4=Neighborhood
5=Prison/Jail
6=Other
99=Unknown
Variable 9 - - RELABET
Relational Contact Between Recruited and Recruiter
0=Relative (If 1 specify relationship)
1=Schoolmate
2=Co-worker
3=Inmate
4=Friends
5=Stranger
6=Mentor
7=Other (specify)______________________
98=Not applicable
99=Unknown
Variable 10a - - TYPREC
Type of Recruitment
0=Direct (face-to-face)
If 0 Skip to 11
1=Indirect (mediated)
If 1 Skip to 10b
2=Combination (direct & indirect)
If 2 Skip to 10b
3=Self-starter
If 3 Includes Indirect Sources Skip to 10b; If No Indirect Sources Were Present Skip
to 11
99=unknown
Variable 10b - - MEDIA
Media used in Recruitment Process
0=Literature
1=Music
2=Televisual material
3=Internet
4=Combination
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
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Variable 11 - - NUMBREC
Number of Recruiters
1=1
2=2
3=3 or more
4=Self-Starter
99=Unknown
Variable 12-16 - - AGEREC (1,2,3,4,5)
Age of Recruiters
0=Childhood (0-12)
1=Adolescence (13-18)
2=Young adult (19-24)
3=Adult (25-40)
4=Mid-life (41 -55)
5=Retirement Age (56 and Over)
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
*if exact year or timeframe is known record in ( ) in Excel only.
Variable 17-21 - - GENDREC (1,2,3,4,5)
Gender of Recruiter (s)
0=Female
1=Male
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
Variable 22 - - GRPTYP
Type of Group
0=Klan
1=Christian Identity
2=National Socialist
3=Skinhead
4=Hybrid (Specify)
5=Militia/Paramilitary
99=Unknown (hard to define)
Variable 23 - - LENGREC
Length of Recruitment
(Days, Months, Years)
0=7 days or less
1=8-180 days (1 week-6 months)
2=181-365 days (6 months-1 year)
3=366-730 days (1-2 years)
4=731-1825 days (2-5 years)
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5=1826 days + (5 years +)
Variable 24 - - LEVINVOL
Level of Involvement
0=Founder
1=Leader (non-founder)
2=Core (non-leader)
3=Member (non-core)
4=Non-member (but associated with group/actions)
99=Unknown
Variable 25 a to e - - MIL
Military Background
MILEXP 25a.
Military Experience
0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown
MILBRA 25b.
Branch of Service
0=Army
1=Navy
2=Air Force
3=Marine Corps
4=Coast Guard
5=National Guard
6=Other
7=Foreign Military
8=Combination of core US branches
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
MILLEN 25c.
Length of Service
0=One year or less
1=2 years
2=3 years
3=3 or more years
98=Not Applicable
99= Unknown
MILLEAV 25d.
Reason for Leaving
0=Honorable Discharge
1=Dishonorable Discharge
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98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
MILSPTR 25e.
Special Military Training
0=paratrooper
1=military police
2=tech sergeant
3=platoon leader
4=vehicle gunner/sergeant
5=security detail/sergeant
6=small arms
7=Airborne
8=Ranger
9=Navy Seal
10=Green Beret
11=No Special Training
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
Research Question #2: Family Dynamics
Variable 1 - - MARSTAT
Marital Status
0=Single (never married)
1=Married
2=Divorced
3=Widowed
4=Co-habitating
99=Unknown
Variable 2 - - CHLD
Children
0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown
Variable 3 - - PARINVOL
Parental Involvement
0=No
1=Yes
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
Variable 4a - - FAMINVOL
Family Members Involved in WSM
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0=No
1=Yes
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
Variable 4b - - NUFAMINV
Number of Family Members Involved
1=1
2=2
3=3
4=4
5=5+
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
Variable 4c - - RELFAMINV (1,2,3,4)
Relation of Family Members Involved (up to 4)
0=Parent
1=Sibling
2=Spouse
3=Child
4=Grandparent
5=Aunt/Uncle
6=Cousin
7=Other
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
Research Question #3: Social Networks
Variable 1 - - RELABET
Relational Contact Between Recruited and Recruiter
0=Relative (If 1 specify relationship)
1=Schoolmate
2=Co-worker
3=Inmate
4=Friends
5=Stranger
6=Mentor
7=Other (specify)______________________
98=Not applicable
99=Unknown
Variable 2a - - FAMINVOL
Family Members Involved in WSM
0=No
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1=Yes
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
Variable 2b - - NUFAMINV
Number of Family Members Involved
1=1
2=2
3=3
4=4
5=5+
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
Variable 2c - - RELFAMINV (1,2,3,4)
Relation of Family Members Involved (up to 4)
0=Parent
1=Sibling
2=Spouse
3=Child
4=Grandparent
5=Aunt/Uncle
6=Cousin
7=Other
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
Variable 3 - - PRIKNOW
Prior Knowledge of WSM
0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown
Variable 4a - - PRIGROUP
Prior Extremist/Terrorist Group Membership
0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown
Variable 4b - - PRINUMB
Prior Number of Group Memberships
1=1
2=2
3=3
4=4 or more
98=Not Applicable
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99=Unknown
Variable 4c - - PRITYPES
Prior Types of Group Memberships
0=Klan
1=Christian Identity
2=National Socialist
3=Skinhead
4=Hybrid
5=Militia/Paramilitary
6=Combination (combination of 1 or more of 0-5)
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
Variable 4d - - PRILEVINV
Highest Level of Involvement in Prior Groups
0=Founder
1=Leader (non-founder)
2=Core (non-leader)
3=Member (non-core)
4=Non-member (but associated with group/actions)
5=Variety of Roles
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
Variable 5 - - CLIQUES
Whether Indictee Joined with Other(s)
0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown
Biographical Availability Variables
Variable 1 - - CURRSES
Current Socio-Economic Status
0=Upper Class
1=Middle Class
2=Working Class
3=Lower Class
99=Unknown
Variable 2 - - EDULEV
Education Level
0=less than high school
1=high school diploma or equivalency
2=some college
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3=2-year college degree
4=4-year college degree
5=graduate school
6=trade or vocational school
99=unknown
Variable 3 - - CHRUNEMP
Chronic Unemployment
0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown
*Chronic unemployment is when a person is unemployed more than 50% during their
adult years
Variable 4 - - CURROCC
Current Occupation
0=Professional and higher administrator (e.g., doctor, teacher, banker, government
official)
1=Clerical (e.g., clerk, office manager, secretary, bookkeeper)
2=Sales (e.g., Sales manager, shop owner shop assistant, buyer, insurance agent)
3=Service (e.g., restaurant owner, policeman, barber, janitor)
4=Skilled worker (e.g., foreman, motor mechanic, printer, seamstress, tool and die maker,
electrician)
5=Unskilled (e.g., laborer, porter, unskilled factory worker)
6=Farm (e.g., farmer, farm laborer, tractor driver)
7=Unemployed
99=Unknown
Variable 5 - - CURRREL
Current Religious Preference
0=Protestant
1=Catholic
2=Jewish
3=Mormon
4=other
5=None
6=Christian Identity
7=Odinism
99=Unknown
Variable 6 - - TURNPTS
Life Turning Points (e.g., recent marriage/divorce/children, job loss, relocation, family
death)
0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown
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Appendix C: Tables
Table 1: Frequencies, Research Question 1 – Structural Characteristics
Variable
Gender
Male
Female
Age at Contact with Movement Ideas
Childhood (0-12)
Adolescence (13-18)
Young Adult (19-24)
Adult (25-40)
Mid-life (41-55)
Age at Time of Joining Group
Adolescence (13-18)
Young Adult (19-24)
Adult (25-40)
Mid-life (41-55)
Retirement Age (56 +)
Social Location of Initial Contact
Home
Work
Church
Other
Relational Contact between Recruited & Recruiter
Relative
Friend
Stranger
Mentor
Other
Not Applicable
Type of Recruitment
Direct
Indirect
Combination
Self-Starter
Media Used in Recruitment Process
Literature
Televisual Material
Combination
Not Applicable
Number of Recruiters
One
Two

Frequency

%

63
3

95.5
4.5

% unknown
0
37.9

12
4
11
12
2

18.2
6.1
16.7
18.2
3.0

3
8
33
15
5

4.5
12.1
50
22.7
7.6

3

16.7
46
1
3
5

69.7
1.5
4.5
7.6
10.6

5
36
4
4
2
8

7.6
54.5
6.1
6.1
3.0
12.1
9.1

48
2
2
8

72.7
3.0
3.0
12.1
10.6

9
3
2
45

13.6
4.5
3.0
68.1
12.1

23
14

34.8
21.2
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Three +
Self-Starter
Age of Recruiter 1
Adolescence (13-18)
Adult (25-40)
Mid-life (41-55)
Retirement Age (56 +)
Not Applicable
Age of Recruiter 2
Adult (25-40)
Mid-life (41-55)
Not Applicable
Age of Recruiter 3
Adult (25-40)
Mid-life (41-55)
Retirement Age (56 +)
Not Applicable
Age of Recruiter 4
Adult (25-40)
Not Applicable
Age of Recruiter 5
Not Applicable
Gender of Recruiter 1
Male
Not Applicable
Gender of Recruiter 2
Male
Female
Not Applicable
Gender of Recruiter 3
Male
Not Applicable
Gender of Recruiter 4
Male
Not Applicable
Gender of Recruiter 5
Not Applicable
Type of Group
Christian Identity
Skinhead
Hybrid
Militia/Paramilitary
Length of Recruitment
7 days or less
1 week - 6 months

6
15

9.1
22.7
10.6

2
33
6
2
16

3.0
50
9.1
3.0
24.2
12.1

15
4
39

22.7
6.1
59.1
10.6

3
1
1
54

4.5
1.5
1.5
81.8
10.6

3
56

4.5
84.8

60

90.9

9.1
9.1
43
17

65.2
25.8

17
2
40

25.8
3.0
60.6

10.6

10.6
5
54

7.6
81.8

3
56

4.5
84.8

10.6
9.1
60

90.9

18
2
42
4

27.3
3.0
63.6
6.1

0

24.2
8
19

12.1
24.2
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6 months - 1 year
1 – 2 years
2 – 5 years
5 years +
Level of Involvement
Founder
Leader
Core
Member
Non-member but associated with group/actions
Military Experience
No
Yes
*No (22 unknowns removed)
*Yes (22 unknowns removed)
Branch of Service
Army
Navy
Air Force
Marine Corps
Combination of Core US Branches
Not Applicable
Length of Military Service
1 year or less
1-2 years
2-3 years
3 + years
Not Applicable
Reason for Leaving
Honorable Discharge
Dishonorable Discharge
Not Applicable
Special Military Training
Military Police
Tech Sergeant
Vehicle Gunner/Sergeant
Small Arms
Navy Seal
Green Beret
No Special Training
Not Applicable

14
5
4
3

21.2
7.6
6.1
4.5

9
12
20
19
3

13.6
18.2
30.3
28.8
4.5

4.5

33.3
21
23
21
23

31.8
34.8
47.8
52.3
36.4

10
4
2
2
3
21

15.2
6.1
3.0
3.0
4.5
31.8
43.9

4
1
2
9
21

6.1
1.5
3.0
13.6
31.8
42.4

14
3
21

21.2
4.5
31.8

1
1
1
2
1
1
4
25

1.5
1.5
1.5
3.0
1.5
1.5
6.1
37.9

45.5
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Table 2: Frequencies, Research Question 2 – Family Dynamics
Variable
Marital Status
Single (never married)
Married
Divorced
Co-habiting
Children
No
Yes
Parental Involvement
No
Yes
Not Applicable
Family Members Involved in WSM
No
Yes
Number of Family Members Involved in WSM
1
2
3
4
Not Applicable
Relation of Family Members Involved 1
Parent
Sibling
Spouse
Child
Grandparent
Cousin
Not Applicable
Relation of Family Member Involved 2
Parent
Sibling
Spouse
Aunt/Uncle
Other
Not Applicable
Relation of Family Member Involved 3
Sibling
Not Applicable
Relation of Family Member Involved 4
Sibling
Not Applicable

Frequency

%

12
38
10
1

18.2
57.6
15.2
1.5

19
28

28.8
42.4

% unknown
7.6

28.8
28.8
2
26
19

3.0
39.4
28.8

18
33

27.3
50

22.7
22.7
24
7
1
1
18

36.4
10.6
1.5
1.5
27.3

6
4
19
2
1
1
18

9.1
6.1
28.8
3.0
1.5
1.5
27.3

22.7

22.7
2
1
3
1
2
42

3.0
1.5
4.5
1.5
3.0
63.6
22.7

2
49

3.0
74.2
22.7

1
50

1.5
75.8
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Table 3: Frequencies, Research Question 3 – Non-familial Relationships
Variable
Relational Contact between Recruited &
Recruiter
Prior Knowledge of WSM
No
Yes
Prior Extremist/Terrorist Group Membership
No
Yes
Prior Number of Group Memberships
1
2
3
4+
Not Applicable
Prior Types of Group Memberships
Klan
Christian Identity
National Socialist
Skinhead
Hybrid (single group of many types)
Militia/Paramilitary
Combination (various group memberships)
Highest Level of Involvement in Prior Group
Founder
Leader
Core
Member
Not Applicable
Joined as Clique
No
Yes

Frequency
%
% unknown
See Research Question 1
1.5
7
58

10.6
87.9

22
43

33.3
65.2

1.5
1.5
26
9
6
2
22

39.4
13.6
9.1
3.0
33.3

3
11

4.5
16.7

3
10
2
14

4.5
15.2
3.0
21.2

1.5

1.5
4
4
7
28
22

6.1
6.1
10.6
42.4
33.3

20
42

30.3
63.6

6.1
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Table 4: Frequencies, Biographical Availability Variables
Variable
Current Socio-Economic Status
Middle Class
Working Class
Lower Class
Education Level
Less than High School
High School Diploma or Equivalency
Some College
4-Year College Degree
Trade or Vocational School
Chronic Unemployment
No
Yes
Current Occupation
Professional & Higher Administrator
Clerical
Sales
Service
Skilled Worker
Unskilled Worker
Farm
Unemployed
Retired
Current Religious Preference
Christian Identity
Odinism
Other
None
Life Turning Points
No
Yes

Frequency

%

16
15
24

24.2
22.7
36.4

% unknown
16.7

27.3
10
15
15
6
2

15.2
22.7
22.7
9.1
3.0

31
8

47
12.1

40.9
34.8
3
7
2
11
7
3
1
8
1

4.5
10.6
3.0
16.7
10.6
4.5
1.5
12.1
1.5
34.8

36
1
1
4

54.5
1.5
1.5
6.1

3
23

4.5
34.8

60.6

